Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Weber and Dixie Weber irrigated eight tracts of water from the upper Taylor-Ord Canal under contract with North Loup Public Power and Irrigation District. In June 2010, flooding occurred that destroyed a diversion dam that North Loup had utilized to deliver water to irrigators. Due to the extent of the damage, North Loup concluded that water would not be provided to irrigators on the upper Canal during the 2010 irrigation season. At the time of the flooding, the Webers had not yet paid their 2010 irrigation charges. The Webers sued North Loup, alleging breach of contract and negligence and claiming damages resulting from reduced crop yields. The district court granted summary judgment for North Loup, concluding that because the Webers had not paid the 2010 irrigation charges, North Loup had no duty under the contracts to deliver water to the Webers during 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Webers’ failure to pay was both a nonfulfillment of a condition and a material breach of contract that relieved North Loup of its duty to perform; and (2) the Webers’ negligence claim failed as a matter of law because North Loup owed no duty to the Webers. View "Weber v. N. Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Barbara Potter suffered a repetitive trauma injury as a result of her employment as a dental hygienist over a period of more than 30 years. In late 2007 or early 2008, while working in a dental clinic for Dr. Patrick McCulla, Potter began experiencing pain in her neck. Potter received medical treatment for her pain 12 times between October 17, 2008, and January 20, 2009. By this time, McCulla had sold the dental practice to Dr. Tracy Garcia. Potter’s duties and hours remained the same during and after the ownership change. Potter filed a petition in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court seeking benefits. That court found Potter had preexisting conditions in her neck which were aggravated by her duties as a dental hygienist and awarded benefits based on a 40-percent loss of earning capacity. It determined that the date of the injury was February 11, 2009, as that was the date she first missed work to be treated for her injury. Because Garcia was Potter’s employer on the date of the injury, the court held Garcia and FirstComp liable for all of Potter’s medical expenses and compensation benefits. Garcia appealed. The Supreme Court concluded Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court properly determined that her injury manifested itself on February 11, 2009, during Potter’s employment with Garcia, and that Garcia and Garcia’s workers’ compensation carrier are liable for all of Potter’s medical expenses and compensation benefits. View "Potter v. McCulla" on Justia Law

Virginia Jacobson died from complications after choking on a piece of meat. Jacobson was under the care of Dr. Sherry Shresta and Dr. Gaston Cornu-Labat before she died. Virginia’s husband and the special administrator of Virginia’s estate (collectively, the Jacobsons) filed a wrongful death action against the doctors (Defendants). Defendants filed a motion to bifurcate on the issue of whether Defendants were employees of the hospital, a political subdivision. If Defendants were hospital employees, the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) barred the Jacobsons’ action. Before hearing the bifurcated employment issue, the trial court rejected the Jacobsons’ claim that they were entitled to a jury trial on the employment issue. The district court then dismissed the complaint, finding that Defendants were employees. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Jacobsons had waived their right to a jury trial because they failed to make a timely objection to the bench trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Jacobsons, by their silence, could not have waived their right to a jury trial; but (2) the Jacobsons did not have a right to have a jury decide whether Defendants were political subdivision employees. View "Jacobson v. Shresta" on Justia Law

Gloria Correa was involved in a motor vehicle accident with E. Dean Hascall (Hascall). Hascall later died of causes unrelated to the accident. After Hascall’s estate was closed, Correa filed a negligence action against the estate and the estate’s personal representative, Neomi D. Hascall (Neomi). The estate and Neomi moved for summary judgment, arguing that dismissal would be appropriate because Correa filed suit against a closed estate and a discharged personal representative. Correa, however, filed an emergency motion to reopen the estate and assign a special administrator for purposes of service, which was granted. The district court granted summary judgment for the estate and Neomi and denied Correa’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The Supreme Court dismissed Correa’s appeal, holding that, because the special administrator was not served within six months of the commencement of this action, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Correa’s claims, and likewise, this Court lacked jurisdiction over Correa’s appeal. View "Correa v. Estate of Hascall" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a legal injury when she fell while using a wooden plank walkway at a cabin owned by Lee Simmons, doing business as Niobrara River Ranch, LLC (Niobrara Ranch). Appellant filed an amended complaint against Simmons and Niobrara Ranch (together, Defendants), alleging negligence for failure to inspect the premises, to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe manner, or to warn Appellant of the dangerous condition on the premises. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. On appeal, Appellant contended that the Nebraska jury instruction on burden of proof in premises condition liability cases is not compatible with Nebraska’s comparative fault statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in giving the contested jury instruction, as it was a correct statement of the law regarding a plaintiff’s burden of proof in premises condition liability cases. View "Warner v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Appellant filed this action against Prairie Fields Family Medicine, P.C., bringing claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy and alleging that a Prairie Fields employee disclosed her positive HIV test results to a third party, and as a result, the information spread throughout the community where Appellant did business and had friends. The district court (1) dismissed Appellant’s invasion of privacy claim, concluding that it was time barred; and (2) granted summary judgment for Prairie Fields on Appellant’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, concluding that Appellant failed to create an issue of fact that someone from Prairie Fields had disclosed her diagnosis to a third party. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment order, holding that Appellant raised a genuine issue of material fact that someone at Prairie Fields disclosed information from her private medical records. Remanded. View "C.E. v. Prairie Fields Family Med., P.C." on Justia Law

Attorney represented Plaintiff in a negligence lawsuit against Defendant. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Attorney subsequently made an oral motion for payment of attorney fees and costs in the underlying negligence lawsuit. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order granting Attorney’s oral motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal because (1) Attorney never filed a petition in intervention, and therefore, at the time of his oral motion, Attorney was not a party to the suit; (2) furthermore, Attorney stated at the time he made his motion that he no longer represented Plaintiff; and (3) therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide Attorney’s oral motion for payment. View "Wisniewski v. Heartland Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

Edwin Kuhnel, an employee of BNSF Railway Company, was injured during while working for BNSF. Kuhnel brought this action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that his injuries were caused by BNSF’s failure to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work and its failure to take other appropriate safety measures. Pursuant to the jury’s general verdict, the district court entered judgment for BNSF. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the district court’s jury instructions erroneously permitted the jury to decide, as a factual determination, whether BNSF was under a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work; and (2) the general verdict rule did not bar the court from overturning the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instructions in this case did not rise to the level of plain error because the instructions implicitly recognized BNSF’s duty by requiring the jury to find that BNSF was negligent if it found that BNSF had failed to provide Kuhnel with a reasonably safe place to work. View "Kuhnel v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 1985, Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder. The Supreme Court later decided State v. Myers, which held that if malice was an essential element of the crime of second degree murder and the jury was not so instructed, reversal of the conviction was required. In accordance with Myers, Appellant’s conviction was vacated and a retrial ordered. Before Myers was decided, however, Appellant was charged in Lancaster County with several felonies. Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. The second degree murder charges against Appellant were eventually dismissed. In 2009, Appellant unsuccessfully filed a claim asking for compensation under the Nebraska Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment Act (Act). Appellant then filed suit against the State, alleging that he was entitled to damages for his wrongful conviction for second degree murder. After a trial, the district court found that Appellant had not shown he was innocent of the murder, as required by the Act, and dismissed Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) requiring Appellant to prove his innocence and not finding Appellant innocent under the Act; (2) denying Appellant’s motion for counsel; and (3) considering Appellant’s Lancaster County convictions. View "Hess v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Red Willow Dairy, LLC, and Jim and Ann Huffman. The day before the order granting the default judgment was signed and file stamped, Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. Plaintiff settled her claim in return for an assignment of rights to any causes of action Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans might have against Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company with respect to the underlying lawsuit. Plaintiff then sued Fireman’s for breach of its duty to defend Red Willow Dairy and Huffmans. The district court found that the filing of the default judgment violated the automatic stay of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Fireman’s. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the filing of the bankruptcy stayed any further proceedings in the underlying action, preventing the rendition and entry of the default judgment. View "Doe v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co." on Justia Law