Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On November 10, 2010, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that Appellant carried a concealed weapon on his person and possessed a "pistol, revolver or other form of short-barreled hand firearm." On October 12, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to discharge for failure to adjudicate within the time statutorily required. At the adjudication hearing on October 14, 2011, the juvenile court denied the motion to discharge. The hearing was then continued to December 22, 2011. On November 8, 2011, Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to discharge. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in affirming the decision of the juvenile court; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in not addressing Appellant's constitutional speedy adjudication rights. View "In re Shaquille H." on Justia Law

After an amended petition was filed in the juvenile court alleging the Candice H., a juvenile, had possessed marijuana and drug paraphernalia, the juvenile court placed Candice under the supervision of a probation officer for an open-ended period of time. The next year, the juvenile court ordered that its jurisdiction should be terminated because Candice had reached the age of majority. The court also ordered that the record be sealed. The State appealed, contending that the juvenile court erred in ordering that the record be sealed without giving prior notice to the county attorney and without determining that Candice had satisfactorily completed her probation. The Supreme Court vacated the order sealing Candice's juvenile record, holding that the juvenile court erred in ordering that the record be sealed because (1) the order did not include a finding that Candice had satisfactorily completed her probation, and (2) the county attorney was not given the required notice of the proceeding to seal the record. View "In re Candice H." on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Ashley W. as a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(1) for possession of marijuana. Ashley appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. The court of appeals declined to address issues previously raised by Ashley in a motion to suppress, concluding she had failed to preserve the alleged errors. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Ashley's motion to suppress and in finding that she had waived her objection to the evidence at the adjudication hearing and that the court of appeals erred in affirming the order of adjudication. View "In re Ashley W." on Justia Law

Erick M., a juvenile, requested that the juvenile court enter an order finding that under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), he was eligible for "special immigrant juvenile" (SIJ) status. SIJ status allows a juvenile immigrant to remain in the United States and seek lawful permanent resident status if federal authorities conclude that the statutory conditions are met. The conditions include a court order determining that the juvenile's reunification with "1 or both" parents is not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The juvenile court found Erick did not satisfy that requirement. At issue on appeal was the meaning of the phrase "1 or both" parents. Erick lived only with his mother when the juvenile court adjudicated him as a dependent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when ruling on a petitioner's motion for an eligibility order under section 1101(a)(27)(J), a court should generally consider whether reunification with either parent is feasible; and (2) therefore, the juvenile court did no err in finding that because reunification with Erick's mother was feasible, he was not eligible for SIJ status. View "In re Interest of Erick H." on Justia Law

The juvenile court signed written orders committing and transferring a juvenile to the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC). The orders were made in error and did not reflect the court's orally pronounced intention to pursue foster placement for the juvenile. In a subsequent written order, the court vacated and corrected the erroneous orders, but the juvenile had already been transferred to the YRTC. Despite the court's insistence that the juvenile be returned, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) refused to do so and appealed the juvenile court's order. While the appeal was pending, DHHS obtained an order from the court of appeals staying the juvenile court's corrected order. This left the juvenile in the YRTC, where she completed her program, was paroled, and was subsequently discharged from parole. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as moot, as there was no longer an actual case or controversy requiring judicial resolution. View "In re Shaleia M." on Justia Law

The juveniles in these two cases, Charlicia H. and Jauvier P., were both adjudicated for law violations. Following an evaluation, Charlicia was placed with the Office of Juvenile Services (OJC), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Subsequently, the juvenile court discharged OJS, and Charlicia was transferred to Office of Probation Administration (Probation). Jauvier was temporarily placed at OJS, but after Jauvier was placed with an aunt, the juvenile court discharged OJS and transferred Jauvier to Probation. DHHS appealed, arguing that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to transfer a juvenile from OJS to Probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court had the authority to discharge the OJS and instead place the juveniles in the instant cases on probation. View "In re Charlicia H." on Justia Law

Jerad Parks was charged with first degree sexual assault on a child. Although Parks was twenty-four years old at the time he was charged, he filed a motion to transfer to the juvenile court because he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses. The district court denied the motion. Parks then pled no contest to attempted second degree sexual assault and felony child abuse. The district court ordered Parks to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Parks' motion to transfer because under the plain language of the juvenile code, the juvenile court's jurisdiction ends when the juvenile reaches the age of majority; and (2) because Parks pled no contest to a registrable offense under SORA, the plain language of the statute required Parks to register as a sex offender. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

Thomas M. was adjudicated to be a juvenile who had committed acts which would constitute a felony and misdemeanors and who was mentally ill and dangerous. The juvenile court ordered Thomas to be placed in the custody of DHHS and committed to detention. The court then ordered DHHS to identify appropriate placement, including counseling, for Thomas. The court subsequently found DHHS in contempt of the order. In a second order, the court stated that DHHS would be in contempt of court if it did not provide satisfactory evidence that certain future billings related to Thomas' placement were timely paid. DHHS appealed both orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the issues surrounding the first order were moot but could be considered under the public interest exception; and (2) the second order was not a final, appealable order because it did not affect a substantial right of DHHS. View "In re Interest of Thomas M." on Justia Law

The State brought a petition before the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that Christopher T., who was fifteen years old at the time, was a juvenile within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(b), in that he deported himself so as to injure or danger seriously the morals or health of himself or others, and under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(c), in that he was a mentally ill and dangerous juvenile. The State alleged that Christopher unlawfully subjected his stepbrothers to sexual contact without consent. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the juvenile court did not err in (1) adjudicating under section 435-427(3)(c) using the clear and convincing standard of evidence to find that Christopher was a mentally ill and dangerous person; (2) in finding that the State had adduced sufficient evidence to adjudicate Christopher under either section 435-427(3)(b) or (c); (3) in overruling the objection to certain testimony on Daubert-Schafersman grounds; and (4) finding certain testimony satisfied the reasonable degree of medical certainty standard set forth in In re Interest of G.H. View "In re Interest of Christopher T." on Justia Law

After it was discovered that Katrina R., who was fifteen years old at the time, sent nude photographs of herself to her boyfriend's cellular phone, Katrina was adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(b) as a child who deports herself so as to injure or endanger seriously the morals or health or herself or others. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Katrina serve six months' probation, that she be placed in the legal custody of The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and that she participate in counseling and community service. DHHS appealed the order, contending that the juvenile court erred in simultaneously committing Katrina to DHHS and placing her on probation in the same juvenile court case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that is within the juvenile court's statutory power to issue a dispositional order for juveniles adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(b) that includes both legal custody with DHHS and supervision by a probation officer. View "In re Interest of Katrina R." on Justia Law