Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At the center of this dispute was defective rebar that was incorporated into the construction of concrete pile caps that would form support for the Pinnacle Bank Arena. Some of the pile caps had to be modified in order to provide the necessary structural support for the Arena. The general contractor paid the costs of the correction and sought reimbursement from Drake-Williams Steel, Inc. (DWS), which fabricated the rebar. DWS reimbursed the general contractor and sought coverage from its insurers. The insurers denied the claim and commenced this action to determine their obligations under the policies of insurance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no coverage under the policies. View "Drake-Williams Steel, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Opal Lowman was injured in an automobile accident. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company provided underinsured motorist coverage to Opal and her husband. The Lowmans sued State Farm, seeking damages. The jury returned a verdict for the Lowmans in the amount of $0. The Lowmans filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it entered judgment on the jury’s verdict where the jury awarded the Lowmans no money damages; and (2) the district court did not err in denying the Lowmans’ motion for new trial. View "Lowman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Rent-A-Roofer, Inc. (Appellant) settled a lawsuit filed by the National Research Corporation (NRC) without notifying its insurer, Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company (the Insurer), of the lawsuit. Appellant later notified the Insurer of its involvement in litigation and made a demand under Appellant’s policy with the Insurer. The Insurer declined coverage on the grounds that Appellant breached the policy’s notice provision and the voluntary payments provision. Appellant subsequently brought this action against the Insurer, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment for the Insurer. The district court first concluded that for an insurer to deny coverage based on breach of a voluntary settlement condition, the insurer must show prejudice in connection with its claim. The court then ruled that, where Appellant failed to meet both the notice and voluntary payments provisions, prejudice had been established as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that the Insurer was not liable for settlement by NRC against Appellant and not liable for Appellant’s defense costs. View "Rent-A-Roofer v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

An employee at a boiler manufacturing plant sustained permanent hearing loss as a result of his employment. Between the time he was injured and the time he filed his workers’ compensation claim, the plant changed ownership. Twin City Fire Insurance Company insured the plant for the previous owner, and American Insurance Company insured the new owner. Counsel representing American mistakenly believed that American had insured the plant during the time of the injury, and Twin City was not given notice of the claim until after entry of an award. The new owner of the plant filed a declaratory judgment action against the previous owner and both insurers to determine who was liable for payment of the award. The district court determined that Twin City was liable for the employee’s workers’ compensation award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Twin City was liable for the award, in rejecting Twin City’s equitable defenses, and in dismissing Twin City’s counterclaims. View "Cleaver-Brooks Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Improper transfers were made from a title insurance agent’s escrow account. The agent’s principal, United General Title Insurance Company, paid the loss and then sued to recover the loss from multiple entities and persons, including recipients of the transferred funds. United General recovered judgment against some entities and persons, but summary judgment was entered against it on various claims. After a jury trial, several recipients of the transferred funds successfully defended the action on the remaining issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court correctly granted summary judgment, with the exception of United General’s claims for conversion and a constructive trust; (2) there was no merit to the alleged errors that United General asserted occurred at trials; and (3) after trial, the district court correctly granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. View "United Gen. Title Ins. Co. v. Malone" on Justia Law

Jennifer Van Kleek was caring for Walter and Janet Chapman’s dog while the Chapmans were out of town when the dog bit her on her lower lip. Van Kleek sent a claim to the Chapmans’ homeowner’s insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), for her injuries from the bite. Farmers denied the claim, concluding the Van Kleek was “legally responsible” for the dog and therefore, she was also an insured, and the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries to insureds. The policy defined “insured” to include “any person…legally responsible for covered animals." Van Kleek filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that the policy covered her claim. The district court granted Farmers’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Van Kleek was “legally responsible” for the dog because she was the only person responsible for feeding, watering, and letting the dog into the backyard while the Chapmans were away. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Van Kleek was an insured under the policy because she was “legally responsible” for the Chapmans’ dog, and therefore, the unambiguous terms of the policy excluded coverage of her injury. View "Van Kleek v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Appellant, an over-the-road truck driver, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that he sustained injuries in the form of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism in an accident that occurred during the course and scope of his employment. The compensation court applied a split test of causation used in heart attack cases, which requires proof of both legal and medical causation. The court then dismissed Appellant’s claim for failure to establish the medical cause prong. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s claim, holding (1) the split test was properly applied to Appellant’s injuries in this case, as deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism present the same difficulties in attributing the cause of a heart attack to a claimant’s work and are similar in origin to a heart attack; and (2) the compensation court’s finding as to causation was not clearly wrong.View "Wingfield v. Hill Bros. Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Appellant suffered injuries to both of his knees in a work-related accident. Appellant filed a request for loss of earning compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that, notwithstanding findings of permanent impairment, because no permanent physical restrictions were specifically assigned by an expert for Appellant’s left knee, the court could not perform a loss of earning capacity calculation authorized under the third paragraph of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3) and that Appellant was thus limited to scheduled member compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred as a matter of law in concluding that there must be expert opinion of permanent physical restrictions as to each injured member in order to perform a loss of earning capacity calculation under section 48-121(3). Remanded.View "Rodgers v. Neb. State Fair" on Justia Law

A guest (“Guest”) at an apartment complex fell of a third-story apartment’s balcony, rendering him quadriplegic. Guest sued the apartment complex’s ownership (“Owner”) and management (“Manager”) under theories of joint and several liability. American Family Mutual Insurance Company held liability policies covering both Owner and Manager. Regent Insurance Company held liability policies covering Manager, but the parties disputed whether the policies also covered the “same risk” for Owner as an additional insured. American Family settled with Guest and sued Regent for equitable contribution toward the payment it made to Guest under the settlement agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Family. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its apportionment of the common obligation toward Guest’s settlement.View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Regent Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed a quiet title action against owners of adjacent lots, seeking a declaration that express easements granted in favor of the adjacent lots were invalid. The defendants filed counterclaims asserting that the express easements were valid. Plaintiffs submitted to Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") a claim for defense pursuant to a policy of title insurance issued by Commonwealth insuring Plaintiffs’ property, but Commonwealth denied the claim. In the quiet title action, the district court extinguished the express easements and denied the counterclaims but concluded that the defendants possessed implied easements. While the quiet title action was pending, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Commonwealth, seeking a determination that Commonwealth breached its duty under the policy by refusing to provide a defense to the counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in sustaining Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment because Commonwealth did not violate its contract with Plaintiffs by denying coverage or indemnification.View "Woodle v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law