Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial in 2008 Appellant was convicted of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child, a Class I misdemeanor. In 2011, Appellant applied for a permit to carry a concealed handgun.The Nebraska State Patrol denied Appellant’s application pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 69-2433(5), which provides that a permit will be denied an applicant convicted a “misdemeanor crime of violence” within the ten years preceding the date of application. On appeal, Appellant contended that his conviction for attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 69-2433(5). The district court affirmed the State Patrol’s denial of Appellant’s application for a concealed handgun permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court and State Patrol did not err in finding that Appellant’s conviction of attempted third degree sexual assault of a child was a crime of violence under section 69-2433(5) and disqualified him from receiving a concealed handgun permit. View "Underwood v. Neb. State Patrol" on Justia Law

Appellant sustained a compensable injury while working for Employer. The workers’ compensation court awarded benefits. Appellant later filed a second petition to modify, alleging that her injury had materially and substantially worsened, necessitating a modification of the award. The workers’ compensation court found that a modification was not warranted and that, in the alternative, Employer could not be ordered to pay more even if Appellant had established that she was entitled to modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation court did not err in concluding that Appellant did not prove a material and substantial change for the worse in her condition warranting a modification of the award. View "Rader v. Speer Auto" on Justia Law

Employee was severely injured when he fell off a flatbed truck driven by the location manager for Employer’s facility after a customer appreciation supper. Employee filed for workers’ compensation benefits. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court concluded that Employee was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The court reserved the issue of benefits for a later determination, and Employer appealed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court’s order was final. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that Employer did not appeal from a final order because the trial court had not yet determined benefits. Remanded. View "Jacobitz v. Aurora Coop." on Justia Law

Robert Sivick was appointed the county attorney for Howard County. Sivick was unsuccessful in his bid to be elected the county attorney for the next term of office and subsequently filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the State. The Nebraska Department of Labor determined that Sivick was ineligible for benefits because his wages were not for covered "employment." The Nebraska Appeal Tribnual reversed, concluding that because the majority of Sivick's duties were not spent in policymaking or advisory capacities, because Sivick was not an elected official, and because there was no statutory designation of his position being a major advisory position, Sivick's earnings were covered wages for the purposes of unemployment insurance benefits. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the position of county attorney is one that has been designated a "major nontenured policymaking or advisory position" under Nebraska law, and therefore, the services Sivick performed in his position were monetarily ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because his wages were not for covered "employment." View "Lang v. Howard County" on Justia Law

The Harold Warp Pioneer Village Foundation (Foundation) owned and operated a museum, motel, and campground. The motel and campground were primarily used by museum visitors. The museum, motel, and campground were all granted property tax exemptions for many years, but in 2011, state tax officials challenged the exemptions granted to the motel and campground. The Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission determined that because the motel and campground were not used exclusively for educational purposes, neither was entitled to tax exemptions under Nebraska law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motel and campground were beneficial to the museum and reasonably necessary to further its educational mission, and were therefore entitled to property tax exemptions. View "Harold Warp Pioneer Village Found. v. Ewald" on Justia Law

Mike and Becky Carey applied for a building permit for an interior renovation of an apartment building. A municipal building inspector denied the application because the construction documents were not prepared by a registered design professional. The city's appeals board denied the Careys' appeal. The district court overruled the appeals board and ordered that the Careys be issued a building permit without the requirement that they retain a licensed architect, concluding (1) the appeals board did not act within its jurisdiction, and (2) the renovation fell into one of the exemptions to the Engineers and Architects Regulation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appeals board acted within its jurisdiction and that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the proposed renovation failed to qualify for statutory and regulatory exemptions to the Act. View "Carey v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant purchased the assets of an indoor football team owned by Omaha Beef, LLC. In 2008, Appellant applied for workers' compensation insurance under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Plan, arguing that it was entitled to a certain experience modifier (XMod), which is used when calculating the premium owed, because it was a new entity with no claims experience. The National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. determined that Appellant was a successor entity to Omaha Beef, and thus, the various XMods assigned to Omaha Beef for the relevant time periods must be transferred to Appellant. The director of the Department of Insurance affirmed. The district court affirmed, reasoning that Appellant was a successor to Omaha Beef and that the change in ownership resulted in the transfer of the workers' compensation rating for Omaha Beef to Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Appellant had the burden of proof to show there was no "change in ownership"; and (2) a "change in ownership" existed such that the XMod of Omaha Beef should be transferred to Appellant. View "Gridiron Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union Local 226 (Local 226) was the certified exclusive bargaining agent for three bargaining groups of the Douglas County School District 001 (District). Following the implementation of the District's new vacation accrual policy, Local 226 filed petitions with the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that the District had engaged in a prohibited practice of bad-faith bargaining under the Industrial Relations Act by failing to negotiate regarding the vacation accrual policy and that the unilateral action constituted a change in the terms and conditions of employment with respect to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The CIR found that the District had not engaged in a prohibited practice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District unilaterally changed its vacation accrual policy but presented Local 226 with opportunities to give input on the policy changes and request negotiations before implementation of the changes, and because Local 226 failed to take advantage of those opportunities it waived its right to negotiate on the matter of vacation accrual. View "Serv. Employees Int'l Union (AFL-CIO) Local 226 v. Douglas County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) filed an application with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to appropriate additional surface water from the Niobrara River. The Middle and Lower Niobrara Natural Resources Districts (collectively, NRDs) and Thomas Higgins, who held senior existing and pending Niobrara River surface water appropriations, objected to the application. The DNR dismissed all objections sua sponte, concluding that the objectors lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DNR did not err in (1) dismissing the NRDs' objections for lack of standing because they failed to allege any legal right, title, or interest in the subject water of the Niobrara River and because the NRDs' allegations that the granting of the application would cause a portion of the Niobrara River Basin to be declared fully appropriated in the future were based on mere conjecture; and (2) finding that Higgins lacked standing, as Higgins failed to allege sufficient allegations of harm. View "In re Application A-18503" on Justia Law

The County Board of Equalization determined that land owned by Ladd Krings was not agricultural or horticultural land. On appeal, the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) upheld the Board's decision but further concluded that the value of Krings' property should be equalized with the value of agricultural and horticultural land. Determining that the assessor's assessments of agricultural and horticultural land to be impermissibly low, TERC subsequently equalized Krings' property by reducing its assessed value. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of TERC's order determining that Krings' land was nonagricultural and nonhoricultural; but (2) reversed the portion of the order in which TERC equalized the value of Krings' nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the county, as this decision did not conform to the law. Remanded. View "Krings v. Garfield County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law