Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee was severely injured while working for Employer. Employer and its Insurer began paying lifetime workers' compensation benefits. Employee brought a separate negligence action against Employer's parent company (Ridgetop) and joined Employer and Insurer for workers' compensation subrogation purposes. Employee reached a settlement agreement with Ridgetop, after which the trial court granted Employer and Insurer's motion, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-118, for a future credit in the amount of Employee's settlement with Ridgetop against its continuing workers' compensation obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order granting the future credit, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting the motion for credit against the settlement proceeds Employee received from Employer; (2) Insurer did not waive its right to a future credit through a waiver clause in the policy or statements during settlement negotiations; but (3) the trial court erred in granting the credit for the entire amount of the settlement. Remanded for the limited purpose of deducting $437,500 - the amount paid to Insurer and an indemnity company - out of the settlement and for determining the amount of attorney fees to additionally be deducted from the amount of the credit. View "Bacon v. DBI/SALA" on Justia Law

Owners of a duplex insured a building through two concurrently issued, identical policies - one for each unit. A fire damages the entire structure, and Insurer paid the owners' claims under both policies. Insurer then brought this action to determine its subrogation rights against the tenant (Tenant) of one of the duplex units, who was allegedly negligent in starting the fire. Insurer conceded the pursuant to Tri-Par Investments v. Sousa, Tenant was an implied coinsured under the policy covering the unit he lived in. Therefore, Insurer sought to recoup payments made for the damage only to the unit Tenant did not live in. The district court granted Tenant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting Tenant's motion for summary judgment, as the rule in Tri-Par Investments applies to bar subrogation against a duplex tenant as to both sides of the building; (2) ruling that Tenant was a coinsured with Owners under Nebraska law; (3) failing to rule that Insurer was allowed to subrogate against Tenant; and (4) denying Insurer's request for declaratory judgment. View "Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Humlicek" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) determined that Douglas County committed a prohibited labor practice when it increased union members' monthly health insurance premiums without negotiating. The County appealed, contending that the parties' collective bargaining agreement authorized its unilateral action and that its action did not change the status quo. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed (i) the CIR's determination that the County committed a prohibited labor practice in failing to negotiate health insurance premium increases; and (ii) the CIR's decision not to award attorney fees; but (2) reversed and vacated those portions of the CIR's orders requiring the County to reimburse union members for increased insurance premiums deducted from their wages, plus interest. View "Employees United Labor Ass'n v. Douglas County" on Justia Law

This was an appeal after a retrial on remand in a breach of contract claim by Insured against Insurer. At issue on appeal was the optional replacement cost coverage that Insured contracted. The question was whether Insurer's general denial of liability excused Insured from complying with a policy condition requiring that Insured actually repair or replace the damaged property before replacement costs would be paid. The Supreme Court remanded the cause for a new trial on the limited issue of the extent to which Insurer's conduct prevented Insured from complying with the repair / replace condition to replacement cost coverage under the policy. Also to be tried on remand was the amount of the actual cash value of the loss in the event Insured was not excused from the condition precedent to replacement cost coverage. View "D & S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mack Downey and his wife sued Western Community College area, which operates Western Nebraska Community College, after Downey suffered injuries from a fall that occurred while he was replacing a scoreboard at the College. Downey's employer, Ferguson Signs, was named as a plaintiff to preserve a subrogation interest for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court found that the College was liable for a portion of Downey's injuries and apportioned liability to Downey and Ferguson Signs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the court did not err in finding the College liable; (2) the court correctly denied the College's claim for indemnity; but (3) the court erred in apportioning negligence to Ferguson Signs where Ferguson Signs was not a "released person" within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,185.11. Remanded for the court to reapportion Ferguson Signs' share of the negligence to Downey and the College. View "Downey v. Western Cmty. College Area" on Justia Law

Anthony Alsidez died in a single-car accident after a passenger, Gregory Segura, grabbed the steering wheel of the Jeep Anthony was driving. The Jeep was owned by Melissa Alsidez, Anthony's mother, who had a policy with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Melissa filed a negligence suit against Segura, combined with a coverage action against American Family. After Melissa settled with Segura at an amount that did not compensate her for her claimed loss, Melissa sought to recover underinsured motorist coverage from American Family. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Melissa, holding, among other things, that the exclusion from the underinsured coverage in Melissa's policy for vehicles "owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or a relative" was not void as against public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment where (1) the Jeep was not an "underinsured vehicle" under the policy, and (2) the "regular use" exclusion was consistent with the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Act and not void as against public policy. View "Alsidez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Danny O'Neall was injured while working for Sadler Line Construction, a subcontractor of Alliance Construction. Sadler had commercial general liability (CGL) coverage with Federated Service Inusrance Company. In the underlying personal injury action, O'Neall sued Alliance and Sadler for negligence. In the instant action, Federated filed a declaratory judgment action against Alliance, alleging that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Alliance against O'Neall's personal injury action. The district court granted summary judgment for Federated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the parties, by requiring Sadler to name Alliance as an additional insured on its CGL policy, intended that Sadler would insure against loss caused by Alliance's negligence; and (2) Sadler's additional insured endorsement, which provided coverage for liability arising out of Sadler's operations, was broad enough to include coverage for Alliance's negligence even if Sadler was not negligent. Remanded. View "Federated Serv. Ins. Co. v. Alliance Constr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Darlene Howsden was injured on premises that were leased to her employer by a legally distinct entity that was owned and operated by the same shareholders as her employer. Plaintiff sued Defendant, the entity that owned the premises, for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the exclusive remedy rule extended to Defendant because (1) Defendant was a legally separate entity from Plaintiff's employer, despite their corporate kinship, and there was no equitable basis to justify piercing the corporate veil between the two entities; and (2) therefore, Defendant was a third party to the employment relationship between Plaintiff and her employer, so Plaintiff's third-party claim against Defendant was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. View "Howsden v. Roper's Real Estate Co." on Justia Law

The City of Scottsbluff implemented changes to police officers' health insurance coverage and related benefits without bargaining with the Scottsbluff Police Officers Association (the Union). The Union filed a petition with the Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), alleging that the City violated Nebraska's Industrial Relations Act (IRA) by unilaterally implementing changes in the health insurance hazardous activities exclusion and by unilaterally changing the group health care benefits. The CIR (1) determined that the City violated the IRA, ordered the City to return the parties to the status quo ante, and ordered the parties to commence good faith negotiations within thirty days; and (2) determined that the Union had not violated the IRA in refusing to execute a previously ratified agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the portion of the CIR's order requiring the parties to commence good faith negotiations on the health insurance issues was affirmed; and (2) the Union's refusal to execute the previously ratified agreement constituted a prohibited practice under the IRA. Remanded to determine what remedies were available to the City for the Union's violation. View "Scottsbluff Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Scottsbluff" on Justia Law

Ronald Bacon was injured while working at a construction site. Bacon sued the general contractor, the general contractor's commercial liability insurer, the subcontractor, and the parent company of the subcontractor. Bacon settled with the insurer, which together with the general contractor's separate liability insurer, made payments to Bacon pursuant to the settlement agreement. After Bacon settled with the subcontractor's parent company, the general contractor's two insurers filed a breach of contract action because Bacon received the proceeds of his second settlement but refused to make payment to the insurers under the terms of the first settlement agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurers, finding Bacon, his lawyer, and the lawyer's law firm liable in the amount of $437,500. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's finding that lawyer and law firm were personally liable on the contract, holding that an attorney and/or law firm is not liable on a contract negotiated on behalf of a client when the contract provides that both the client and the attorney "agree to and will pay" a certain sum of money and the attorney signs the contract under the legend "Agreed to in Form & Substance". The Court otherwise affirmed. View "RSUI Indemnity Co. v. Bacon" on Justia Law