Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from an automobile accident that occurred when the vehicle being driven by William Webster struck the vehicle being driven by Marcus Williams. Williams sued the City of Omaha, alleging that, at the time of the crash, Webster was fleeing to avoid apprehension by a police cruiser that was actively attempting to apprehend Webster. Therefore, Williams argued, the City was strictly liable for all of his damages under the pursuit statue, Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-911. The City argued that the pursuit statute did not apply because the officers intended only to stop the vehicle and not to “apprehend” Webster. The district court entered judgment in favor of Williams, finding that the City was strictly liable for Williams’ damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the police officers made an active attempt to apprehend Webster prior to the collision; and (2) because the other requirements for a pursuit under Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-911 were satisfied, the officers’ pursuit of Webster was a proximate cause of the collision. View "Williams v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries at a motel while he was on duty for Union Pacific Railroad Company. Plaintiff sued Union Pacific and the motel. The parties later settled. Thereafter, Union Pacific asserted a contractual right of subrogation to the extent of medical payments made on Plaintiff’s behalf by the Union Pacific Railroad Employees Health Systems. The contract created a lien or right of reimbursement if a third party is liable but not if Union Pacific is liable. The trial court concluded that Union Pacific did not have a valid lien, right of reimbursement or right of subrogation because it was party to the settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the unambiguous terms of the contract, Union Pacific did not have a lien or right of reimbursement. View "Kasel v. Union Pacific R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Judy Hoffman were divorced in 1994. Judy died intestate in 2007, and Plaintiff was named personal representative of her estate. Defendant, an attorney and Judy’s friend, was the beneficiary of two of Judy’s life insurance policies and her retirement account and received $236,024 from these accounts. Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant alleging breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the duty of a trustee, and conversion. The district court found for Defendant and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) determining that an express trust needed to be created in order to find Defendant liable and in placing the burden to prove such trust on Plaintiff; (2) failing to impose a constructive trust on the insurance proceeds; (3) failing to find that Defendant deviated from the standard of care and committed legal malpractice by accepting and retaining Judy’s death benefit funds given his status as her attorney; and (4) admitting into evidence a photocopy of a note purportedly given from Judy to Defendant. View "Gallner v. Larson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this personal injury action alleging that Plaintiff was injured after she lost control of her vehicle due to corn mash that had spilled from a truck onto the highway the previous day. Plaintiff brought this action against the driver of the truck, the driver’s employer, and three political subdivisions. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all named defendants, concluding (1) the political subdivisions were immune from suit under Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-910(12); and (2) the actions of firefighters and a state trooper in conducting the cleanup of the corn mash spill and declaring the road safe for travel eliminated any duty on the part of the driver and his employer to remediate the spill. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to the driver and his employer, holding the actions of the firefighters and state trooper who responded to the spill and opened the road for traffic cut off any duty that these defendants had to remediate the spill or warn of the hazard it posed to other motorists; but (2) reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of the three political subdivisions, holding that these defendants’ sovereign immunity was waived pursuant to section 13-910(12). View "Kimminau v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

Devin Witt allegedly drove a pickup truck over Benjamin Carrel’s foot in a parking lot in Beatrice, Nebraska. The truck was registered to Serco, Inc. Carrel brought a personal injury action against Serco and Witt. When Serco did not respond to a service of summons, a show cause order, or notice of Carrel’s motion for a default judgment, the district court entered a default judgment against Serco. The district court denied Serco’s motion to vacate the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Serco’s motion to vacate the default judgment, holding that, where Serco placed Carrel on notice of its meritorious defense that it did not employ Witt or own the vehicle he was driving at the time of the incident and where any negligence on the part of Serco in responding to the suit was excusable, permitting the default judgment to stand would unfairly deprive Serco of a substantial right and produce an unjust result. Remanded with directions to vacate the default judgment and to give Serco a reasonable time in which to file an appropriate responsive pleading. View "Carrel v. Serco Inc." on Justia Law

Ellen Panec died after being injured in a motor vehicle accident. Ellen’s husband, William, was appointed the personal representative of her estate. The majority of Ellen’s estate passed to her daughter, Rebecca Griffin, as the remainder beneficiary. A lawsuit was filed against the driver of the other vehicle. William also made a claim against his and Ellen’s underinsurance carrier. Both the driver’s liability insurer and the underinsurance carrier offered to settle the claims. After a hearing, the county court approved the settlements and distributed the majority of the settlement proceeds to William. Although the proceeds flowed from both a survival claim and a wrongful death claim, the county court applied Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-810 - the wrongful death statute - to govern all distributions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the county court with directions to allocate the settlement proceeds between the wrongful death and survival claims, to direct distribution of the wrongful death settlement proceeds, and to direct distribution of the survival claim proceeds to Griffin as the sole beneficiary of Ellen’s residuary probate estate, holding that because the proceeds included the settlement of the survival claim, the proceeds for the survival claim were wrongly distributed in accordance with section 30-810. View "In re Estate of Panec" on Justia Law

Donald Peterson, a resident of Kings Gate senior homes, was assaulted by Floyd Wallace on Kings Gate’s premises. Peterson filed suit against Kings Gate, alleging that Kings Gate was negligent by failing to exercise reasonable care in performing a criminal background check of Wallace, by failing to exclude Wallace from the Kings Gate premises, and by failing to warn tenants about Wallace and provide safe premises for tenants. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Kings gate had no duty to protect Peterson from Wallace. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Kings Gate owed a duty to Peterson such as to overcome Kings Gate’s motion to dismiss. View "Peterson v. Kings Gate Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Omaha pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act seeking damages for injuries he sustained when he was struck by a stolen vehicle allegedly being pursued by Omaha police officers. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that any pursuit had terminated prior to the accident and that the officers’ actions were not the proximate cause of the accident in which Plaintiff was injured. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that any pursuit was terminated prior to the accident; and (2) finding that the officers’ actions were not the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages and in applying the applicable law with respect to proximate cause. View "Maclovi-Sierra v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Jan Golnick filed a complaint alleging that he sustained injuries as a direct and proximate result of a crash with the vehicle driven by Jack Callender. Callender admitted in his answer that he was negligent in causing the vehicle accident that injured Golnick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did commit prejudicial error in (1) denying Golnick’s request to amend his complaint to allege specific acts of tortious conduct; (2) sustaining Callender’s motion to prohibit Golnick from presenting evidence of Callender’s negligence at trial; and (3) rejecting three of Golnick’s proposed jury instructions. View "Golnick v. Callender" on Justia Law

Cole Hodson was invited by Whitney Taylor to the residence of her parents, Bradley and Laura Taylor, for the purpose of swimming and boating in the Willers Cove lake. While diving into the water, Hodson abruptly came into contact with something in the water. As a result, Hodson was paralyzed and without feeling from the chest down. Hodson filed this action alleging (1) the Taylors were negligent in failing to warn users of Willers Cove of the dangerous condition of the lake and in allowing Whitney use the boat without supervision; (2) the Willers Cove Association (WCOA), which owned and maintained the lake, should have known of dangerous conditions in the lake; and (3) Ronald and Marilyn Willers, who created the lake, negligently constructed a culvert which led to the dangerous condition that caused Hodson’s injury. The district court granted summery judgment in favor of the defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court’s determination that the Recreational Liability Act applied to the Taylors; (2) affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment to the Willers; and (3) reversed the court’s finding that the open and obvious doctrine applied to bar the WCOA’s liability. Remanded to determine the negligence of the Taylors and the WCOA. View "Hodson v. Taylor" on Justia Law