Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was a pregnant sixteen-year-old who sought authorization for an abortion with consent of a parent or guardian. In general, an abortion can only be performed on a unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen with the consent of both the pregnant woman and one of her parents or a legal guardian. The district court denied Petitioner's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a waiver of consent under the provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-6903(3) for abuse or neglect by a parent or guardian, the pregnant woman must establish that a parent or guardian has abused or neglected her; (2) Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that she was a victim of abuse or neglect under section 71-6903(3); and (3) Petitioner failed to establish that was sufficiently mature and well informed to decide on her own whether to have an abortion. View "In re Petition of Anonymous 5" on Justia Law

Michael and April are the biological parents of Avalyn, born out of wedlock in 2002. A court ordered Michael to pay child support but did not order visitation. In 2005, the state took temporary emergency custody of Avalyn after April attempted suicide. The county sought an adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), but did not give Michael notice. Avalyn was placed in foster care with her maternal grandmother in April’s home. Michael claims that because he was paying support through the state, caseworkers knew or should have known how to contact him. About six months after the disposition he received notice and intervened. The court placed Avalyn with Michael until November 2007, when the parties stipulated that Avalyn should be placed with April but divide her time between her parents. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Michael alleged that in failing to notify him of the juvenile proceedings, the defendants interfered with constitutional rights to familial integrity, substantive due process, and equal protection and that the Nebraska statutes were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that claims against state defendants for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity; qualified immunity shielded employees from liability in their individual capacities because they did not violate a clearly established right. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not barred. In a juvenile proceeding alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard for a child’s known adjudicated or biological father who is providing substantial and regular financial support; the statutes at issue are not facially unconstitutional, but cannot be constitutionally applied to avoid notification. View "Michael E. v. State" on Justia Law

Child was born out of wedlock to Mother in 2005. Six years later, Sherman filed an amended complaint seeking to establish paternity both as an individual and behalf of Child as "next friend." Alternatively, Sherman asserted that Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1411 denied him due process and equal protection. The district court dismissed the amended complaint filed by Sherman as an individual as untimely and dismissed the amended complaint as to Sherman's filing as the next friend of Child, determining that suit may be brought on behalf of a child as next friend only when the child lacks a guardian. The court made no findings as to Sherman's constitutional claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's dismissal of Sherman's constitutional claims, holding that Sherman's complaint stated plausible due process and equal protection claims, and the factual allegations suggested the existence of the elements required to show both a due process and an equal protection violation; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Sherman T. v. Karen N." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff's former husband filed for dissolution, the parties reconciled and entered into two postmarital agreements specifying how their property would be divided in the event of a future dissolution. The district court approved the agreements and dismissed the dissolution proceeding. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second dissolution proceeding. On the advice of Defendants, certain attorneys and law firms, Plaintiff accepted a settlement proposal from her former husband based upon the postmarital agreements approved in the first dissolution action. The marriage was then dissolved. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants were negligent in advising her to accept the settlement proposal. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the actions of Defendants were not the proximate cause of any damage to Plaintiff, and even if Defendants breached the standard of care, Plaintiff could not have received a more favorable settlement in the second dissolution proceeding because the court was bound to enforce the order in the first dissolution proceeding under the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment in the first proceeding had preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata. View "Young v. Govier & Milone, LLP" on Justia Law

Shawna was the biological mother of two girls and two boys, all of whom were under fifteen years old. After an amended petition was filed by the State, the juvenile court found that all four children were within Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) due to the faults and habits of Shawna and her husband and ordered the children to remain in the temporary care of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services for placement. Shawna challenged only the juvenile court's adjudication of her two sons, arguing that because the boys were not residing with her, they were not at risk of harm and did not fall within the meaning of section 435-247(3)(a). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court pertaining to the two boys, holding that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an adjudication of the boys. View "In re Justine J." on Justia Law

In 1985, Husband and Wife obtained a certificate of marriage form from the county court and participated in a wedding ceremony officiated by the county judge. In 2012, Husband brought this declaratory judgment action asking the district court to declare that no marriage ever existed because the section of the certificate of marriage form entitled "return of marriage ceremony certificate" was not completed and was never filed with the bureau of vital statistics. The district court found that a valid marriage existed between Husband and Wife and awarded attorney fees to Wife. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that all statutory requirements were met in this case and that the marriage of Husband and Wife was valid. View "Vlach v. Vlach" on Justia Law

In 1996, the district court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff child support. In 2006, the court issued a writ of execution against Defendant's unspecified property to satisfy the child support lien. However, Defendant had conveyed the property to his girlfriend by quitclaim deed. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a second praecipe for an execution on Defendant's property, seeking an execution sale of the property that Defendant had previously owned and alleging that when the quitclaim conveyances were made, the property was subject to her lien. The court ordered the sheriff to execute on the property, and the sheriff sold the property to Plaintiff. John McWilliams challenged the sale, alleging that when the court issued the writ of execution, he was the record owner, and therefore, the court could not order the sheriff to conduct the execution sale because the property was not titled in Defendant's name. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order confirming the sale, holding that the court lacked authority to order the sheriff to levy the writ on property in which Defendant, the judgment debtor, no longer had an interest, absent any finding that Defendant's transfer of the property was fraudulent. Remanded. View "Fox v . Whitbeck" on Justia Law

After the dissolution of her marriage to Father, Mother sought a modification of child custody and related matters. Father was personally served but defaulted. The district court first entered a default modification order. The court subsequently entered a second order vacating the first order based on the fact that Father was not given notice of the default hearing. Mother appealed, contending that the second order was an abuse of discretion. Father cross-appealed, challenging the first order. The Supreme Court dismissed Father's cross-appeal and affirmed the district court's order vacating the first order, holding (1) because the first order was a final order from which Father did not timely appeal, Father could not use his cross-appeal to attack it; and (2) precedent does not forbid a court from promptly vacating a default modification order for failure to comply with an approved local district court rule requiring notice of the motion for default. View "Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

The marriage of Mother and Father was dissolved by consent decree in 2010. The decree required Father to pay child support and to be responsible for half of the parties' child's extraordinary expenses. Father subsequently became unemployed and filed a petition to modify the decree. Following a hearing, the court reduced Father's child support obligation and responsibility for some expenses and left Father responsible for fifty percent of extraordinary expenses but modified the provision addressing these expenses to require Father to contribute only to the expenses of which he approved. The Supreme Court affirmed the modification of the parties' dissolution decree, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that it had power to modify the extraordinary expenses provision of the parties' divorce decree; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a change in circumstances sufficient to reduce Father's child support and childcare contribution percentage; and (3) it was not an abuse of discretion to modify the extraordinary expenses provision to require Father's approval. View "Caniglia v. Caniglia" on Justia Law

Rylee, age sixteen, was nonverbal and autistic. A juvenile petition was filed because Rylee was excessively absent from school. The State placed no fault on Lisa, Rylee's mother. The juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Rylee as a child defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). As part of the adjudication, Lisa was ordered to complete a pretreatment assessment and to sign releases of information to allow the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) an opportunity to access information from her therapist and treatment providers. Lisa appealed, challenging the reasonableness of the juvenile court's order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decision of the juvenile court ordering Lisa to submit to a pretreatment assessment and to sign releases of information to allow the DHHS to access her mental health information was unreasonable. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Rylee S." on Justia Law