Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After B.M. was born in 1994, Brian F. signed an acknowledgement of paternity stating that he was the biological father of B.M. In 1996, a decree of paternity established Brian F. as the legal father of the child and ordered him to pay child support. More than a dozen years later, Brian sought to reduce or terminate his child support obligation. During the course of the modification proceedings, genetic testing results revealed that Brian was not B.M.’s biological father. Based on the results of the genetic testing, the district court converted the action to modify child support to a disestablishment action and terminated Brian’s child support obligation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in treating this modification of child support proceeding as a successful challenge to the acknowledgment, setting aside the finding of paternity, and terminating Brian’s child support obligation. Remanded.View "State ex rel. B.M. v. Brian F." on Justia Law

Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce from Wife. Before trial, the parties negotiated a settlement, and Wife’s attorney drafted a decree. Wife, however, refused to sign the decree, and Husband filed a motion to compel. At a hearing on the motion to compel, the district court signed and entered a copy of the drafted decree, which had not been signed by either party. Wife subsequently filed a motion to vacate. The district court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Wife’s amended motion to vacate the judgment, as (1) although the decree was not signed by Wife, it was drafted by Wife’s attorney, and, at the motion to compel hearing, Wife presented no evidence that she had changed her mind about or disagreed with the settlement; and (2) Wife’s remaining assignment of error was waived. View "Kibler v. Kibler" on Justia Law

In 2011, the district court filed a decree dissolving the marriage of Brenda Rice and Dale Rice that incorporated a property settlement agreement (“agreement”) previously entered into by the parties. Dale died one week later. At the time of his death, Dale owned two life insurance policies, both of which listed Brenda as the primary beneficiary. Brenda subsequently filed claims for the proceeds of the policies. The personal representative of Dale’s estate moved to enforce the dissolution decree, claiming that under the agreement, Brenda relinquished her beneficiary interests in the life insurance policies. The district court ordered Brenda to withdraw her claims under the policies and to renounce her rights to any property or interest in Dale’s estate and proceeds from any insurance policies on Dale’s life. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, Brenda relinquished all rights to Dale’s life insurance policies in the agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce decree; and (2) therefore, the district court did not err when it enforced the dissolution decree and ordered Brenda to withdraw claims to Dale’s life insurance policies.View "Rice v. Web" on Justia Law

Nicole and Sandra were removed from their family home in 2011 due to its unsanitary condition. The children were later adjudicated and moved to a foster placement. The Department of Health and Human Services’ case plans focused on the unsanitary home condition, as well as Mother and Father’s parenting skills and abuse allegations. In 2013, after a trial, the county court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the county court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights, as the State rebutted the presumption that Mother was a fit parent and that it was in the children’s best interests for Mother’s rights to remain intact; but (2) reversed the order terminating Father’s parental rights, as the State did not rebut the presumption that Father was a fit parent.View "In re Interest of Nicole M." on Justia Law

The State petitioned to remove Mother’s two daughters, age fourteen and age eleven, from Mother’s home and to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the girls. The juvenile court found that the children came within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-292(1) (abandonment) and (9) (aggravated circumstances) insofar as Mother was concerned, but the court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights to the two girls was not in the girls’ best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not commit plain error in finding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. View "In re Interest of Justine J." on Justia Law

The State filed an amended petition seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights to her three minor children, alleging the children were within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292(2) because Mother had substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected and refused to give necessary parental care and protection. The juvenile court ordered the children to remain in the temporary custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, finding that the State had failed to present a prima facie case that termination of Mother’s parental rights was appropriate under section 43-292(2). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Mother’s noncompliance with voluntary State-offered services was not acceptable evidence to be used to satisfy the requirements of section 43-292(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State made at least a prima facie case that the requirements of section 43-292(2) were met due to Mother’s history of drug use and improper supervision. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Joseph S." on Justia Law

Orfa Torres applied for a domestic abuse protection order against her boyfriend, Benjamin Morales. The district court issued an order to show case. After a hearing, the district court vacated its order to show cause, dismissed the case, and required Torres to pay the costs of the action. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order dismissing the cause, holding that the district court did not err in failing to issue the protection order because Torres did not provide some evidence of abuse as defined under Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-903(1); and (2) reversed the portion of the order requiring Torres to pay costs, holding that because the facts in Torres’s affidavit were not false and the order was not sought in bad faith, the district court erred in taxing costs to Torres. View "Torres v. Morales" on Justia Law

Mother and Father, who were not married, had a relationship during which Mother became pregnant. Mother sought to place the child up for adoption. Father attempted to prevent the adoption proceedings by filing an amended petition to establish the necessity of his consent to the adoption. The county court granted summary judgment for Mother, determining that Father did not comply with Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-104.02 by objecting to the adoption within five business days of the child’s birth. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the county court held (1) Mother intentionally hid the child’s birth from Father and was therefore equitably estopped from relying on the five-day time limit for objections; and (2) Father’s consent to any proposed adoption of the child was required. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court did not err in finding (1) Mother failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father neglected or abandoned the child; (2) Mother did not prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) Mother’s conduct excused Father’s failure to provide reasonable financial support for Mother and the child and reasonable financial support during Mother’s pregnancy. View "Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D." on Justia Law

In 2008, the district court entered a decree of dissolution of Father and Mother’s marriage and granted legal custody of Jakob, the parties’ child, to Father. In 2010, Father filed a complaint to modify the decree of dissolution and the parenting plan, seeking to be allowed to move from Nebraska to Texas for better career opportunities. After a bench trial, the district court denied Father’s request, finding that Father failed to meet his burden of showing that he had a legitimate reason to relocate and that the relocation was in the best interests of Jakob. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court plainly erred on the removal issue, as there was a legitimate reason for removal, and the removal was in Jakob’s best interests. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not plainly err in determining that Father failed to prove that moving to Texas was in Jakob’s best interests. Remanded. View "Steffy v. Steffy" on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Child under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) because of parental neglect. Because Mother was making poor progress toward the goal of reunification, the State moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Before the termination hearing began, Mother’s attorney asked the court for leave to withdraw. The juvenile court allowed the attorney to withdraw because Mother had not communicated with him. The court then terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child. Mother appealed, arguing that by allowing her attorney to withdraw before the termination hearing began, the juvenile court denied her due process. The Supreme Court vacated the court’s order, holding (1) a juvenile court may not permit an attorney to withdraw from representing a parent at a termination hearing for lack of communication unless the attorney shows that he or she has provided notice of an intent to withdraw or made diligent efforts to do so; and (2) the court’s procedures in this case denied Mother due process at the termination hearing. Remanded for a new termination hearing. View "In re Landon H." on Justia Law