Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a woman, M.S., who was the subject of a petition filed by the State in May 2024, alleging she was mentally ill and dangerous under Nebraska law. The petition was supported by statements from M.S.’ daughter, who described recent concerning behavior, including M.S. bringing a gun to her daughter’s home, appearing paranoid, and exhibiting signs of being out of touch with reality. M.S. was admitted to a psychiatric facility pending commitment proceedings, and a hearing was held before the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District. During the proceedings, M.S. was represented by counsel and objected to certain testimony on confrontation and hearsay grounds.The Mental Health Board overruled M.S.’ motion for a continuance and proceeded with the commitment hearing, where it heard testimony from a psychiatrist, M.S.’ daughter, and M.S. herself. The Board found, by clear and convincing evidence, that M.S. suffered from bipolar I disorder, manic with psychosis, and was dangerous to herself and others. The Board ordered inpatient treatment and authorized forced medication. M.S. appealed to the District Court for Douglas County, arguing that her rights to confrontation were violated, that inadmissible hearsay was admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to support her commitment. The district court affirmed the Board’s decision, ruling that any errors in admitting certain evidence were harmless because the facts were otherwise established in the record.On further appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that confrontation rights under both the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, as extended by statute to mental health commitment proceedings, are trial rights that do not apply to pretrial hearings. The court further found that the challenged statements by family members were admissible under the medical purpose exception to the hearsay rule. The court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported the findings that M.S. was mentally ill and dangerous, and that the treatment ordered was the least restrictive alternative. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "In re Interest of M.S." on Justia Law

A self-described "lay midwife" was charged by the State of Nebraska with practicing a profession without a credential after being ordered to cease and desist. The midwife, who did not hold a state-issued credential, provided prenatal and postnatal care and assisted with childbirth. The charges were based on her alleged violation of the Uniform Credentialing Act (UCA).In Madison County, the district court sustained the midwife's plea in abatement, finding that "nurse midwives" were not required to hold credentials under the UCA. The court also suggested that the UCA would be unconstitutionally vague if it required a credential for practicing "nurse midwifery." Similarly, in Douglas County, the district court sustained a plea in abatement on the same grounds, dismissing the charges against the midwife.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district courts had misconstrued the UCA. The court held that the UCA requires individuals to hold a credential to engage in practices such as attending childbirth and providing related care, which fall under the scope of medicine and surgery, advanced practice registered nursing, and certified nurse midwifery. The court also found that the evidence presented was sufficient to show probable cause that the midwife had committed the charged crime.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district courts' orders sustaining the pleas in abatement and dismissing the charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including consideration of the midwife's motions to quash and demurrers. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this case brought under the Developmental Disabilities Court-Ordered Custody Act (DDCCA) the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that T.W. was a person in need of court-ordered custody and adopting the custody and treatment plan prepared by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) with additional restrictions, holding that the district court was entitled to modify the terms of the treatment plan if the additional terms are supported by sufficient evidence.The State filed a petition under the DDCCA for court-ordered custody of T.W., an adult male. The district court found that T.W. was a person in need of court-ordered custody and treatment and, in accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1124, ordered DHHS to prepare a written custody and treatment plan. After a hearing, the district court adopted DHHS' treatment plan and added conditions to T.W.'s placement that were not part of the plan offered by the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court's order, including the added conditions, conformed to the law, was supported by competent evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. View "In re T.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this purported appeal brought by K.C. after the district court ordered an evaluation of K.C. and preparation of a plan pursuant to the Development Disabilities Court-Ordered Custody Act (DDCCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1101 to 71-1134, holding that the order was not final or appealable.The State filed a petition pursuant to the act seeking court-ordered custody and treatment for K.C., alleging that K.C. was a person with a developmental disability who posed a threat of harm to others and was in need of court-ordered custody and treatment. After a hearing, the district court issued an order adjudicating K.C. under the DDCCA. Prior to submission of any plan or dispositional hearing, K.C. filed an appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "In re Interest of K.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a district court's order denying injunctive relief, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.Plaintiffs were ten students at Creighton University who brought this petition seeking to enjoin Creighton from administratively withdrawing students who did not comply with its COVID-19 vaccine policy. After a hearing, the district court denied the petitions, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm or a likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court's denial of a temporary injunction was not a final order, and therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Ramaekers v. Creighton University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleging violations of the Health Care Facility Licensure Act (HCFLA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-401 to -476, and granting summary judgment to DHHS on the claims alleging violations of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1101 to -1125, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs were two former employees of a state hospital who highlighted inadequate record keeping for hospital psychiatrists. Plaintiffs were subsequently fired. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging violations of the NFEPA and the HCFLA. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims based on the HCFLA on sovereign immunity grounds and then granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS on the NFEPA claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiffs did not establish that they engaged in protected activity, the district court properly entered summary judgment against them on the NFEPA claims; and (2) because the State did not waive its sovereign immunity to suit under the HCFLA, the court properly dismissed those claims. View "Baker-Heser v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the county court purporting to discharge the Office of Public Guardian (OPG) and appoint the ward's parents as successor coguardians over their objection, holding that the parents had standing to appeal and that the Public Guardianship Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-4101 to 30-4118, did not permit the discharge of the OPG.Nicholas was an adult with severe mental illness who was in need of a guardian. His parents served as his court-appointed coguardians until they petitioned to have the OPG appointed as Nicholas's guardian pursuant to the Act. The county court appointed the OPG as Nicholas's guardian, but OPG later filed a motion for discharge, asserting that Nicholas's parents should be named successor guardians. After a hearing, the court granted the OPG's motion for discharge and directed that Nicholas's parents be appointed his successor coguardians. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the OPG failed to prove that its services were no longer necessary, and therefore, the county court erred in discharging the OPG under section 30-4117. View "In re Guardianship of Nicholas H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the county court's decision ordering Douglas County to pay the balance of the attorney fees owed by a former guardian-conservator to the successor guardian-conservator, holding that the county court's order did not conform to the law and was not supported by competent evidence.In 2007, a guardian-conservatorship was established for Alice H. In Douglas County. Pamela Grimes was appointed her guardian-conservator. In 2012, the court appointed Jodie McGill to serve as Alice's guardian-conservator. In 2016, the county court surcharged Grimes $37,505.70 in attorney fees to McGill. Grimes paid only a portion of the fees. In 2018, McGill asked the county court to order Douglas County to pay the balance. The court granted that request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order neither conformed to the law nor was supported by competent evidence. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Alice H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the decision of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) terminating Appellant's status as a Medicaid service provider, holding that the district court's affirmance of the sanction imposed by DHHS was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.Based on Appellant's failures to adhere to the standards for participation in Medicaid, DHHS terminated Appellant's provider agreements for good cause and then informed Appellant of her permanent exclusion from the Medicaid program. The DHHS director of the Division of Medicaid and Long-Term Care ruled that DHHS' decision to terminate Appellant as a Medicaid service provider was proper. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court's finding that Appellant billed for overlapping services was based on competent evidence; and (2) DHHS' sanction to permanently exclude Appellant from the Medicaid program was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Tran v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal after the district court administratively dismissed a negligence action for failure to timely submit a proposed scheduling order and then granted a motion to reinstate the case, holding that the district court’s reinstatement order was not a final, appealable order.On appeal, Appellants argued that the district erred when it applied the local rules regarding reinstatement of cases instead of Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-201.01 to decide whether to reinstate the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order vacating dismissal and reinstating the case put the parties back in approximately the same litigation posture as before the action was dismissed, and there was no reason to disrupt the progression of the case by entertaining an interlocutory appeal. View "Fidler v. Life Care Centers of America" on Justia Law