Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An employee, Matthew I. Ortega, voluntarily quit his job as an office manager at Island Towing after 17 years, citing work-related stress from interactions with law enforcement as the reason. Ortega applied for unemployment benefits, stating that the stress affected his mental health and ability to perform his job. The Nebraska Department of Labor denied his application, finding that he did not have good cause to quit.Ortega appealed to the Nebraska Department of Labor’s Appeal Tribunal, where both he and his supervisor, Chloe Aguilar, testified. Ortega described two specific incidents involving law enforcement that caused him significant stress, one of which occurred 2½ years prior to his resignation. Aguilar confirmed the ongoing negative interactions with law enforcement but stated that there was no way to alleviate the stress. The Appeal Tribunal upheld the denial, stating that Ortega did not provide sufficient evidence, such as medical documentation, to prove that his stress constituted good cause for quitting.Ortega then appealed to the district court for Hall County, which affirmed the Appeal Tribunal’s decision. The district court agreed that Ortega’s stress was a health concern requiring medical evidence and noted that Ortega had not pursued alternative solutions to preserve the employment relationship, such as seeking a leave of absence or modifying his job duties.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Ortega failed to meet his burden of proof to show good cause for voluntarily leaving his employment. The court found that the evidence provided, including the details of only one specific negative interaction with law enforcement, was insufficient to establish that Ortega’s work conditions were an increasingly unreasonable burden affecting his health or sense of well-being. View "Ortega v. Albin" on Justia Law

Courtney Galloway, a used car sales manager at Husker Auto Group, LLC, was terminated from her position in January 2019. Galloway claimed her termination was in retaliation for investigating and reporting a fraudulent sales scheme involving a fellow employee, Ryan Mathis. She alleged that the scheme involved selling vehicles to straw purchasers to evade state sales tax and Mercedes-Benz export policies, and that upper management was aware of and benefited from the scheme.Galloway filed a claim with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission (NEOC), alleging whistleblower retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA). The NEOC dismissed her claim, concluding that she had not engaged in protected activity because she reported a coworker’s actions, not those of her employer. The NEOC also found no evidence that the individual who terminated her employment was aware of her protected activity.Galloway then filed a lawsuit in the district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, asserting claims of retaliation under the NFEPA and wrongful discharge under Nebraska’s public policy exception to the at-will employment rule. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Husker Auto, agreeing with the NEOC’s findings.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Husker Auto was involved in or knew of the fraudulent scheme and whether the company knew of Galloway’s role in investigating the scheme. The court noted conflicting testimony and evidence about Husker Auto’s knowledge and involvement, as well as Galloway’s performance and the reasons for her termination. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Galloway v. Husker Auto Group" on Justia Law

A Catholic priest, Andrew J. Syring, sued the Archdiocese of Omaha, alleging defamation, tortious interference with prospective employment, slander per se, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. His claims stemmed from the Archdiocese publishing his name on a list of clergy with substantiated claims of sexual misconduct and a subsequent phone conversation where a church official referenced this list when discussing Syring's potential employment as a hospital chaplain.The District Court for Cuming County granted summary judgment for the Archdiocese on Syring's defamation claim, finding it barred by Nebraska’s one-year statute of limitations. The court ruled that the initial publication of the list in 2018 started the limitations period, and subsequent updates to the list did not constitute republication. The court also granted summary judgment on Syring's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, concluding that Syring failed to provide medical evidence of severe emotional distress.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the single publication rule applied to the Archdiocese's list, meaning the statute of limitations began with the initial publication. The court also found that the Archdiocese's conduct did not meet the high threshold for extreme and outrageous behavior required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of Syring's claims for tortious interference, slander per se, and breach of fiduciary duty, citing the ministerial exception. This doctrine prevents courts from interfering with the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers, thus barring Syring's claims related to his employment and the Archdiocese's internal governance decisions. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, dismissing all of Syring's claims. View "Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha" on Justia Law

Shawn Slezak, a mechanic for Lancaster County, Nebraska, filed a grievance after his performance evaluation for 2021 was completed late and by higher-level supervisors rather than his direct supervisor. The evaluation, which was below the threshold for a merit increase, was delayed due to discrepancies between numerical ratings and written comments. Slezak argued that the late evaluation violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and sought a merit increase.The Lancaster County Personnel Policy Board found that the late evaluation constituted a breach of contract and awarded Slezak a retroactive merit increase. The County challenged this decision, arguing that the remedy was improper since Slezak's evaluation score did not warrant a merit increase. The District Court for Lancaster County agreed with the County, reversing the Board's decision on the grounds that the remedy made Slezak "more than whole" and was inconsistent with the objective of a damages award in a breach of contract case.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the Board's remedy was inappropriate because it exceeded the scope of a damages award in a breach of contract case. The Court emphasized that the objective of such an award is to make the injured party whole, not to provide a benefit they would not have received if the contract had been performed. The Court also noted that Slezak's score on the late evaluation was below the threshold required for a merit increase, and thus, the delay in the evaluation did not cause his injury. The Court concluded that the District Court did not err in reversing the Board's decision and affirmed the order. View "Lancaster County v. Slezak" on Justia Law

The case involves an employee, Marlene Mosher, who filed a petition against her employer, Whole Foods Market, Inc., claiming she suffered an injury from a fall during her employment. Mosher alleged that she sustained injury to her right lower extremity and right ankle and developed low-back pain. She claimed that she had suffered periods of temporary disability, required reasonable and necessary medical care, incurred mileage and expenses, and had not yet reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). Mosher also alleged that Whole Foods had failed or refused to provide those benefits, thus, she was entitled to waiting-time penalties and attorney fees.The Workers’ Compensation Court found that Mosher had not yet reached MMI and was unable to return to work without restrictions. The court awarded Mosher temporary total disability benefits, payment for medical bills, future medical care, a waiting-time penalty, and attorney fees. The court found that Whole Foods had no reasonable controversy that compensation was due, which justified a waiting-time penalty. The court also found no reasonable controversy as to medical expenses.Whole Foods appealed, arguing that there was a reasonable controversy as to whether Mosher had reached MMI and, thus, as to whether its obligations to pay temporary total disability ceased and its obligations to pay permanent disability began. Whole Foods also contested the amount of the attorney fees awarded.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court. The court held that when there is no reasonable controversy that the employee has been injured in a workplace accident and is entitled to some indemnity benefit, the employer is not excused from timely payments thereof. The court also held that the plain meaning of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” in § 48-125(4)(a) encompasses the work of a legal assistant for the attorney. View "Mosher v. Whole Foods Market" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's denial of summary judgment, determining that the Lincoln Public Schools (LPS), a political subdivision, retained immunity from an employee's wrongful discharge claim under the discretionary function exemption of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The plaintiff, Lynne Simpson, claimed LPS wrongfully terminated her in retaliation for her filing a workers' compensation claim. LPS asserted sovereign immunity and immunity under the PSTCA, arguing that its decision to terminate Simpson's employment was a discretionary act.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that employment and termination decisions generally involve a judgment of the kind that the discretionary function exemption is designed to shield. The court found that LPS's decision to terminate Simpson's employment involved an element of judgment, as LPS had to balance information about Simpson's performance against information about her criminal history and honesty issues. Therefore, the court concluded that LPS was entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exemption and remanded the case with directions to dismiss. The court did not rule on LPS's claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, as it had already found that LPS was immune from suit. View "Simpson v. Lincoln Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a decision made by the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) that included corrections unit case managers within the protective service bargaining unit (PSBU), represented by the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88 (FOP 88). The case arose from a petition filed by FOP 88 to the CIR to clarify or amend the PSBU to include corrections unit case managers. The State of Nebraska appealed the CIR's decision, arguing that corrections unit case managers were supervisors and, hence, should not be in the same bargaining unit as their subordinates. The court deemed the CIR had erred in giving preclusive effect to its 2018 order, which certified FOP 88 as the bargaining representative for the PSBU. The court held that the issue of whether corrections unit case managers were part of the PSBU was not precluded by the 2018 order. The court remanded the matter back to the CIR to again determine whether the PSBU includes corrections unit case managers based on the existing record, with instructions to provide an explanation forming the basis for its ruling. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88 v. State" on Justia Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Kathryn Wright was employed as a customer service agent for Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest). In her volunteer role on a workplace social committee, she was found to have not kept adequate records of expenditures and to have spent committee funds for personal purposes. Consequently, Southwest terminated her employment. Wright then applied for unemployment insurance benefits, which were initially granted by the Nebraska Department of Labor (DOL) adjudicator. However, this decision was overturned by the DOL appeal tribunal, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits for the week of the discharge and the 14 weeks thereafter. The district court affirmed this decision and Wright appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Wright had committed misconduct connected with her work under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-628.10 (Reissue 2021). The court found that Wright's failure to keep a ledger and maintain supporting documentation for all committee expenses was misconduct connected with her work, regardless of the fact that her work on the committee was volunteer and separate from her paid job duties. The court also disagreed with Wright's argument that the committee funds were not Southwest's but her coworkers'. The court reasoned that the funds were contributed to the committee organized, promoted, supported, and regulated by Southwest, which had an interest in ensuring that the funds were spent appropriately. Therefore, Wright's failure to follow the rules harmed Southwest and was misconduct connected with her work. View "Wright v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

In the case involving Sandra Lopez and Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Omaha, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, holding that the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries. Lopez, an employee of Catholic Charities, sued her employer alleging assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress following a realistic active shooter drill conducted at her workplace. She claimed physical and mental injuries as a result of the drill. The district court dismissed the suit, asserting that her exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation. On appeal, Lopez argued that she should be able to pursue tort theories of recovery against her employer for injuries suffered if the employer acted with a specific intent to injure the employee. However, the court found that even if an employer acts with a specific intent to injure an employee, the resulting injury is accidental if it is unexpected or unforeseen to the person suffering the injury, and thus compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also rejected Lopez's constitutional challenge due to non-compliance with procedural requirements and her public policy argument because it was not grounded on any specific statute or recognized legal authority. View "Lopez v. Catholic Charities" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal of the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the Nebraska Police Standards Advisory Council denying Appellant admission into the basic officer certification training at the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and therefore, so did this Court.Appellant sought judicial review of the decision of the Council upholding the denial by the Director of the Training Center of Appellant's application for entrance into basic training for failure to meet the minimum requirements for admission. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant's petition because he failed properly to make the Director a party to the proceedings for review. View "Swicord v. Police Standards Advisory Council" on Justia Law