Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mike and Becky Carey applied for a building permit for an interior renovation of an apartment building. A municipal building inspector denied the application because the construction documents were not prepared by a registered design professional. The city's appeals board denied the Careys' appeal. The district court overruled the appeals board and ordered that the Careys be issued a building permit without the requirement that they retain a licensed architect, concluding (1) the appeals board did not act within its jurisdiction, and (2) the renovation fell into one of the exemptions to the Engineers and Architects Regulation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appeals board acted within its jurisdiction and that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the proposed renovation failed to qualify for statutory and regulatory exemptions to the Act. View "Carey v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant purchased the assets of an indoor football team owned by Omaha Beef, LLC. In 2008, Appellant applied for workers' compensation insurance under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Plan, arguing that it was entitled to a certain experience modifier (XMod), which is used when calculating the premium owed, because it was a new entity with no claims experience. The National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. determined that Appellant was a successor entity to Omaha Beef, and thus, the various XMods assigned to Omaha Beef for the relevant time periods must be transferred to Appellant. The director of the Department of Insurance affirmed. The district court affirmed, reasoning that Appellant was a successor to Omaha Beef and that the change in ownership resulted in the transfer of the workers' compensation rating for Omaha Beef to Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Appellant had the burden of proof to show there was no "change in ownership"; and (2) a "change in ownership" existed such that the XMod of Omaha Beef should be transferred to Appellant. View "Gridiron Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union Local 226 (Local 226) was the certified exclusive bargaining agent for three bargaining groups of the Douglas County School District 001 (District). Following the implementation of the District's new vacation accrual policy, Local 226 filed petitions with the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that the District had engaged in a prohibited practice of bad-faith bargaining under the Industrial Relations Act by failing to negotiate regarding the vacation accrual policy and that the unilateral action constituted a change in the terms and conditions of employment with respect to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The CIR found that the District had not engaged in a prohibited practice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District unilaterally changed its vacation accrual policy but presented Local 226 with opportunities to give input on the policy changes and request negotiations before implementation of the changes, and because Local 226 failed to take advantage of those opportunities it waived its right to negotiate on the matter of vacation accrual. View "Serv. Employees Int'l Union (AFL-CIO) Local 226 v. Douglas County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) filed an application with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to appropriate additional surface water from the Niobrara River. The Middle and Lower Niobrara Natural Resources Districts (collectively, NRDs) and Thomas Higgins, who held senior existing and pending Niobrara River surface water appropriations, objected to the application. The DNR dismissed all objections sua sponte, concluding that the objectors lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DNR did not err in (1) dismissing the NRDs' objections for lack of standing because they failed to allege any legal right, title, or interest in the subject water of the Niobrara River and because the NRDs' allegations that the granting of the application would cause a portion of the Niobrara River Basin to be declared fully appropriated in the future were based on mere conjecture; and (2) finding that Higgins lacked standing, as Higgins failed to allege sufficient allegations of harm. View "In re Application A-18503" on Justia Law

The County Board of Equalization determined that land owned by Ladd Krings was not agricultural or horticultural land. On appeal, the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) upheld the Board's decision but further concluded that the value of Krings' property should be equalized with the value of agricultural and horticultural land. Determining that the assessor's assessments of agricultural and horticultural land to be impermissibly low, TERC subsequently equalized Krings' property by reducing its assessed value. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of TERC's order determining that Krings' land was nonagricultural and nonhoricultural; but (2) reversed the portion of the order in which TERC equalized the value of Krings' nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the county, as this decision did not conform to the law. Remanded. View "Krings v. Garfield County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Employee filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits for injuries he received during his employment with Employer. In accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-139(3), Employee entered into a lump-sump settlement with Employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier. Pursuant to the statute, Employee filed a release in which he waived his rights under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act (Act) and discharged Employer from further liability arising from the injury. Employer paid the lump-sum amount forty-two days after the filing of the release. Employee subsequently sought and received a workers' compensation court order awarding a waiting-time penalty and attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a worker waives all of his rights under the Act when he files a release pursuant to the settlement procedures in section 48-139(3), including the right to penalties; and (2) therefore, a waiting-time penalty and the corresponding attorney fees cannot be imposed following a settlement reached under section 48-139(3). Remanded. View "Holdsworth v. Greenwood Famers Coop." on Justia Law

While at work, Employee was asked by his supervisor to enter a grain bin and to shovel grain into the center of the bin's conical base in order to facilitate removal of grain from the bin. Employee died of asphyxiation after being engulfed in the grain. Employer pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of willfully violating Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations by knowingly permitting an employee to enter a grain bin in violation of safety standards. The personal representative of Employee's estate (Estate) subsequently brought this action against Employer for wrongful death and assault and battery and for a declaratory judgment that either the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act did not apply or, alternatively, that it was unconstitutional on its face as applied. The district court dismissed the Estate's complaint, finding that the Act applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite the egregiousness of Employer's conduct, the injury was still an "accident" as defined by the Act; and (2) the Act does not thereby unconstitutionally discriminate between employees and nonemployees or employee victims of employer willful negligence and employee victims of their own willful negligence. View "Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Coop. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an accident arising out of the course of his employment on October 23, 2007. Employee filed a workers' compensation action on February 28, 2012 against Employer, seeking relief under an amended version of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3), alleging that he was entitled to benefits calculated on the basis of the loss of earning capacity pursuant to this amendment. The Legislature specified that the operative date of the amendment to the statute was January 1, 2008. The workers' compensation court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that the amendment was substantive rather than procedural and that because Employee's accident and injuries occurred prior to the operative date of the amendment, Employee could not recover for a loss of earning capacity under the amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the amendment to section 48-121(3) did not apply to Employee's action, he could not recover for an alleged loss of earning capacity on that basis. View "Smith v. Mark Chrisman Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee suffered a shoulder injury arising out of the course of his employment with Employer. Employee subsequently resigned his employment with Employer and began working for another company. Employee later filed a petition against Employer in the compensation court, seeking temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The compensation court awarded Employee TTD benefits for the periods he was unable to work due to postsurgery restrictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of TTD benefits, holding that an employee who leaves a job with an employer responsible for an injury in order to pursue more desirable employment does not waive TTD benefits simply because the employer responsible for the injury would have accommodated light-duty restrictions during postsurgical recovery periods necessitated by the injury. View "Zwiener v. Becton Dickinson-East" on Justia Law

Lozier Corporation (Lozier) claimed that the Douglas County Board of Equalization (Board) overvalued three parcels of land it owned. Lozier mailed three appeals to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). Although Lozier mailed the appeals before the filing deadline, TERC did not receive the appeals until after the deadline had passed. TERC dismissed the appeals as untimely, concluding that the mailing did not meet the requirements under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5013(2). At issue on appeal was whether a postage meter stamp is a "postmark" for purposes of section 77-5013(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a postage meter stamp is a "postmark" within the meaning of section 77-5013(2); and (2) therefore, Lozier's mailing met the jurisdictional requirements under section 77-5013(2). View "Lozier Corp. v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law