Articles Posted in Health Law

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The Supreme Court held that “medical assistance” provided to Medicaid recipients includes costs for room and board and other “nonmedical” expenses at nursing facilities, and therefore, those costs can be recovered from the recipient’s estate. In this case, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition for allowance of a claim for services provided to the decedent while he resided at two different nursing homes. The county court sustained DHHS’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the services defined as room and board fell within the parameters of services provided under the Medical Assistance Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DHHS was statutorily authorized to recover the sums it paid for room and board costs and other expenses from the decedent’s estate. View "In re Estate of Vollmann" on Justia Law

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Brayden O. was a seventeen-year-old girl who suffered from Coffin-Lowry Syndrome and other disabilities. Brayden had been receiving home and community-based waiver services through the Medicaid division of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for almost a dozen years before the DHHS determined that Brayden no longer met the necessary qualifications for such services. Merie B., Brayden’s mother, appealed DHHS’ determination, which was affirmed after an administrative appeal hearing. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions that the district court order DHHS to reinstate waiver services to Brayden, effective as of the date services were originally terminated. On remand, Merie requested reimbursement for expenses she incurred due to the wrongful termination of Brayden’s services, along with attorney fees. The district court granted the request and entered judgment against DHHS in the amount of $76,260.48. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court was without authority to expand the mandate in Merie B. I and hold an evidentiary hearing on Merie’s “Motion to Determine Expenses.” View "Merie B. on behalf of Brayden O. v. State" on Justia Law

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D.I. was committed for treatment as a dangerous sex offender under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA). The Supreme Court upheld the commitment. The Douglas County public defender’s office represented D.I. during the SOCA proceedings. Thereafter, D.I. filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from his commitment. At some point, attorney Ryan Stover began to represent D.I. and represented him for the remainder of the proceedings before the district court and the Supreme Court. The district court dismissed D.I.’s petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Stover subsequently filed an application for an order fixing attorney fees and expenses. The district court ordered Madison County to pay Stover’s fees and expenses in the amount of $6,259. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) statutes authorize the payment of attorney fees incurred by court-appointed counsel representing an indigent subject challenging his custody or treatment under the SOCA via a habeas petition; and (2) Stover’s fees were for services apparently performed in that capacity, and therefore, the district court properly ordered payment of attorney fees in this case. View "D.I. v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Health Law

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After a hearing, the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District found that L.T. was a dangerous sex offender under Sex Offender Commitment Act and that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative for him. On appeal, the district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board’s determination and that there was clear and convincing evidence that L.T. could be treated on an outpatient basis. The district court then ordered L.T. unconditionally discharged from commitment as a dangerous sex offender. The State sought to appeal the district court’s order pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1214. L.T. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the State did not follow the proper appeal procedure and, therefore, failed to perfect its appeal. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal, holding that the State failed to perfect an appeal under section 71-1214 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1912. View "In re Interest of L.T." on Justia Law

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Before Genevieve Franke’s death in 2014, she had been a resident of a nursing home. In 2013, Genevieve agreed to sell her farmland to her son John Franke at a price below its fair market value. Laurie Berggren, Genevieve's daughter, subsequently petitioned for the appointment of a conservator. The court appointed Laurie as Genevieve’s temporary conservator and Cornerstone Bank as Genevieve’s permanent conservator. Both Genevieve and John appealed. Before the parties filed briefs, Genevieve’s attorney filed a suggestion of death stating that Genevieve had died. Genevieve, through her attorney of record, sought an order to dismiss the appeal as moot and to vacate the county court’s order appointing a permanent conservator. John, in turn, moved for an order reviving the appeal. The Supreme Court overruled both of these motions, holding (1) Genevieve’s attorney has no standing to represent her in the Court after her death; (2) Genevieve’s death has abated John’s appeal, for which he has standing, because her competency and need for a conservator are moot issues; and (3) the abatement of John’s appeal does not require the Court to vacate the county court’s orders appointing a conservator. View "In re Conservatorship of Franke" on Justia Law

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Under Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-1207, a mental health board “shall” hold a hearing within seven days after the subject is taken into emergency protective custody. Appellant was convicted of sexual assault on a child. Before Appellant finished his sentence, the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District (Board) issued a warrant directing that Appellant remain in custody under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) until a commitment hearing. The hearing was held approximately five weeks later. The Board determined that Appellant was a dangerous sex offender and placed him in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services for inpatient treatment. Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the Board’s failure to hold a hearing within seven days violated the SOCA and his right to due process. The district court dismissed Appellant’s habeas petition, concluding that the seven-day time limit in section 71-1207 is directory, not mandatory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the seven-day time limit for holding a hearing under the statute is directory, and therefore, the untimeliness of the commitment hearing in this case did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction. View "D.I. v. Gibson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff’s minor daughter, Brayden, who suffers from Coffin-Lowry Syndrome, had been receiving home and community-based waiver services for approximately twelve years when the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) determined that she no longer qualified for waiver services and terminated the services. Plaintiff filed this action on behalf of Brayden, contending that DHHS used the wrong criteria to evaluate Brayden’s eligibility and erred in finding that she did not qualify for waiver services. The district court affirmed the termination of those services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) DHHS’ creation and use of exhibit 4, the assessment document used to evaluate children with disabilities, to evaluate Brayden was arbitrary and produced an unreasonable result; and (2) DHHS should have found that Brayden qualified for waiver services. View "Merie B. v. State" on Justia Law

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Rhonda was the mother and sole surviving parent of Benjamin, a twenty-two-year-old incapacitated adult. Rhonda filed a petition for the appointment of a guardian for Benjamin and nominated herself as guardian. The county court appointed an unrelated individual as Benjamin’s guardian without making findings or providing an explanation for passing over Rhonda. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appointment was arbitrary and capricious, as the county court appointed the unrelated individual as Benjamin’s guardian without specific findings, any explanation for bypassing Rhonda’s statutory priority for appointment, or any reason readily apparent in the evidentiary record. View "In re Guardianship of Benjamin E." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law, Health Law

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In 1998, a trust was established for the care of Evelyn A. Nabity. In 2011, Evelyn amended the trust agreement that changed the identity of the trustees. In 2012, Evelyn’s son, Robert, petitioned for the appointment of a guardian, conservator, and guardian ad litem for Evelyn and for registration and administration of the trust. Robert argued that Evelyn had not been competent to amend the trust agreement and requested a determination of the proper trustees. In the trust administration proceeding, the county court found that Evelyn was not competent to execute the trust amendment and entered an order declaring Robert and his brother cotrustees. In the guardianship proceeding, the county court set aside a health care power of attorney Evelyn executed in 1998 and ordered Robert to serve as Evelyn’s permanent guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was clear and convincing evidence that Evelyn was incompetent to execute the amendments to the trust agreement; and (2) the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator for Evelyn did not deny her the benefit of a valid health care power of attorney. View "In re Trust Created by Nabity" on Justia Law

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Appellant filed this action against Prairie Fields Family Medicine, P.C., bringing claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy and alleging that a Prairie Fields employee disclosed her positive HIV test results to a third party, and as a result, the information spread throughout the community where Appellant did business and had friends. The district court (1) dismissed Appellant’s invasion of privacy claim, concluding that it was time barred; and (2) granted summary judgment for Prairie Fields on Appellant’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, concluding that Appellant failed to create an issue of fact that someone from Prairie Fields had disclosed her diagnosis to a third party. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment order, holding that Appellant raised a genuine issue of material fact that someone at Prairie Fields disclosed information from her private medical records. Remanded. View "C.E. v. Prairie Fields Family Med., P.C." on Justia Law