Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An 11-year-old child with significant disabilities, including autism and other disorders, attended a public elementary school where staff were aware of his special needs and history of leaving school grounds when unsupervised. Despite this knowledge, the child was left alone multiple times, and on May 17, 2021, he walked out of the school unattended and was never seen again. His mother, acting as his legal guardian, alleged that the school district and staff negligently supervised her son, leading to his disappearance and likely death or serious harm. She also claimed severe emotional distress resulting from the incident.The mother filed suit in the District Court for Sarpy County under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), naming the school district and three staff members as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by sovereign immunity under the PSTCA’s due care and discretionary function exemptions, and that the complaint failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the motion, finding both exemptions applied and that the emotional distress claim was either barred or insufficiently pled. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, based solely on the complaint’s allegations and reasonable inferences, it could not determine whether the PSTCA exemptions applied, as a more developed factual record was needed. The court also found the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims for negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larsen v. Sarpy Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 77-0027" on Justia Law

After the Nebraska Legislature enacted L.B. 77, which allowed concealed carry without a permit and limited local regulation of weapons, the mayor of Lincoln issued an executive order prohibiting weapons in city-owned properties. This order was quickly amended but maintained similar restrictions, including criminal and civil penalties for violations. Several longstanding city ordinances also regulated firearms and other weapons, such as prohibiting weapons in parks, requiring reporting of firearm sales, and banning certain devices and knives. The Nebraska Firearms Owners Association (NFOA) and four individual plaintiffs, all regular concealed carriers, alleged that these local measures conflicted with state law and deterred them from activities they would otherwise pursue, such as carrying firearms in parks or purchasing certain items.The plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for Lancaster County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The City moved to dismiss, arguing lack of standing. The district court dismissed the case entirely, finding that neither the NFOA nor the individuals had standing because none had been prosecuted or directly affected by enforcement of the challenged laws. The court relied on federal precedent, including Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, but concluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were too speculative or abstract.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the NFOA lacked associational standing because it failed to allege its authority to represent its members. However, the individual plaintiffs had standing to challenge the executive order and most ordinances, as they alleged a credible and imminent threat of prosecution sufficient for a preenforcement challenge. The court affirmed the dismissal as to the NFOA and the challenge to the vehicle storage ordinance, but reversed and remanded as to the individual plaintiffs’ challenges to the executive order and other ordinances. View "Nebraska Firearms Owners Assn. v. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

Two landowners initiated mandamus actions challenging an order issued by a local natural resources district (NRD) that permanently reduced certified irrigated acres on their properties under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act. One party, a corporation, owned the affected real estate at the time the administrative proceeding began, while the other acquired ownership only after the proceeding and subsequent appeals had concluded. The NRD’s order stemmed from findings that flow meters on wells had been tampered with, violating district rules. Notice of the proceeding was served on the original landowners and published in local newspapers, but not directly on the corporation.The District Court for Harlan County reviewed the case. It dismissed related declaratory judgment actions but granted mandamus relief to both plaintiffs, finding that the NRD’s order was void as to them because they were not served or made parties to the original administrative proceeding. The court ordered the NRD not to enforce the penalties against the plaintiffs and to take steps to restore their rights to irrigate the affected acres. Attorney fees were also awarded to both plaintiffs.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the corporation was entitled to relief because it was not properly served with notice, rendering the order void as to it. However, the individual who acquired property after the administrative proceeding was not entitled to relief, as the reduction of irrigated acres was completed before he obtained an interest, and the statute does not provide for restoration in such circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and attorney fee award for the individual, but affirmed as modified the judgment and attorney fee award for the corporation. The main holdings are: due process requires notice to a corporation owning certified irrigated acres, and a reduction completed before a person acquires an interest is not affected by later acquisition. View "State ex rel. Seeman v. Lower Republican NRD" on Justia Law

Westside Community School District was entitled to receive payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT funds) from the Douglas County treasurer, as required by the Nebraska Constitution and statutes. In 2021, the Nebraska Auditor of Public Accounts found that the treasurer had erroneously distributed PILOT funds, resulting in Westside being underpaid by millions of dollars, while other entities, including Omaha Public Schools (OPS), Douglas County, and the city of Omaha, were overpaid. The parties did not dispute the existence of these errors. Westside filed suit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the treasurer to correct the underpayment.After litigation began, Westside, the treasurer, and the city of Omaha entered into a settlement agreement to rectify the payment errors from 2019 to 2021, agreeing to prospective repayments over six years. OPS declined to participate. Pursuant to the agreement, Westside and the treasurer jointly moved for a peremptory writ of mandamus, which the District Court for Douglas County initially granted. OPS then intervened, arguing the writ was improper and that the statutory provisions did not authorize the proposed remedy. The district court vacated the writ, finding no statutory duty to correct the underpayment in the manner outlined, and left the case pending.Westside renewed its motion for a writ, seeking only correction of the underpayment without specifying the remedy’s form. The treasurer moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing the court’s vacation of the writ was equivalent to a denial, requiring dismissal. The district court denied Westside’s renewed motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, enforcing the settlement agreement.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the treasurer has a ministerial duty to properly distribute PILOT funds according to the statutory formula, and that mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel correction of erroneous distributions. The court affirmed the vacation of the initial writ but reversed the denial of the renewed motion and the dismissal, remanding with direction to issue an alternative writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Deckard, an inmate at the Nebraska State Penitentiary, filed a mandamus action against the Nebraska Board of Parole, alleging that the Board had a clear ministerial duty under the 1971 statutes to provide him with a parole discharge date. Deckard was convicted in 1974 of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, with an additional 10-year sentence for escape, to be served concurrently. He was initially released on parole after 12½ years but had his parole revoked in 1995 and again in 2022. Deckard argued that under the statutes and Board practices in effect at the time of his conviction, he should have been discharged from parole after 2 to 3 years of good behavior.The district court for Lancaster County denied Deckard’s petition, finding that the Board had no clear ministerial duty to determine a parole discharge date for an inmate serving a life sentence. The court noted that the 1971 statutes provided the Board with discretion regarding parole discharge and that the 2018 statutory amendments, which introduced a mathematical formula for determining parole discharge, did not apply to life sentences as they are indefinite and cannot be quantified in numerical terms.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that neither the 1971 nor the 2018 statutes created an absolute ministerial duty for the Board to set a mandatory parole discharge date for Deckard. The court also rejected Deckard’s ex post facto argument, concluding that the 2018 amendments did not increase his punishment or affect his parole eligibility. The court emphasized that there is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence and that Deckard’s life sentence precludes a mandatory parole discharge date. View "Deckard v. Cotton" on Justia Law

A resident taxpayer of Omaha challenged the City of Omaha's contract for residential solid waste collection, alleging it was an illegal expenditure of public funds and violated the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act (ISWMA). The contract, awarded to FCC Environmental Services Nebraska, LLC (FCC-Nebraska), included a yard waste sticker program where residents could purchase stickers for additional yard waste disposal.The district court for Douglas County granted summary judgment in favor of the City and FCC-Nebraska, dismissing the taxpayer's claims. The court found that the City acted within its discretion in seeking a postopening bid clarification from FCC-Spain (the original bidder) to standardize the unit price for yard waste stickers, which did not materially alter the bid or give FCC an unfair advantage. The court also determined that the yard waste sticker fee charged by FCC did not require voter approval under § 13-2020(4) of the ISWMA, as the fee was charged by and paid to the contractor, not the City.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the City did not act in bad faith or with favoritism in seeking the bid clarification and that the clarification did not result in a material variance from FCC's original bid. The court also agreed that the voter approval requirement in § 13-2020(4) did not apply to the yard waste sticker fee, as it was governed by § 13-2020(5), which allows contractors to charge service rates without voter approval. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the taxpayer's motion to amend the complaint to add a new theory of invalidity based on the identity of the contracting party. View "Johnson v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Marjorie Johnson, the owner of farmland, was denied a permit by the Village of Polk to drill a new well for irrigating her farmland. She sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance requiring a permit for new wells in the village’s wellhead protection area was invalid, arguing it was preempted by the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and violated state law by interfering with her existing farming operations.The district court for Polk County denied her request for declaratory judgment and her petition in error. The court found that the ordinance was not preempted by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature intended for both local natural resources districts (NRDs) and municipalities to have control over water sources. The court also found that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the land was previously irrigated through an agreement with a neighbor, and it was the dispute with the neighbor, not the ordinance, that resulted in the land being dryland.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was enacted under the necessary statutory grant of power to the municipality, as the Wellhead Protection Area Act and other statutes granted villages the authority to adopt controls to protect public water supplies. The court also found no field or conflict preemption by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature did not intend to deprive municipalities of their statutory authority to require permits for wells within wellhead protection areas. Finally, the court agreed that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the existing farming at the time of the permit request was dryland farming, and it was the neighbor’s actions, not the ordinance, that prevented irrigation. View "Johnson v. Village of Polk" on Justia Law

A Nebraska county (Hayes) sought reimbursement from a neighboring county (Frontier) for half the cost of replacing a bridge under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-827 et seq. Hayes claimed the bridge was on a county line road, thus requiring shared expenses. Frontier's board of commissioners denied the claim, arguing the bridge was not on a county line road and that Frontier was not equally interested in the bridge. Hayes then filed a petition in error in the district court, seeking review of the board's decision.The district court reviewed the case and found that Hayes had not provided sufficient evidence to support its claim. Specifically, the court noted that Hayes did not request an evidentiary hearing before the Frontier Board, resulting in a lack of formal proof regarding the bridge's location. The court concluded that the only evidence in the record was Hayes' claim and its attachments, which were insufficient to establish the bridge's location as required by § 39-827. Consequently, the district court denied and dismissed Hayes' petition in error.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the Frontier Board acted within its jurisdiction and whether its decision was supported by sufficient relevant evidence. The court found that Hayes failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that the bridge was on a county line road as defined by § 39-1403. The court also noted that the Road Agreement between Hayes and Frontier did not conclusively establish the bridge's location for the purposes of the bridge statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment but modified the disposition from "denied and dismissed" to "affirmed." View "County of Hayes v. County of Frontier" on Justia Law

Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, submitted a request to pool ground water from several registered wells for the 2023-2027 allocation period. The Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) denied their application, citing a rule that allows denial for any reason, including rule violations. The denial was communicated through a letter and a marked application. The Hauxwells challenged this denial, alleging it violated their constitutional rights and was arbitrary and capricious.The Hauxwells filed a petition for review with the district court for Frontier County, Nebraska, under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They argued that the denial was contrary to a court order staying penalties previously imposed by the NRD. The NRD moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the letter was not a final agency action or an order in a contested case, and thus not subject to judicial review under the APA. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the letter did not arise from a contested case and was not a final order of the decision-making body.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the letter denying the Hauxwells' pooling application was not an "order" as defined under the NGWMPA. The court explained that the term "order" in the NGWMPA includes orders required by the act, a rule or regulation, or a decision adopted by the board of directors of a natural resources district. However, the letter in question did not meet these criteria, as it was not issued as part of any case or proceeding and was not required by any specific authority. Consequently, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, were involved in a dispute with the Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) over alleged violations of the NRD’s rules and regulations. The NRD claimed the Hauxwells used ground water to irrigate uncertified acres, failed to install flowmeters, and used non-compliant flowmeters. The NRD issued a cease-and-desist order and penalties after a 2020 hearing, where the NRD’s general manager and counsel participated in the board’s deliberations.The Hauxwells challenged the 2020 findings in the district court for Frontier County, which ruled in their favor, citing due process violations and remanded the case. In 2021, the NRD issued a new complaint and held another hearing, excluding the general manager and counsel from deliberations. The board again found violations but deferred penalties to a later hearing. The district court dismissed the Hauxwells' challenge to the 2021 findings, stating it was not a final order as penalties were not yet determined.In 2022, the NRD held a hearing to determine penalties, resulting in restrictions on the Hauxwells' water use. The Hauxwells filed another petition for review, arguing that the 2020 due process violations tainted the subsequent hearings. The district court agreed, reversing the NRD’s 2022 findings and vacating the penalties.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in concluding that the 2020 due process violations tainted the 2021 and 2022 hearings. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions to address the other claims in the Hauxwells' petition for review. The court emphasized that the NRD’s actions in 2021 and 2022 were separate and not influenced by the 2020 hearing’s procedural issues. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law