Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (NPPD) was the owner or lessee of three water appropriations to divert water from the Niobrara River for hydropower generation. In 2007, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (Department) issued closing notices to several hundred junior appropriators, including Joe McClaren Ranch, LLC and Weinreis Brothers (the junior appropriators), directing them to cease water diversions from the Niobrara in favor of NPPD’s senior appropriations. The junior appropriators challenged the Department’s administration of the Niobrara and sought to stay any future closing notices. After a second hearing on remand, the Department denied the junior appropriators’ claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department (1) erred in admitting certain evidence relating to the statutory procedure for cancellation of appropriations, but the error was harmless; (2) did not err in finding that the junior appropriators failed to prove NPPD had abandoned or statutorily forfeited its appropriations; (3) did not err in determining that it had property determined the flow demand for NPPD’s appropriations; and (4) did not err in failing to conduct a futile call analysis on the main stem of the Niobrara. View "In re 2007 Appropriations of Niobrara River Waters" on Justia Law

In December 2008, Appellee was performing his duties as an outdoor parking lot attendant when he developed frostbite. Appellee’s employer and its insurance company (Appellants) voluntarily paid for the medical treatment of Appellee’s frostbite injury and paid temporary total disability benefits through mid-2009. In September 2012, a partial amputation of the fifth metatarsal in Appellee’s right foot was performed. In January 2013, Appellee sought additional benefits for his work-related injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court awarded benefits. On appeal, Appellants argued that the Workers’ Compensation Court erred in finding that Appellee’s claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the partial amputation of Appellee’s foot was a material change in condition and substantial increase in disability that would permit Appellee to seek benefits more than two years after Appellants’ last voluntary payment. View "Lenz v. Cent. Parking Sys. of Neb., Inc." on Justia Law

SourceGas Distribution, LLC owned property located in an area that had been annexed by the City of Hastings. The City, on behalf of the board of public works, filed a petition in the county court under the general condemnation procedures found at Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-101 through 76-726, seeking to initiate condemnation proceedings against the property owned by SourceGas. In an effort to enjoin the county court proceedings, SourceGas Distribution filed a complaint in the district court for temporary and permanent injunction, primarily alleging that the City must utilize Nebraska’s Municipal Gas System Condemnation Act (the Act) rather than the procedures in chapter 76. The district court overruled the motion for temporary injunction and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 19-4626(2) exempted the City from being required to proceed under the Act and that the City could utilize chapter 76’s general condemnation procedures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that, pursuant to the exception set forth in section 19-4626(2), the Act does not apply in this case and, instead, the general condemnation procedures of chapter 76 apply. View "SourceGas Distrib., LLC v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered an injury while working for Employer in Nebraska. After a trial, Appellant was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Three years later, Employer petitioned to discontinue the TTD benefits. Meanwhile, Appellant moved to Mexico. The compensation court terminated Employer’s obligation to pay TTD benefits but declined Appellant’s claim for permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity, finding that Appellant had failed to prove loss of earning capacity in his new community in Mexico. The Supreme Court remanded the case to permit Appellant to establish loss of earning capacity using the Nebraska community where the injury occurred. On remand, the compensation court found that Appellant suffered a forty-five-percent loss of earning capacity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred in failing to weigh all the evidence in making its factual findings, specifically in regard to the court’s findings that the opinions of a vocational rehabilitation counselor regarding Appellant’s loss of earning capacity were not rebutted. Remanded. View "Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions" on Justia Law

Appellee injured his back while working for Appellant. The original workers’ compensation judge found that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled. On appeal, a three-judge review panel concluded it could not tell whether the judge had considered the presumption of correctness afforded to a vocational rehabilitation specialist’s opinion of Appellee’s disability and remanded the cause. The court of appeals affirmed. On remand, the case was assigned to a new trial judge, who ruled that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding that Appellee had rebutted the presumption afforded to the specialist’s opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that new judge’s ruling on the issues without a new evidentiary hearing violated Appellee’s right to due process because the witnesses’ credibility was relevant to the issues presented at trial. View "Liljestrand v. Dell Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 2008 Appellant was convicted of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child, a Class I misdemeanor. In 2011, Appellant applied for a permit to carry a concealed handgun.The Nebraska State Patrol denied Appellant’s application pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 69-2433(5), which provides that a permit will be denied an applicant convicted a “misdemeanor crime of violence” within the ten years preceding the date of application. On appeal, Appellant contended that his conviction for attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 69-2433(5). The district court affirmed the State Patrol’s denial of Appellant’s application for a concealed handgun permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court and State Patrol did not err in finding that Appellant’s conviction of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was a crime of violence under section 69-2433(5) and disqualified him from receiving a concealed handgun permit. View "Underwood v. Neb. State Patrol" on Justia Law

Appellant sustained a compensable injury while working for Employer. The workers’ compensation court awarded benefits. Appellant later filed a second petition to modify, alleging that her injury had materially and substantially worsened, necessitating a modification of the award. The workers’ compensation court found that a modification was not warranted and that, in the alternative, Employer could not be ordered to pay more even if Appellant had established that she was entitled to modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation court did not err in concluding that Appellant did not prove a material and substantial change for the worse in her condition warranting a modification of the award. View "Rader v. Speer Auto" on Justia Law

Employee was severely injured when he fell off a flatbed truck driven by the location manager for Employer’s facility after a customer appreciation supper. Employee filed for workers’ compensation benefits. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court concluded that Employee was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The court reserved the issue of benefits for a later determination, and Employer appealed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court’s order was final. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that Employer did not appeal from a final order because the trial court had not yet determined benefits. Remanded. View "Jacobitz v. Aurora Coop." on Justia Law

Robert Sivick was appointed the county attorney for Howard County. Sivick was unsuccessful in his bid to be elected the county attorney for the next term of office and subsequently filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the State. The Nebraska Department of Labor determined that Sivick was ineligible for benefits because his wages were not for covered "employment." The Nebraska Appeal Tribnual reversed, concluding that because the majority of Sivick's duties were not spent in policymaking or advisory capacities, because Sivick was not an elected official, and because there was no statutory designation of his position being a major advisory position, Sivick's earnings were covered wages for the purposes of unemployment insurance benefits. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the position of county attorney is one that has been designated a "major nontenured policymaking or advisory position" under Nebraska law, and therefore, the services Sivick performed in his position were monetarily ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because his wages were not for covered "employment." View "Lang v. Howard County" on Justia Law

The Harold Warp Pioneer Village Foundation (Foundation) owned and operated a museum, motel, and campground. The motel and campground were primarily used by museum visitors. The museum, motel, and campground were all granted property tax exemptions for many years, but in 2011, state tax officials challenged the exemptions granted to the motel and campground. The Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission determined that because the motel and campground were not used exclusively for educational purposes, neither was entitled to tax exemptions under Nebraska law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motel and campground were beneficial to the museum and reasonably necessary to further its educational mission, and were therefore entitled to property tax exemptions. View "Harold Warp Pioneer Village Found. v. Ewald" on Justia Law