Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits for injuries he received during his employment with Employer. In accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-139(3), Employee entered into a lump-sump settlement with Employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier. Pursuant to the statute, Employee filed a release in which he waived his rights under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act (Act) and discharged Employer from further liability arising from the injury. Employer paid the lump-sum amount forty-two days after the filing of the release. Employee subsequently sought and received a workers' compensation court order awarding a waiting-time penalty and attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a worker waives all of his rights under the Act when he files a release pursuant to the settlement procedures in section 48-139(3), including the right to penalties; and (2) therefore, a waiting-time penalty and the corresponding attorney fees cannot be imposed following a settlement reached under section 48-139(3). Remanded. View "Holdsworth v. Greenwood Famers Coop." on Justia Law

While at work, Employee was asked by his supervisor to enter a grain bin and to shovel grain into the center of the bin's conical base in order to facilitate removal of grain from the bin. Employee died of asphyxiation after being engulfed in the grain. Employer pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of willfully violating Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations by knowingly permitting an employee to enter a grain bin in violation of safety standards. The personal representative of Employee's estate (Estate) subsequently brought this action against Employer for wrongful death and assault and battery and for a declaratory judgment that either the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act did not apply or, alternatively, that it was unconstitutional on its face as applied. The district court dismissed the Estate's complaint, finding that the Act applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite the egregiousness of Employer's conduct, the injury was still an "accident" as defined by the Act; and (2) the Act does not thereby unconstitutionally discriminate between employees and nonemployees or employee victims of employer willful negligence and employee victims of their own willful negligence. View "Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Coop. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an accident arising out of the course of his employment on October 23, 2007. Employee filed a workers' compensation action on February 28, 2012 against Employer, seeking relief under an amended version of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3), alleging that he was entitled to benefits calculated on the basis of the loss of earning capacity pursuant to this amendment. The Legislature specified that the operative date of the amendment to the statute was January 1, 2008. The workers' compensation court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that the amendment was substantive rather than procedural and that because Employee's accident and injuries occurred prior to the operative date of the amendment, Employee could not recover for a loss of earning capacity under the amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the amendment to section 48-121(3) did not apply to Employee's action, he could not recover for an alleged loss of earning capacity on that basis. View "Smith v. Mark Chrisman Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee suffered a shoulder injury arising out of the course of his employment with Employer. Employee subsequently resigned his employment with Employer and began working for another company. Employee later filed a petition against Employer in the compensation court, seeking temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The compensation court awarded Employee TTD benefits for the periods he was unable to work due to postsurgery restrictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of TTD benefits, holding that an employee who leaves a job with an employer responsible for an injury in order to pursue more desirable employment does not waive TTD benefits simply because the employer responsible for the injury would have accommodated light-duty restrictions during postsurgical recovery periods necessitated by the injury. View "Zwiener v. Becton Dickinson-East" on Justia Law

Lozier Corporation (Lozier) claimed that the Douglas County Board of Equalization (Board) overvalued three parcels of land it owned. Lozier mailed three appeals to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). Although Lozier mailed the appeals before the filing deadline, TERC did not receive the appeals until after the deadline had passed. TERC dismissed the appeals as untimely, concluding that the mailing did not meet the requirements under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-5013(2). At issue on appeal was whether a postage meter stamp is a "postmark" for purposes of section 77-5013(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a postage meter stamp is a "postmark" within the meaning of section 77-5013(2); and (2) therefore, Lozier's mailing met the jurisdictional requirements under section 77-5013(2). View "Lozier Corp. v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

United States Cold Storage (Cold Storage) and Sanitary and Improvement District No. 59 of Sarpy County (SID 59) filed complaints challenging separate annexation ordinances enacted by the City of La Vista. The ordinances at issue were ordinance 1142 and ordinance 1107, together which purported to annex SID 59 in its entirety, including an industrial area. The district court found in favor of La Vista on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in upholding the validity of both ordinance 1007 and ordinance 1142 adopted by La Vista for the annexation of SID 59. View "U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of La Vista" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured during the course of his employment with Employer. Appellant obtained a workers' compensation award that covered future medical treatment. Appellant subsequently underwent knee replacement surgery and sought a further award of benefits. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) denied the petition, finding that Appellant's knee replacement surgery was not established to be the product of the subject accident but, rather, was prompted by Appellant's preexisting degenerative knee condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence provided sufficient competent evidence to support a finding that Appellant's knee replacement surgery was not the result of the work-related accident, and therefore, the WCC did not err in finding that Appellant's surgery was not compensable; and (2) in so holding, the WCC was not acting contrary to the original award but was enforcing the award's plain language. View "Pearson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Co." on Justia Law

Butler County Diary, LLC (BCD) requested a permit to install a liquid livestock manure pipeline under a public road. Read Township and Butler County cited two regulations it had adopted governing livestock confinement facilities in denying BCD's request. BCD challenged the regulations, alleging that the regulations were invalid and unenforceable. The district court ruled that the Township had the statutory authority to enact the regulations and that they were not preempted by the Livestock Waste Management Act or Nebraska's Department of Environmental Quality livestock waste control regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Township had the statutory authority to enact the pertinent regulations and the regulations were not preempted by state statute or regulation. View "Butler County Dairy, LLC v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Employee, an undocumented worker, was injured while working for Employer. Employee was awarded temporary total disability benefits. Employer later petitioned the workers' compensation court to discontinue the temporary benefits. While the action was pending, Employee returned to his county of origin. The compensation court concluded (1) Employer's obligation to pay Employee temporary total disability should cease because Employee had reached maximum medical improvement; and (2) there was no credible evidence which could be used to determine Employee's loss of earning capacity in his new community, and therefore, Employee's request for benefits for his claim of permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity was denied. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the compensation court's conclusion that Employee had reached maximum medical improvement; but (2) reversed the denial of Employee's claim of permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity because where no credible data exists for the community to which the employee has relocated, the community where the injury occurred can serve as the hub community. Remanded. View "Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions" on Justia Law

While in the course and scope of her employment, Appellant suffered and injury and incurred medical expenses. The Workers' Compensation Court ordered Appellant's employer (Employer) to pay the expenses. Employer made payments directly to Appellant's health care providers within thirty days of the court's order. Because she was not personally reimbursed for the medical expenses within thirty days, Appellant sought a waiting-time penalty, attorney fees, and interest pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-125. The Workers' Compensation Court denied relief, and Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because section 48-125 did not apply to Appellant's request for a waiting-time penalty, the compensation court did not err in overruling her motion for a waiting-time penalty; and (2) Employer in this case was not subject to liability for attorney fees, and therefore, Appellant was not entitled to an award of interest. View "VanKirk v. Cent. Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law