Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Alexander was approximately twelve years old, he was placed in a program with Envisions of Norfolk, Inc. The juvenile court ordered that Alexander remain in the Envisions program until further order of the court. Less than two months later, Alexander was moved into a new foster home without further order of the court and without notice. The juvenile court found the Department of Health and Human Services and Nebraska Families Collaborative in contempt of court and ordered them to pay a fine of $5,000 or purge the contempt by complying with certain conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding the Department to be in contempt of court; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction. View "In re Interest of Zachary D." on Justia Law

Rhonda was the mother and sole surviving parent of Benjamin, a twenty-two-year-old incapacitated adult. Rhonda filed a petition for the appointment of a guardian for Benjamin and nominated herself as guardian. The county court appointed an unrelated individual as Benjamin’s guardian without making findings or providing an explanation for passing over Rhonda. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appointment was arbitrary and capricious, as the county court appointed the unrelated individual as Benjamin’s guardian without specific findings, any explanation for bypassing Rhonda’s statutory priority for appointment, or any reason readily apparent in the evidentiary record. View "In re Guardianship of Benjamin E." on Justia Law

Mother, on behalf of her minor child, filed a petition for a domestic abuse protection order against Father. The district court issued an ex parte domestic abuse protection order. The evidence against Father included text messages with vulgar language and name calling. Upon a show cause hearing on the ex parte order, the district court upheld its domestic abuse protection order. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court incorrectly granted a domestic abuse protection order, as Father’s conduct did not fit within the statutory definition of “abuse”; and (2) because the case was tried on the domestic abuse theory, Mother could not change to a harassment theory on appeal. View "Linda N. v. William N." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and as guardians and next friends on behalf of their seven minor children, sued the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), several DHHS employees in their official and individual capacities, and the children’s guardian ad litem, alleging that over the course of the juvenile proceedings involving their oldest three children, Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights had been violated. The district court sustained Defendants’ motions do dismiss, concluding (1) Defendants were entitled to sovereign, qualified, absolute, and statutory immunities; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims against the DHHS employees in their individual capacities were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing the claims against the DHHS, the DHHS employees in their official capacities, and the guardian ad litem on the basis that they were immune from Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims; and (2) did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against the DHHS employees in their individual capacities on the grounds that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "Anthony K. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

After Plaintiffs’ oldest three children were removed from Plaintiffs' care and eventually reunified with them, Plaintiffs, individually and as guardians and next friends on behalf of their seven minor children, sued the State, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and several DHHS employees. The case was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. In the complaint, Plaintiffs sought general and special damages for violations of their constitutionally protected rights to familial integrity, due process, and equal protection. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, concluding (1) only the State had been properly served; (2) the State was entitled to sovereign immunity as to Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims that requested monetary damages; and (3) the State was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly dismissed DHHS and the DHHS employees for lack of proper service of process; (2) correctly determined that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiffs’ claims against the State for monetary damages under section 1983; and (3) erred in not granting the State’s motion to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action but achieved the same result by dismissing all remaining causes of action against the State on summary judgment. View "Anthony K. v. State" on Justia Law

Father had custody of his three minor children that were “Indian children” within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA). The children were adjudicated as being within Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) because they lacked proper parental care. The juvenile court determined that it was in the children’s best interests for Father to have only physical custody and awarded legal custody of the children to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred by not addressing at the dispositional hearing whether the State made “active efforts,” as required by ICWA/NICWA, to return the children’s legal custody to Father. The State appealed, arguing that the “active efforts” standard did not apply to the disposition in this case, but rather, the “reasonable efforts” standard applicable in cases involving non-Indian children applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that at any point in an involuntary juvenile proceeding involving Indian children at which a party is required to demonstrate its efforts to reunify or prevent the breakup of the family, the “active efforts” standard of ICWA/NICWA applies. View "In re Interest of Shayla H." on Justia Law

In 2010, the district court for Boone County issued a default judgment of paternity against the father of a child born out of wedlock. In 2013, the mother filed a complaint for custody in the district court for Madison County, where all parties lived. The district court for Madison County ultimately dismissed the case and vacated its prior orders, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the child’s paternity had been decided by the district court for Boone County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the district court for Boone County did not transfer the cause or otherwise relinquish its continuing jurisdictional priority, the district court did not err in vacating its orders and dismissing the complaint. View "Charleen J. v. Blake O." on Justia Law

Upon the divorce of Mother and Father, Mother was awarded custody of the parties’ two children, and Father was granted parenting time. Thereafter, Mother joined the military and was assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia for a one-year period. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-2929.01, which affords procedural protections in cases involving child custody and parenting time to military parents affected by mobilization or deployment, the district court permitted the children to relocate to Georgia with Mother for the remainder of her temporary assignment. Father appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Legislature did not intend for appellate review of truly temporary orders entered pursuant to section 43-2929.01(4)(a), and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Huskey v. Huskey" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to his daughter based on Father’s abandonment of the child. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to his daughter, finding clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the child and that termination was in the child’s best interests. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Father intentionally abandoned the child due to Father’s lack of absolute certainty concerning paternity and his incarceration while awaiting trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence supported the finding of abandonment because Father was initially involved in his daughter’s life but later demonstrated no interest in her or in exercising parental responsibilities; and (2) the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of Father’s parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests. View "In re Interest of Gabriella H." on Justia Law

Connor was born out of wedlock to Blake and Amanda and given Amanda’s maiden surname. Amanda was granted sole legal and physical custody of Connor. Amanda subsequently married and changed her surname to that of her husband. Thereafter, both Amanda and Blake sought to change Connor’s surname - Blake proposing his surname and Amanda proposing her married surname. The district court entered an order changing Connor’s surname to Blake’s surname, giving preference to the paternal surname and using a “substantial evidence” standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court applied an incorrect burden of proof, as the child’s best interests is the controlling standard; (2) the district court wrongfully gave preference to the surname of Blake because no automatic preference as to the surname of a child born in wedlock exists in Nebraska law; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to show that a change to either Blake’s surname or Amanda’s married surname would promote his best interests. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Connor H." on Justia Law