Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiffs’ oldest three children were removed from Plaintiffs' care and eventually reunified with them, Plaintiffs, individually and as guardians and next friends on behalf of their seven minor children, sued the State, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and several DHHS employees. The case was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. In the complaint, Plaintiffs sought general and special damages for violations of their constitutionally protected rights to familial integrity, due process, and equal protection. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, concluding (1) only the State had been properly served; (2) the State was entitled to sovereign immunity as to Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims that requested monetary damages; and (3) the State was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly dismissed DHHS and the DHHS employees for lack of proper service of process; (2) correctly determined that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiffs’ claims against the State for monetary damages under section 1983; and (3) erred in not granting the State’s motion to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action but achieved the same result by dismissing all remaining causes of action against the State on summary judgment. View "Anthony K. v. State" on Justia Law

Father had custody of his three minor children that were “Indian children” within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA). The children were adjudicated as being within Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) because they lacked proper parental care. The juvenile court determined that it was in the children’s best interests for Father to have only physical custody and awarded legal custody of the children to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred by not addressing at the dispositional hearing whether the State made “active efforts,” as required by ICWA/NICWA, to return the children’s legal custody to Father. The State appealed, arguing that the “active efforts” standard did not apply to the disposition in this case, but rather, the “reasonable efforts” standard applicable in cases involving non-Indian children applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that at any point in an involuntary juvenile proceeding involving Indian children at which a party is required to demonstrate its efforts to reunify or prevent the breakup of the family, the “active efforts” standard of ICWA/NICWA applies. View "In re Interest of Shayla H." on Justia Law

In 2010, the district court for Boone County issued a default judgment of paternity against the father of a child born out of wedlock. In 2013, the mother filed a complaint for custody in the district court for Madison County, where all parties lived. The district court for Madison County ultimately dismissed the case and vacated its prior orders, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the child’s paternity had been decided by the district court for Boone County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the district court for Boone County did not transfer the cause or otherwise relinquish its continuing jurisdictional priority, the district court did not err in vacating its orders and dismissing the complaint. View "Charleen J. v. Blake O." on Justia Law

Upon the divorce of Mother and Father, Mother was awarded custody of the parties’ two children, and Father was granted parenting time. Thereafter, Mother joined the military and was assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia for a one-year period. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-2929.01, which affords procedural protections in cases involving child custody and parenting time to military parents affected by mobilization or deployment, the district court permitted the children to relocate to Georgia with Mother for the remainder of her temporary assignment. Father appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Legislature did not intend for appellate review of truly temporary orders entered pursuant to section 43-2929.01(4)(a), and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Huskey v. Huskey" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to his daughter based on Father’s abandonment of the child. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to his daughter, finding clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the child and that termination was in the child’s best interests. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Father intentionally abandoned the child due to Father’s lack of absolute certainty concerning paternity and his incarceration while awaiting trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence supported the finding of abandonment because Father was initially involved in his daughter’s life but later demonstrated no interest in her or in exercising parental responsibilities; and (2) the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of Father’s parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests. View "In re Interest of Gabriella H." on Justia Law

Connor was born out of wedlock to Blake and Amanda and given Amanda’s maiden surname. Amanda was granted sole legal and physical custody of Connor. Amanda subsequently married and changed her surname to that of her husband. Thereafter, both Amanda and Blake sought to change Connor’s surname - Blake proposing his surname and Amanda proposing her married surname. The district court entered an order changing Connor’s surname to Blake’s surname, giving preference to the paternal surname and using a “substantial evidence” standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court applied an incorrect burden of proof, as the child’s best interests is the controlling standard; (2) the district court wrongfully gave preference to the surname of Blake because no automatic preference as to the surname of a child born in wedlock exists in Nebraska law; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to show that a change to either Blake’s surname or Amanda’s married surname would promote his best interests. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Connor H." on Justia Law

In 2009, Bonnie Nichols and Margie Nichols were married in Iowa. In 2012, Bonnie filed a complaint in a Nebraska court to dissolve the union. Margie filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that a Nebraska court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex marriage. The district court granted Margie’s motion to dismiss for subject matter jurisdiction. The district court’s order purported to dismiss Bonnie’s complaint if Bonnie failed to amend it within fifteen days. Bonnie did not file an amended complaint, and the district court did not enter a judgment dismissing the action. Bonnie appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Bonnie appealed from a conditional order and not a final judgment, and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.View "Nichols v. Nichols" on Justia Law

After mother remarried, she petitioned for the termination of Father’s parental rights to the parties’ minor child. The county court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights, concluding that termination was in the child’s best interests and that one of more of the grounds in Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292 existed in support of termination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err by (1) not addressing the county court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for Father; and (2) finding the evidence sufficient to terminate Father’s parental rights under section 43-292.View "Wayne G. v. Jacqueline W." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of Son and had joint legal custody of Son. Since his birth, Son lived primarily with Mother. In 2001, Mother married Stepfather. In 2013, Father filed a complaint to modify, seeking sole custody of Son. In his complaint, Father alleged there had been a material change in circumstance because Stepfather had been deported to Mexico and Mother wished to join him in Mexico with Son. Mother filed a countercomplaint seeking to permanently remove Son to Mexico. The district court granted summary judgment for Father on Mother’s countercomplaint, finding that Mother’s reason for removal was not legitimate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in determining that Mother’s desire to live with Stepfather in Mexico was not a legitimate reason for removal as a matter of law. Remanded.View "Daniels v. Maldonado-Morin" on Justia Law

Mother and Father had a son while they were married. Mother filed for divorce, and a decree and parenting plan awarded sole primary and legal custody to Mother. Father was awarded visitation and ordered to pay $500 per month in child support. Father later filed a second amended application for modification, alleging a material change in circumstances for various reasons, including his unemployment and his relocation to Kansas. Following a trial, the district court found a material change in circumstances, made changes to the parties’ parenting time, and reduced Father’s child support obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) its order regarding visitation transportation; (2) reducing and in calculating Father’s child support obligation; and (3) awarding Mother attorney fees.View "Garza v. Garza" on Justia Law