Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured when he fell off a truck following a customer appreciation supper held by his employer (Defendant). The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that Plaintiff was injured in the course and scope of his employment, thus making Defendant liable for the injury. Defendant appealed, arguing that the compensation court applied the wrong legal standard in its finding that Defendant received a “substantial benefit” from Plaintiff’s attendance at the supper, when the correct legal standard for the test is a “substantial direct benefit.” The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the compensation court applied the wrong legal standard. Remanded for an application of the correct standard. View "Jacobitz v. Aurora Coop." on Justia Law

In 2010, Appellant was administratively adjudicated in Kansas to have committed the offense of driving under the influence. In 2013, Appellant was convicted in South Dakota of driving under the influence. Thereafter, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Appellant’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-4,168. The district court affirmed the lifetime revocation. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the Kansas administrative license revocation and the South Dakota conviction for driving under the influence were offenses included in section 60-4,168(1)(a) and therefore provided a basis to revoke his CDL. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that out-of-state convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol are included in the provisions of section 60-4,168 pertaining to the revocation of CDLs. View "Klug v. Neb. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s minor daughter, Brayden, who suffers from Coffin-Lowry Syndrome, had been receiving home and community-based waiver services for approximately twelve years when the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) determined that she no longer qualified for waiver services and terminated the services. Plaintiff filed this action on behalf of Brayden, contending that DHHS used the wrong criteria to evaluate Brayden’s eligibility and erred in finding that she did not qualify for waiver services. The district court affirmed the termination of those services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) DHHS’ creation and use of exhibit 4, the assessment document used to evaluate children with disabilities, to evaluate Brayden was arbitrary and produced an unreasonable result; and (2) DHHS should have found that Brayden qualified for waiver services. View "Merie B. v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, a deputy sheriff at the Cass County sheriff’s office, was suspended for ten days. Appellant filed a grievance on his suspension. The Cass County Merit Commission affirmed the actions of the sheriff’s office. Forty-two days from the date the Commission orally announced its decision, Appellant filed a petition in error with the Cass County District Court. The notice of appeal was filed seventeen days after the date the Commission’s decision was faxed and mailed to Appellant’s counsel. The district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the appeal was not filed within the thirty-day time period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) although decisions rendered by an inferior tribunal, board or commission are typically final when they are announced on the record, Neb. Rev. Stat. 23-1734 - which requires that the order must be in writing, certified to the sheriff, and delivered - overrides that general rule; and (2) pursuant to section 23-1734, the appeal was timely. Remanded. View "Schaffer v. Cass County" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Nebraska Advantage Act, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) entered an agreement with the Tax Commissioner with the aim of using incentives set forth in the Act for a project in Platte County. ADM sought a personal property tax exemption for the year 2010 under the Act for property involving agricultural processing equipment. The Department denied the exemption on the grounds that the personal property tax exemption claim had not been timely filed. The Tax Equalization Review Commission (TERC) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) ADM did not timely file its claim for a personal property tax exemption for the subject property, and therefore ADM was not entitled to the exemption; and (2) TERC did not err when it affirmed the order of the Tax Commission denying ADM’s protest. View "Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State" on Justia Law

Melanie M., who lived in North Platte, Nebraska, received benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp Program. In 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) informed Melanie that it was going to change her benefits. Melanie requested an administrative hearing regarding the proposed changes. The Department informed Melanie that it would hold the hearing in Lincoln, Nebraska and that Melanie could participate in person or telephonically. Before the administrative hearing occurred, Melanie filed a complaint alleging that the Department’s regulations and procedural due process required that the Department grant her a face-to-face hearing at the Department’s North Platte office. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the summary judgment as to Melanie’s due process claim, holding that the due process clause did not require a face-to-face hearing at the North Platte office; but (2) reversed on Melanie’s prayer for relief under the Department’s regulations, holding that the regulations required that the Department hold the face-to-face hearing at the local office. View "Melanie M. v. Winterer" on Justia Law

Taxpayer timely filed a 2010 personal property tax return properly listing certain taxable property. The property, however, was not placed on the tax rolls. In 2013, the Colfax County Board of Equalization placed the personal property back on the tax rolls. Taxpayer appealed. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission ultimately decided that the Board’s action was void on the grounds that the Board did not have authority to place the items of personal property on the tax rolls, thereby reversing and vacating the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s action in placing Taxpayer’s personal property on the tax rolls for 2010 was void because it lacked statutory authority to do so under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1507(1). View "Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. v. Colfax County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Between 2004 and 2009, Valpak of Omaha, LLC (“Valpak”) paid more than $5.5 million to Val-pak Direct Marketing Systems, Inc. (“Direct Marketing”) to print direct mail advertisements and distribute them around Omaha, Nebraska. The Nebraska Department of Revenue assessed use taxes on that amount. Valpak asked the Tax Commissioner for a redetermination that no taxes were due, arguing that its payments to Direct Marketing were not transactions that were subject to use taxes under Nebraska law. The Tax Commissioner denied Valpak’s petitions for redetermination, concluding that Valpak was subject to use taxes under the Department’s sales and use tax regulations. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that Valpak was an advertising agency and was liable for use taxes on its payment to Direct Marketing. View "Valpak of Omaha, LLC v. Neb. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working as a staff home nurse at the Eastern Nebraska Veterans’ Home. Appellant filed a petition in Workers’ Compensation Court alleging that she suffered from complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) and had sustained injuries to her left and right upper limbs as a result of the accident. The compensation found that Appellant was entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. Appellant appealed the award. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the compensation court (1) did not err in finding that Appellant was permanently partially disabled and suffered a seventy-five percent loss of earning capacity; (2) did not err by denying Appellant a waiting-time penalty, attorney fees, and interest; but (3) erred in failing to consider mileage expenses for all of Appellant’s travel to injury-related medical appointments. Remanded. View "Armstrong v. State" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the City of Omaha’s home rule charter, the Omaha City Council enacted an ordinance creating the City of Omaha Police and Fire Retirement System (System), which was administered by a board of trustees. The board commenced this declaratory judgment action against the City asking the district court to construe Omaha’s home rule charter and applicable ordinances to authorize the board to retain an actuarial consultant and private legal counsel at city expense. The district court granted summary judgment for the board. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified as to the issue of the board’s authority to retain consultants and reversed and vacated the portion of the judgment declaring that the board had discretion to hire independent legal counsel whenever it deemed such retention to be necessary, holding (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine the authority of the board to retain outside consultants other than an actuary; but (2) the court did not err in determining that the board had legal authority to retain an actuary to undertake a study of disability benefits paid from the System’s trust fund and that the cost of such a study is an administrative expense payable by appropriation from the City’s general fund. View "Board of Trustees v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law