Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1502(2) imposes a requirement and specifies a consequence for its violation. In this case, a taxpayer filed a property valuation protest. The taxpayer’s protest form specified the assessed and requested valuation amounts but stated no reason for the requested change. The Lincoln County Board of Equalization dismissed the protest, citing section 77-1502(2). The taxpayer appealed to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal with prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the protest due to the taxpayer’s failure to state the reason for the protest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly dismissed the taxpayer’s protest because the protest failed to include a reason for the requested change in valuation; and (2) because the Board lacked authority to hear the taxpayer’s property valuation protest on the merits, TERC likewise lacked authority to do so. View "Village at North Platte v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, applied for reclassification of his custody level from medium custody to minimum custody. The Department of Correctional Services determined that Appellant’s classification should remain at medium custody. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition in the district court seeking judicial review of DCS’ decision. The district court sustained the DCS’ motion to dismiss, concluding that DCS’ decision regarding Defendant’s level of custody was not made in a “contested case” and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court of appeals agreed with the district court’s conclusion and dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DCS’ decision was not made in a “contested case” as defined in the APA; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the level of custody decision. View "Purdie v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Following the insolvency of Pierce Elevator, Inc. (PEI), the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated proceedings to determine claims under the Grain Warehouse Act and the Grain Dealer Act. After PEI voluntarily surrendered its grain warehouse license to the PSC, the PSC took title to all PEI grain in storage in trust for distribution to all valid owners, depositors, or storers of grain pursuant to the Grain Warehouse Act. The PSC then determined valid claims under the Grain Warehouse Act and the Grain Dealer Act. The appellant and cross-appellants in this case were claimants who challenged the PSC’s classification of their claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed and dismissed, holding (1) the PSC correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to determine the fraud claims of the appellant and some cross-appellants and that the appellant and other-cross appellants were not entitled to recovery under the Grain Warehouse Act; (2) the PSC erred in finding that some cross-appellants were not entitled to recovery under the Grain Warehouse Act; and (3) some cross-appellants did not have standing to challenge the classification of a certain transaction. View "In re Claims Against Pierce Elevator" on Justia Law

In 2012, as the result of a change in the way the Custer County assessor classified irrigated grassland for purposes of valuation, the assessor increased the assessed value of the property owned by Appellant from $734,968 to $1,834,924. Appellant filed petitions with the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1507.01 challenging the valuation increase. After two separate hearings on Appellant’s petitions, TERC affirmed the assessor’s valuations for 2012. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TERC’s consideration of Appellant’s petitions using the appellate standard of review described in Nev. Rev. Stat. 77-5016(9) constituted plain error. Remanded. View "Cain v. Custer County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Under Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1207, a mental health board “shall” hold a hearing within seven days after the subject is taken into emergency protective custody. Appellant was convicted of sexual assault on a child. Before Appellant finished his sentence, the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District (Board) issued a warrant directing that Appellant remain in custody under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) until a commitment hearing. The hearing was held approximately five weeks later. The Board determined that Appellant was a dangerous sex offender and placed him in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services for inpatient treatment. Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the Board’s failure to hold a hearing within seven days violated the SOCA and his right to due process. The district court dismissed Appellant’s habeas petition, concluding that the seven-day time limit in section 71-1207 is directory, not mandatory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the seven-day time limit for holding a hearing under the statute is directory, and therefore, the untimeliness of the commitment hearing in this case did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction. View "D.I. v. Gibson" on Justia Law

John Joubert murdered two children in 1983. Mark Pettit was in the process of writing a book about Joubert when he attempted to gain access to two graphic drawings that Joubert had created while Joubert was on death row. The drawing had been confiscated as contraband by authorities with the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS). The prison warden refused to release the drawings to Pettit, and Joubert was subsequently executed. In 2013, as the thirtieth anniversary of Joubert’s crimes approached, Pettit requested access to the drawings for inspection and reproduction. DCS refused the request, stating that the drawings had been placed in Joubert’s institutional file and were not subject to further disclosure by DCS. The district court ordered DCS to permit Pettit to inspect, examine, and reproduce the confiscated drawings, concluding that Pettit had showed good cause for inspection and reproduction of the drawings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Pettit failed to demonstrate a legally sufficient reason for inspection of the drawings. View "Pettit v. Neb. Dept. of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Hamilton County EMS Association, IAFF Local 4956 (Union) filed a petition with Nebraska’s Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) seeking to become the exclusive bargaining agent for employees of the Hamilton Coutny Ambulance Service. Hamilton County objected to the inclusion of two shift captains of the Union in the bargaining unit. The CIR concluded that the captains were not statutory supervisors under Nebraska’s Industrial Relations Act and could be included with the nonsupervisors’ bargaining unit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the CIR did not err in classifying the two shift captains as nonsupervisors and allowing them to take part in the workers’ bargaining unit. View "Hamilton County EMS Ass’n v. Hamilton County" on Justia Law

Appellee suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court awarded temporary benefits to Appellee. Nearly three years later, Employer petitioned to modify the award, alleging that Appellee had reached maximum medical improvement and had experienced a decrease in incapacity. The compensation court found that Appellee had reached maximum medical improvement. After a trial held on Employer’s petition to modify, the compensation court then filed a “Further Award,” determining that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation err did not err when it (1) admitted and relied upon reports of a psychiatrist and a neurologist when it considered Appellee’s preexisting mental and cognitive deficits in determining the extent of his disability; and (2) applied the odd-lot doctrine and found that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled. View "Gardner v. Int’l Paper Destruction & Recycling" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he fell off a truck following a customer appreciation supper held by his employer (Defendant). The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that Plaintiff was injured in the course and scope of his employment, thus making Defendant liable for the injury. Defendant appealed, arguing that the compensation court applied the wrong legal standard in its finding that Defendant received a “substantial benefit” from Plaintiff’s attendance at the supper, when the correct legal standard for the test is a “substantial direct benefit.” The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the compensation court applied the wrong legal standard. Remanded for an application of the correct standard. View "Jacobitz v. Aurora Coop." on Justia Law

In 2010, Appellant was administratively adjudicated in Kansas to have committed the offense of driving under the influence. In 2013, Appellant was convicted in South Dakota of driving under the influence. Thereafter, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Appellant’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-4,168. The district court affirmed the lifetime revocation. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the Kansas administrative license revocation and the South Dakota conviction for driving under the influence were offenses included in section 60-4,168(1)(a) and therefore provided a basis to revoke his CDL. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that out-of-state convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol are included in the provisions of section 60-4,168 pertaining to the revocation of CDLs. View "Klug v. Neb. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law