Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Synergy4 Enterprises, Inc. brought an action against Pinnacle Bank on claims of promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud, alleging that Pinnacle Bank caused damages by orally assuring Synergy4 that Pinnacle would provide a $1 million credit line and then only providing $400,000 provided for in a commitment letter. The district court sustained Pinnacle’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Synergy4’s claims were barred by Nebraska’s credit agreement statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Synergy4’s claims were based on a credit agreement that was not in writing, they were barred by Nebraska’s credit agreement statute of frauds. View "Synergy4 Enters., Inc. v. Pinnacle Bank" on Justia Law

Appellee, on behalf of her minor child, filed a petition and affidavit for a harassment protection order against her child’s boyfriend, Appellant. The district court filed an ex parte harassment protection order and, after a show cause hearing, ordered that the harassment protection order remain in effect for a period of one year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it admitted certain exhibits into evidence; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the harassment protection order. Remanded with directions to vacate the harassment protection order. View "Richards v. McClure" on Justia Law

John Hughes, the parent of a student at a middle school in Aurora, Nebraska, tripped and fell while exiting the middle school building. Hughes sued the owner of the building, the School District of Aurora, alleging that the District failed to maintain sufficient lighting at the building’s exit, failed to construct a proper handrail along an exit ramp, allowed a section of sidewalk to “heave,” and allowed a concrete bench to obstruct the path of egress. The district court granted summary judgment for the District because Hughes was not sure what caused him to fall. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because reasonable minds could draw contrary conclusions from the evidence presented, the District did not show it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hughes v. Sch. Dist. of Aurora" on Justia Law

Improper transfers were made from a title insurance agent’s escrow account. The agent’s principal, United General Title Insurance Company, paid the loss and then sued to recover the loss from multiple entities and persons, including recipients of the transferred funds. United General recovered judgment against some entities and persons, but summary judgment was entered against it on various claims. After a jury trial, several recipients of the transferred funds successfully defended the action on the remaining issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court correctly granted summary judgment, with the exception of United General’s claims for conversion and a constructive trust; (2) there was no merit to the alleged errors that United General asserted occurred at trials; and (3) after trial, the district court correctly granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. View "United Gen. Title Ins. Co. v. Malone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a home inspector and the sole member of an LLC. Two years after Plaintiff inspected a house of the client of a real estate agent (“Agent”) affiliated with a brokerage firm (“Company”), the Agent sent an e-mail to the Company’s real estate agents and employees stating that Plaintiff was a “total idiot.” Plaintiff sued the Agent and the Company, alleging libel, false light invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that a qualified privilege protected the e-mail and that the evidence failed to show that Plaintiff had a business relationship or expectancy with either the Agent or the Company. Defendant attempted to appeal for both himself and the LLC. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in its judgment regarding the claims asserted by Plaintiff in his personal capacity; and (2) the portion of the judgment as it related to the LLC must be vacated because, where Plaintiff was not licensed to practice law in Nebraska, his appeal for the LLC was a nullity. View "Steinhausen v. HomeServices of Neb., Inc." on Justia Law

Bradly Brothers received medical treatment at Kimball County Hospital after suffering injuries in a single-vehicle accident. After a chiropractor subsequently discovered multiple fractures in Brothers’ finger, Brothers filed a tort claim pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act and later filed a complaint against Kimball County, the Hospital, and a Physician. The district court dismissed the County and entered summary judgment for the Hospital and the Physician. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a county hospital is a separate legal entity from the county, and because the County in this case could have no liability under the facts alleged, any error by the district court in failing to allow Brothers to present evidence on the County’s motion to dismiss was harmless; and (2) the Hospital and Physician were properly dismissed due to Brothers’ failure to meet the Act’s filing requirements. View "Brothers v. Kimball County Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against the City of Omaha under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), alleging that the City was responsible for injuries Plaintiff sustained in a slip-and-fall accident on a sidewalk. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the “snow or ice” exemption in the PSTCA, which exempts claims arising out of snow or ice conditions in a public place due to weather. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred under the snow or ice exemption. View "Stick v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Debtors contracted with Builder to finish construction on a house. After Debtors defaulted on progress payments, Builder sued Debtors and Bank, claiming that Defendants falsely represented or concealed material information about whether Debtors could pay for the work. The district court sustained Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Builder’s fraud and conspiracy claims. Debtors then confessed judgment on Builder’s breach of contract claim. After a bench trial, the district court ruled for Defendants on Builder’s equitable and promissory estoppel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court erred in granting summary judgment to Debtors on Builder’s fraud claim and to Debtors and Bank on Builder’s civil conspiracy claim; and (2) during trial, the court did not err in finding that Builder had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Bank promised to fund Builder’s work that was definite enough to induce Builder’s foreseeable reliance on the statement, but these factual findings did not preclude Builder’s proof of the same facts for its fraud claims. Remanded. View "deNourie & Youst Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

Jose Dominguez was working for D & BR Building Systems, Inc. (D&BR) on the roof of a building being constructed for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. when he was killed in an accident. D&BR had subcontracted with with Graham Construction, Inc. (Graham), the general contractor on the project, to install the steelwork necessary for the building. Guadalupe Gaytan, the special administrator of Dominguez’s estate, brought this negligence action against Wal-Mart and Graham. The district court granted summary judgment for Wal-Mart and Graham. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted to Wal-Mart, as no genuine issues of material fact existed as to any of Gaytan’s claims against Wal-Mart; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to Gaytan’s direct negligence claim against Graham arising from Graham’s alleged retention of control over the use of safety equipment on the roof. Remanded. View "Gaytan v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law

State farm Fire & Casualty Company issued a rental dwelling policy to Jerry Dantzler. The tenants of Dantzler’s rental property sued Dantzler for personal injuries allegedly sustained by a Dantzler’s tenant as a result of exposure to lead-based paint. Dantzler tendered the claim to State Farm. State Farm subsequently filed an action for declaratory judgment against Dantzler and the tenants asking for a determination of whether its policy precluded coverage for the tenants’ personal injury claim. The district court granted summary judgment for State Farm, concluding as a matter of law that the pollution exclusion barred coverage under State Farm’s policy. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the tenant’s injuries were the result of a “discharge, dispersal, spill, release or escape of pollutants” as described in the pollution exclusion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that all manners of exposure to lead-based paint involve discharge, dispersal, spill, release, or escape, and therefore, the manner of exposure was not a material fact that prevented summary judgment. Remanded. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dantzler" on Justia Law