Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with committing criminal mischief for damaging the property of Cedars Teaching, Learning, & Connecting group home (Cedars Home) while she was a participant in its program. While the charges were pending final disposition, Appellant ran away from other placements several times. Although another group home accepted Appellant at its location, the juvenile court ordered intensive supervised probation at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC), pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-286(1)(b)(ii), finding that all levels of probation supervision and options for community-based services had been exhausted and that intensive supervised probation was appropriate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 43-286 requires that before a juvenile is placed in YRTC, the Office of Probation Administration must consider what would be a reliable alternative to commitment at YRTC and report its findings to the court; and (2) applying section 43-286 to the present case, Appellant’s placement at YRTC was premature. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Nedhal A." on Justia Law

The county court for Madison County, sitting as a juvenile court, committed thirteen-year-old Nathaniel to a youth rehabilitation and treatment center. The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services appealed, arguing that the court did not have the authority under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-286(1)(b)(i) to commit the juvenile when he was under the age of fourteen. Nathaniel was discharged from the rehabilitation and treatment center after the appeals were filed, causing the appeals to become moot. Acknowledging that the cases were moot, the Department asked the Supreme Court to decide them under the public interest exception to the doctrine of mootness. The Supreme Court declined to do so and dismissed the appeals, holding that, based on the manner in which the cases became moot and the possibility that the issue presented was one of last impression, the public exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply. View "In re Interest of Nathaniel M." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that Samantha C. was a juvenile as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(b) for being habitually truant from school. Samantha argued that the juvenile court could not adjudicate her under section 43-247(3)(b) because her school had failed to comply with the remedial measures set forth in the compulsory education statutes. The juvenile court rejected Samantha’s argument and entered an order adjudicating Samantha as being habitually truant from school. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State was not required to first prove Samantha’s school’s compliance with the compulsory education statutes because the Nebraska Juvenile Code and the compulsory education statutes are separate statutory enactments with distinct purposes and goals; and (2) the State met its burden of proving that Samantha was habitually truant from school under section 43-247(3)(b). View "In re Samantha C." on Justia Law

On March 1, 2013, the juvenile court adjudicated Marcella G. for a misdemeanor law violation and committed Marcella to the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). On July 5, 2013, DHHS filed a motion seeking to transfer Marcella from a group-home to a youth rehabilitation and treatment center (YRTC) as a condition of intensive supervised probation (ISP). The juvenile court sustained the motion and approved the transfer of Marcella to a YRTC without making the transfer as a condition of ISP. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247.02(2), on and after July 1, 2013, a juvenile court can commit a juvenile to OJS for placement at a YRTC only as part of an order of ISP; and (2) but because Marcella had already been committed to OJS for placement at a level less restrictive than a YRTC before July 1, 2013 and transferred to a YRTC after July 2, 2103, subsection (2) did not apply; and (3) therefore, the juvenile court acted within its authority when its transferred Marcella to the YRTC without making the placement as part of an order of ISP. View "In re Marcella G." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder he committed when he was sixteen years old. More than fifteen years later, Defendant filed an amended postconviction motion challenging his life imprisonment sentence. The district court denied the motion. After Defendant appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a state sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender convicted of homicide. The Supreme Court reversed in this case, holding (1) the rule announced in Miller applied retroactively to Defendant; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional under Miller, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to be resentenced. Remanded. View "State v. Mantich" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and other charges arising from three shootings. At the time of the shootings, Defendant was fifteen years old. Defendant was sentenced to two life terms without the possibility of parole for the murder counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions in all respects but vacated the sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, holding that the life imprisonment sentences were unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile convicted of a homicide to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. View "State v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

Michael and April are the biological parents of Avalyn, born out of wedlock in 2002. A court ordered Michael to pay child support but did not order visitation. In 2005, the state took temporary emergency custody of Avalyn after April attempted suicide. The county sought an adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), but did not give Michael notice. Avalyn was placed in foster care with her maternal grandmother in April’s home. Michael claims that because he was paying support through the state, caseworkers knew or should have known how to contact him. About six months after the disposition he received notice and intervened. The court placed Avalyn with Michael until November 2007, when the parties stipulated that Avalyn should be placed with April but divide her time between her parents. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Michael alleged that in failing to notify him of the juvenile proceedings, the defendants interfered with constitutional rights to familial integrity, substantive due process, and equal protection and that the Nebraska statutes were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that claims against state defendants for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity; qualified immunity shielded employees from liability in their individual capacities because they did not violate a clearly established right. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not barred. In a juvenile proceeding alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard for a child’s known adjudicated or biological father who is providing substantial and regular financial support; the statutes at issue are not facially unconstitutional, but cannot be constitutionally applied to avoid notification. View "Michael E. v. State" on Justia Law

Rylee, age sixteen, was nonverbal and autistic. A juvenile petition was filed because Rylee was excessively absent from school. The State placed no fault on Lisa, Rylee's mother. The juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Rylee as a child defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). As part of the adjudication, Lisa was ordered to complete a pretreatment assessment and to sign releases of information to allow the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) an opportunity to access information from her therapist and treatment providers. Lisa appealed, challenging the reasonableness of the juvenile court's order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decision of the juvenile court ordering Lisa to submit to a pretreatment assessment and to sign releases of information to allow the DHHS to access her mental health information was unreasonable. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Rylee S." on Justia Law

The State filed four juvenile petitions against Edward, a juvenile. The juvenile court found that Edward had violated the terms of his probation in two of these cases. In all four cases, the court found it was in Edward's best interests to be committed to the Office of Juvenile Services with placement at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC). Edward appealed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court had jurisdiction where Edward's mother, rather than Edward, signed the affidavit for an in forma pauperis appeal. The Court concluded (1) the Court had jurisdiction because in a juvenile's in forma pauperis appeal from a delinquency proceeding, the property affidavit of the juvenile's parent is sufficient to vest the Court with appellate jurisdiction; and (2) the juvenile court properly determined that Edward's best interests and the safety of the community required Edward's placement at the YRTC. View "In re Interest of Edward B." on Justia Law

On November 10, 2010, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that Appellant carried a concealed weapon on his person and possessed a "pistol, revolver or other form of short-barreled hand firearm." On October 12, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to discharge for failure to adjudicate within the time statutorily required. At the adjudication hearing on October 14, 2011, the juvenile court denied the motion to discharge. The hearing was then continued to December 22, 2011. On November 8, 2011, Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to discharge. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in affirming the decision of the juvenile court; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in not addressing Appellant's constitutional speedy adjudication rights. View "In re Shaquille H." on Justia Law