Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute between AT&T Communications and TCG Omaha (collectively AT&T) and the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) regarding the correct interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 86-140, which governs the regulation of access charges. In its order, the PSC determined that telecommunications companies like AT&T could seek the negotiation and review of access charges under section 86-140 only when a local exchange carrier had implemented new or revised access charges, and not "at will." The district court reversed in part and in part modified the decision of the PSC. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court placing certain limitations on the section 86-140 negotiation and review process, holding that the plain language of the statute envisions both a negotiation and review process that are not limited by the statute. Remanded. View "AT&T Commc'ns v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

On March 21, 2006, Julie Lovelace was injured in the course of her employment with the City of Lincoln. Lovelace continued to work after her injury up until June 22, 2006, the date of the surgery on her knee. Lovelace returned to work on October 2, 2006 until November 6, 2007, when she was again injured. Lovelace had another surgery on her left knee on December 19, 2007. Lovelace did not return to work, and the City subsequently terminated her employment. Lovelace sought payments for temporary total disability. The workers' compensation court found Lovelace had been temporarily totally disabled from June 22, 2006 through October 1, 2006, and again from December 19, 2007 through August 19, 2009, and thereafter became permanently and totally disabled. A three-judge panel of the compensation court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lovelace was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits for the period of time after she was injured and while she was working between October 2, 2006 and December 18, 2007; and (2) Lovelace was entitled to permanent total disability payments from December 19, 2007 onward. View "Lovelace v. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

Jan Ginapp, a registered nurse, was injured on the job in a violent assault committed by a patient who had been admitted to the hospital after he was taken into emergency protective custody by the City of Bellevue police department. Ginapp sued Bellevue, alleging that her injuries resulted from the police department's negligence. The district court entered judgment for Ginapp against Bellevue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that the patient was in Bellevue's custody at the time of the assault and that Bellevue law enforcement acted unreasonably in transporting the patient to the hospital and permitting him to be admitted; and (2) therefore, the court erred in finding that Bellevue was liable for Ginapp's injuries. View "Ginapp v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

Before Appellee began work as a certified nurse aid at Hospital, she failed to disclose on a preemployment questionnaire a work-related injury she received in 2001. In 2008, while working at Hospital, Appellee injured her back. Appellee subsequently petitioned for workers' compensation benefits. The trial judge dismissed the petition, concluding (1) Appellee had willfully misrepresented her work-related injury history when she failed to disclose information about her previous injury; and (2) the hospital could deny benefits because of Appellee's misrepresentation pursuant to Hilt Trucks Lines, Inc. v. Jones. The Workers' Compensation Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial judge erred in finding a causal connection between Appellee's misrepresentation and her 2008 injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court's decision in Hilt Truck Lines, Inc. was clearly erroneous, and it was therefore overruled. Remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Appellee was entitled to benefits without regard to Hospital's misrepresentation defense. View "Bassinger v. Neb. Heart Hosp." on Justia Law

Appellant Tymar, LLC filed an application with the Nebraska Public Service Commission seeking authority to operate as a common carrier of household goods in intrastate commerce. Appellees, other common carriers in the area, filed protests to Tymar's application. After a hearing, the Commission denied the application, determining that Tymar had failed to establish its prima facie case that it met the standards for approval of its application under the regulatory scheme imposed by Neb. Rev. Stat. 75-301. The district court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether requests for admissions Tymar tendered to Appellees but which Appellees did not answer should have been deemed admitted under Neb. R. Civ. P. R. 36. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission erred when it did not give legal effect to the substance of the unanswered requests, and the district court erred as a matter of law when it failed to correct the Commission's rulings regarding these requests for admissions. Remanded with directions to reconsider Tymar's application. View "Tymar, LLC v. Two Men and a Truck" on Justia Law

The City of Scottsbluff implemented changes to police officers' health insurance coverage and related benefits without bargaining with the Scottsbluff Police Officers Association (the Union). The Union filed a petition with the Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), alleging that the City violated Nebraska's Industrial Relations Act (IRA) by unilaterally implementing changes in the health insurance hazardous activities exclusion and by unilaterally changing the group health care benefits. The CIR (1) determined that the City violated the IRA, ordered the City to return the parties to the status quo ante, and ordered the parties to commence good faith negotiations within thirty days; and (2) determined that the Union had not violated the IRA in refusing to execute a previously ratified agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the portion of the CIR's order requiring the parties to commence good faith negotiations on the health insurance issues was affirmed; and (2) the Union's refusal to execute the previously ratified agreement constituted a prohibited practice under the IRA. Remanded to determine what remedies were available to the City for the Union's violation. View "Scottsbluff Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Scottsbluff" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Pearson was struck by a forklift and was later determined to have been injured in the course of his employment with Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Company (ADM). The workers' compensation court entered an award granting Pearson, among other benefits, certain future medical expenses. Pearson subsequently had a total knee replacement and sought reimbursement from ADM for those expenses as well as for expenses relating to a back injury. After ADM declined to pay the expenses, Pearson filed a motion to compel payment. A further award was entered (1) denying Pearson's motion with respect to the knee replacement but ordering ADM to pay expenses relating to the treatment of the back injury, and (2) applying the workers' compensation court's fee schedule to payments for the back injury, which had previously been paid by Pearson's health insurer. The workers' compensation court review panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly found that the original order denied knee replacement, and (2) the trial court did not err in applying the fee schedule to any reimbursement to a third party. Remanded. View "Pearson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Co." on Justia Law

Appellants, three individuals, filed an initiative and referendum petition to refer a proposed ballot measure, which would have amended a city ordinance imposing an occupation tax, to the electorate of the City. The City filed a declaratory judgment action to have the proposed measure declared invalid. The district court ruled that the petition proposed a referendum measure that violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 18-2528(1)(a), which prohibits referendums that interfere with a city's contractual obligations. The electors voted on the proposed amendment. The district court subsequently ordered the county clerk not to count the votes cast and not to report or certify the results. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and vacated, holding (1) the district court lacked the authority to block the count of the votes cast because the City failed to comply with the statutory requisites that would allow a court to take that action; (2) the district court erred in ruling that the proposed referendum violated section 18-2528(1)(a); and (3) the proposed referendum violated a common-law single subject rule, which invalidates proposed ballot measures that ask voters to approve independent and distinct measures in a single vote. View "City of North Platte v. Tilgner" on Justia Law

This case involved a constitutional challenge to an occupation tax levied pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 2-3226.05. Appellant landowners, who were residents and taxpayers of natural resources districts in the Republican River basin, brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to have the occupation tax declared unconstitutional and its levy and collection enjoined. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the occupation tax, determining that it did not violate the Nebraska Constitution as (1) the occupation tax was not a property tax but, rather, an excise tax levied upon the activity of irrigation; (2) the occupation tax did not result in a commutation of taxes; and (3) section 2-3226.05 was not special legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judgment in Garey v. Nebraska Department of Natural Resources did not bar this action under the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) the landowners did not meet their burden of establishing that the occupation tax was unconstitutional. View "Kiplinger v. Neb. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

The Commission of Industrial Relations was presented with an industrial dispute between the Professional Firefighters Association of Omaha, Local 385, and the City of Omaha. Prior to resolution of the industrial dispute, the Commission issued a status quo order requiring the City to adhere to the employment terms in place at the time. Local 385 then instituted proceedings in the district court, alleging that the City was in violation of the status quo order. The district court entered an order (1) finding that the City was in violation of the status quo order by failing to retain the required minimum number of fire personnel, and (2) determining that the City was not in violation of the status quo order by failing to maintain a specific number of fire captains based on the Commission's previous determination that the issue was one of management prerogative. The City appealed and Local 385 cross-appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding the appeal was moot because the industrial dispute between the parties had been resolved in an order that also dissolved the status quo order. View "Prof'l Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law