Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Randal R. was the father of Ryder J. The State twice charged Randal for abusing Crue J., Ryder's half brother who was not related to Randal. Randal pled no contest both times. The State moved to terminate Randal's parental rights to Ryder, arguing that the repeated abuse of Crue was grounds for termination even though Randal never abused Ryder. Following trial, the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, terminated Randal's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient statutory grounds existed for the termination; and (2) the State proved that Randal was an unfit parent and termination was in Ryder's best interests. View "In re Ryder J." on Justia Law

After the Department of Health and Human Services took custody of Child, Mother filed a motion to require the Department to accept her voluntary relinquishment of Child. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. On the same date, the court entered an order overruling Mother's motion to require the Department to accept her relinquishment. Because the court had terminated Mother's parental rights, it found the relinquishment motion was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the juvenile court should have ordered the Department to accept relinquishment of Mother's parental rights, the relinquishment was moot; and (2) the juvenile court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights. View "In re Elizabeth S." on Justia Law

Grandmother and Grandfather filed a petition for adoption seeking to adopt Child. Grandfather had dementia, so Father, who was Child's father and Grandparents' son, sought to participate in the adoption proceedings on Grandfather's behalf and object to his mental capacity to pursue the adoption. After a hearing, the county court entered an order finding that Father did not have standing in the adoption case. At issue on appeal was whether Father could stand as Grandfather's "next friend" and participate in the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction because Father's appeal was not taken from a final, appealable order; (2) Father could not appeal on his own behalf because he had asserted no personal stake in the controversy; and (3) Father could not appeal on Grandfather's behalf because the court's dismissal of Father did not affect any of Grandfather's substantial rights. View "In re Adoption of Amea R." on Justia Law

Two children were adjudicated and placed in the care and custody of their paternal Grandparents after their parents neglected them. Grandparents were eventually appointed the children's guardians. Subsequently, the children's Father, after completing drug court and obtaining counseling, sought to have the guardianship terminated and his children returned to him. The county court, finding that Father was not an unfit parent, ordered that the guardianship terminate. Grandparents appealed, arguing that the county court erred in incorrectly placing the burden of proof upon them instead of upon Father and applying the incorrect standard of proof in focusing upon parental unfitness instead of the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court (1) correctly applied the parental preference principle, which serves to establish a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by reuniting the child with his or her parent, and properly reasoned that the guardianship should be terminated in the absence of clear and convincing evidence by the Grandparents that Father was an unfit parent; and (2) correctly concluded that given the evidence, Father had not been proved unfit. View "In re Lakota Z." on Justia Law

Thomas M. was adjudicated to be a juvenile who had committed acts which would constitute a felony and misdemeanors and who was mentally ill and dangerous. The juvenile court ordered Thomas to be placed in the custody of DHHS and committed to detention. The court then ordered DHHS to identify appropriate placement, including counseling, for Thomas. The court subsequently found DHHS in contempt of the order. In a second order, the court stated that DHHS would be in contempt of court if it did not provide satisfactory evidence that certain future billings related to Thomas' placement were timely paid. DHHS appealed both orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the issues surrounding the first order were moot but could be considered under the public interest exception; and (2) the second order was not a final, appealable order because it did not affect a substantial right of DHHS. View "In re Interest of Thomas M." on Justia Law

Susan Schwerdtfeger became pregnant by in vitro fertilization, and after giving birth, she and Teri Latham lived with the child for five years. The parties then separated and Latham moved out of the home. After Latham's visitation with the child stopped, Latham brought an action seeking custody and visitation, alleging that she had standing based on the doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Schwerdtfeger and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it concluded that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not apply to the facts of this case, and therefore, Latham had standing to seek custody and visitation of the child; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact whether Latham should be granted custody and/or visitation of the child. View "Latham v. Schwerdtfeger" on Justia Law

In preparation for filing for a dissolution action, Elizabeth Johnson prepared several documents, including a petition for dissolution, a voluntary appearance for her then-husband, Kari Johnson, and a proposed dissolution decree. Kari signed the voluntary appearance and proposed decree. Elizabeth filed the petition for dissolution and Kari's voluntary appearance in the district court. The district court held a hearing that Kari did not attend, but the court found that the voluntary appearance signed by Kari established personal jurisdiction. The district court entered the decree, which required Kari to pay child support and alimony to Elizabeth. Kari moved to vacate the decree of dissolution, arguing that the decree was void because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Kari when Elizabeth failed to serve Kari with process and Kari never waived service. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the voluntary appearance waived service, and thus, the court had jurisdiction. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved pursuant to a decree of dissolution, which included a provision providing that Husband was awarded a profit-sharing plan, and Wife was awarded a portion of the plan. By 2008, when no QDRO had been entered to facilitate transfer of the funds, the district court entered an amended QDRO, which awarded Wife interest on her portion from 2006 to 2008. The court of appeals affirmed. During the appeal process, Wife did not execute on the QDRO. Wife then filed motions to reopen the case and to enter an amended QDRO, arguing that the QDRO should provide for interest that had accrued during the appeal of the prior orders. The district court ordered the case reopened and entered an amended QDRO that provided for interest from the date of the decree of dissolution through the 2010 date of the hearing on the motions. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it extended Wife's award of postjudgment interest through the 2010 date because Wife was entitled to postjudgment interest from the date of the decree until she received her share of the profit-sharing plan. View "Fry v. Fry" on Justia Law

After Alicia L. gave birth to Jaime, Cesar C. and Alicia signed an acknowledgment of paternity form acknowledging that Cesar was Jaime's biological father. The signatures were notarized. Cesar and Jaime lived together for two years. Cesar filed a complaint to establish paternity, custody, and child support with respect to Jaime. Cesar then filed a motion for temporary custody, which the court granted. After genetic testing excluded Cesar as being Jaime's biological father and after Alicia filed a separate complaint, the court awarded custody of Jaime to Alicia based on its application of the parental preference doctrine. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the district court erred when it failed to give proper legal effect to the notarized acknowledgment of paternity. In the absence of a successful challenge directed at the acknowledgment, the acknowledgment had the effect of establishing that Cesar was the legal father of Jaime and matters of custody and child support should have been considered within this legal framework. Remanded. View "Cesar C. v. Alicia L." on Justia Law

Jamyia, a minor child of Navajo decent, was removed from her parents' home after doctors discovered that Jamyia suffered injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. The juvenile court entered a dispositional order that terminated the parents' parental rights. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the State had not proved it made active efforts pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1505(4) to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts had been unsuccessful; and (2) the State was required to provide active efforts to both parents to prevent the breakup of the family within the meaning of the statute when aggravated circumstances were present. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to reach the active efforts issue, and it erred when it reversed the juvenile court's determination that the State had satisfied the statute before terminating the parents' parental rights. View "In re Interest of Jamyia M." on Justia Law