Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Between 2004 and 2009, Valpak of Omaha, LLC (“Valpak”) paid more than $5.5 million to Val-pak Direct Marketing Systems, Inc. (“Direct Marketing”) to print direct mail advertisements and distribute them around Omaha, Nebraska. The Nebraska Department of Revenue assessed use taxes on that amount. Valpak asked the Tax Commissioner for a redetermination that no taxes were due, arguing that its payments to Direct Marketing were not transactions that were subject to use taxes under Nebraska law. The Tax Commissioner denied Valpak’s petitions for redetermination, concluding that Valpak was subject to use taxes under the Department’s sales and use tax regulations. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that Valpak was an advertising agency and was liable for use taxes on its payment to Direct Marketing. View "Valpak of Omaha, LLC v. Neb. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working as a staff home nurse at the Eastern Nebraska Veterans’ Home. Appellant filed a petition in Workers’ Compensation Court alleging that she suffered from complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) and had sustained injuries to her left and right upper limbs as a result of the accident. The compensation found that Appellant was entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. Appellant appealed the award. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the compensation court (1) did not err in finding that Appellant was permanently partially disabled and suffered a seventy-five percent loss of earning capacity; (2) did not err by denying Appellant a waiting-time penalty, attorney fees, and interest; but (3) erred in failing to consider mileage expenses for all of Appellant’s travel to injury-related medical appointments. Remanded. View "Armstrong v. State" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the City of Omaha’s home rule charter, the Omaha City Council enacted an ordinance creating the City of Omaha Police and Fire Retirement System (System), which was administered by a board of trustees. The board commenced this declaratory judgment action against the City asking the district court to construe Omaha’s home rule charter and applicable ordinances to authorize the board to retain an actuarial consultant and private legal counsel at city expense. The district court granted summary judgment for the board. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified as to the issue of the board’s authority to retain consultants and reversed and vacated the portion of the judgment declaring that the board had discretion to hire independent legal counsel whenever it deemed such retention to be necessary, holding (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine the authority of the board to retain outside consultants other than an actuary; but (2) the court did not err in determining that the board had legal authority to retain an actuary to undertake a study of disability benefits paid from the System’s trust fund and that the cost of such a study is an administrative expense payable by appropriation from the City’s general fund. View "Board of Trustees v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Marion’s Quality Services, Inc. was a Nebraska corporation doing business as It’s a Kidz World Child Care Center (Center) and as Deb’s Learning Place Family Child Care Home II (Home). In 2012, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), a state agency responsible for the enforcement of the Child Care Licensing Act, revoked Marion’s licenses to operate the Center and the Home. Marion’s submitted an administrative appeal, and the cases were consolidated. After an administrative appeal hearing, DHHS upheld the revocation of the license for the Home but reversed the revocation of the Center’s license. In lieu of revocation of the license, DHHS imposed an alternative penalty in the form of additional probation and a civil penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s ruling upholding DHHS’ findings regarding the Center’s license was supported by competent evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; and (2) the district court’s ruling upholding DHHS’ findings regarding the Home’s license was supported by competent evidence, conformed to the law, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unreasonable. View "Marion’s Quality Servs., Inc. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Sanitary and Improvement District No. 1, Butler County, Nebraska (SID #1) filed two class action lawsuits in Cass County, Nebraska, alleging that various county treasurers unlawfully deducted an incorrect percentage of assessments of municipal improvements collected on behalf of SID #1 and other sanitary and improvement districts. The county treasurers filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted those motions, concluding that the sanitary and improvement districts are not municipal corporations and therefore do not create municipal improvements. SID #1 appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that SID #1 stated a cause of action because a sanitary and improvement district can levy municipal taxes and make municipal improvements. Remanded. View "Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Adamy" on Justia Law

Falls City Economic Development and Growth Enterprise, Inc. (EDGE), a Nebraska nonprofit corporation, provided economic development services to the City of Falls City, Nebraska. Plaintiff, a Nebraska citizen, sought records relating to a specific economic development project in which EDGE was involved. EDGE denied the request on the basis that it was not a public entity and that its records were not public records. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint and motion for a writ of mandamus to compel production of the requested documents. The district court granted the writ, with the exception of certain documents it determined to be privileged. The Supreme Court vacated and reversed the writ of mandamus, holding that EDGE was not the functional equivalent of an agency, branch, or department of Falls City as a matter of law, and therefore, EDGE’s records requested by Plaintiff were not “public records” within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-712 and 84-712.01. Remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Frederick v. City of Falls City" on Justia Law

L.B. 1161, which was passed in 2012, allows major oil pipeline carriers to bypass the regulatory procedures of the Public Service Commission, instead allowing them to obtain approval from the Governor to exercise the power of eminent domain for building a pipeline in Nebraska. Appellees, a group of landowners, filed a complaint alleging that the bill violated the state Constitution’s equal protection, due process, and separation of powers provisions, as well as the Constitution’s prohibition of special legislation. The district court determined that L.B. 1161 was unconstitutional. Four members of the Supreme Court - a majority of its seven members - held that Appellees had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the bill and that the legislation was unconstitutional. However, because five judges of the Court did not vote on the constitutionality of the bill, the Court held that L.B. must stand by default. View "Thompson v. Heineman" on Justia Law

When Alexander was approximately twelve years old, he was placed in a program with Envisions of Norfolk, Inc. The juvenile court ordered that Alexander remain in the Envisions program until further order of the court. Less than two months later, Alexander was moved into a new foster home without further order of the court and without notice. The juvenile court found the Department of Health and Human Services and Nebraska Families Collaborative in contempt of court and ordered them to pay a fine of $5,000 or purge the contempt by complying with certain conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding the Department to be in contempt of court; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction. View "In re Interest of Zachary D." on Justia Law

Brian Shaffer, who had severe autism and chemical sensitivities, resided with his mother, Delores Shaffer, who was paid to provide private duty nursing (PDN) care to Brian. In 2011, Brian’s Medicaid coverage was transferred to Coventry Health Care of Nebraska, Inc. When Coventry determined that the nursing services were not medically necessary, Shaffer requested a State fair hearing with the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. Coventry participated in the administrative proceedings, at which a hearing officer concluded that the PDN services were not medically necessary. Delores sought judicial review of the order, but the petition did not name Coventry as a respondent. The district court reversed the order of the Department, finding the PDN services that Delores provided to Brian were medically necessary. Coventry appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court, holding that Coventry was a “party of record” at the State fair hearing and therefore a necessary party in the subsequent appeal to the district court, and the failure to make Coventry a party to the appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction. View "Shaffer v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2009, Patricia Damme injured her low back in a workplace accident. In 2013, Damme underwent surgery on her back. The surgery was a success. The Workers’ Compensation Court awarded Damme temporary total disability benefits from 2009 to 2013 and future medical care. Damme’s employer, Pike Enterprises, Inc. appealed, arguing, among other things, that the 2009 incident was not an injury but a “temporary symptom aggravation” of Damme’s preexisting back problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Court did not err in (1) finding a causal relationship between the work-related injury Damme sustained in 2009 and the 2013 surgery; (2) determining that Damme’s 2013 surgery was reasonably necessary to treat her physical condition and pain symptoms; (3) finding that after her injury, Damme could not work until the surgeon who performed the surgery released her to return to work; (4) determining that Damme’s incarceration was not an event that barred her receipt of temporary total disability disability benefits; and (5) awarding nonspecified future medical benefits. View "Damme v. Pike Enters., Inc." on Justia Law