Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two interim juvenile court orders, one dictating an out-of-home placement and the other continuing it, complied with the statutory requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-251.01(7)(a) and (b).After in-home services proved ineffective, the juvenile court ordered Juvenile’s placement at Omaha Home for Boys. The court then continued this interim order and continued the dispositional hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court made the correct statutory findings that all community-based resources had been exhausted and that maintaining Juvenile in his home presented a significant risk of harm to him or the community. View "In re Interest of Dana H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by a juvenile challenging an order of the juvenile court ordering that he be removed from his family home and placed in Boys Town, holding that the juvenile court’s order was not a final order.On appeal, the juvenile argued that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find that, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-251.01(7), all community-based resources had been exhausted and that maintaining him in his home presented a significant risk of harm to him or the community. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order appealed from did not substantially affect the juvenile’s right to home placement and was thus not a final order under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902(2). View "In re Interest of Zachary B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court adjudicating Appellant for violating a Lincoln city ordinance prohibiting disturbing the peace. The juvenile court found that the State had proved the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically, that Appellant knowingly or intentionally disturbed the peace of a high school security officer by engaging in fighting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a school security officer and campus supervisor may be an appropriate victim of disturbing the peace; and (2) the evidence adduced sufficiently supported the juvenile court’s adjudication. View "In re Interest of Elainna R." on Justia Law

In 2001, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellant was sixteen years old when he committed the crimes leading to his convictions. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. In 2013, Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking resentencing on his murder conviction pursuant to Miller v. Alabama. The district court granted postconviction relief. After a resentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced to ninety to ninety years’ imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court imposed an excessive sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits and supported by the record, and there was no merit to Appellant’s claim that his sentence was excessive. View "State v. Garza" on Justia Law

In 1987, Defendant murdered his twelve-year-old sister. Defendant was fourteen years old at the time of the murder. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama. The district court vacated Defendant’s life sentence, finding that the sentence was within the parameters of the holding in Miller, that the rule in Miller applies retroactively, and that Defendant was therefore entitled to postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the relevant sentencing scheme mandated life imprisonment without the possibility for parole, the district court was bound by Miller. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Thieszen" on Justia Law

Sandrino T. and Remus M. were each charged in the juvenile court with six counts of ATM “skimming.” In each case, the State moved to transfer to county court. The juvenile court granted the motions. Both Sandrino and Remus appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal for disposition. The Court then dismissed each appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the orders transferring the cases from juvenile court to county court were not final and appealable because the transfer of the cases from juvenile court to criminal court did not affect the substantial rights of Sandrino and Remus. View "In re Sandrino T." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that sixteen-year-old Tyrone K. committed four counts of theft by receiving stolen property and one count of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. The prosecutor moved to transfer the proceedings to criminal court. The juvenile court granted the motion to transfer after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Tyrone appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to transfer his case to criminal court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the transfer order from which Tyrone appealed was not a final order. View "In re Interest of Tyrone K." on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated twin brothers LeVanta S. and LeRonn S. under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(c) as mentally ill and dangerous. The brother were placed in out-of-home care. The juvenile court later changed the brothers’ permanency objective from family reunification to guardianship. Mother and Father appealed from this order in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order affected a substantial right of the parents, and therefore, the order was a final, appealable order; and (2) the juvenile court exceeded its authority by adopting the permanency plan of guardianship in these cases where there had been no adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). Remanded. View "In re Interest of LeVanta S." on Justia Law

The State filed an amended petition seeking to adjudicate five children under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). At the beginning of the adjudication hearing, the State moved to dismiss without prejudice two factual allegations of the petition. The court dismissed the two allegations with prejudice. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the order as modified, holding that because the State sought dismissal of the factual allegations before any evidence was presented and before the children’s parents entered their admissions to certain counts, the juvenile court erred in ordering the dismissal to be with prejudice. View "In re Interest of Antonio J." on Justia Law

After two commitment hearings, the juvenile court entered an order committing Alan L. to the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS) for commitment at a youth rehabilitation and treatment center. In its first order, the court concluded that the State had not proved the necessary conditions for commitment, but the court subsequently found that the evidence supported a commitment order. Alan appealed, arguing (1) claim preclusion barred the State from presenting any new evidence at the second commitment hearing that was available to it before the first commitment hearing; and (2) the commitment hearing violated his right to due process because he could not confront and cross-examine individuals who provided adverse information against him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Alan was not deprived of his right to procedural due process despite the State’s failure to comply with case law for seeking a new disposition or commitment to OJS; and (2) new evidence at the second commitment hearing, which became available after the first hearing, showed a change of circumstances warranting Alan’s commitment to OJS, and claim preclusion does not bar consideration of changed circumstances. View "In re Interest of Alan L." on Justia Law