Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An employee at a boiler manufacturing plant sustained permanent hearing loss as a result of his employment. Between the time he was injured and the time he filed his workers’ compensation claim, the plant changed ownership. Twin City Fire Insurance Company insured the plant for the previous owner, and American Insurance Company insured the new owner. Counsel representing American mistakenly believed that American had insured the plant during the time of the injury, and Twin City was not given notice of the claim until after entry of an award. The new owner of the plant filed a declaratory judgment action against the previous owner and both insurers to determine who was liable for payment of the award. The district court determined that Twin City was liable for the employee’s workers’ compensation award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Twin City was liable for the award, in rejecting Twin City’s equitable defenses, and in dismissing Twin City’s counterclaims. View "Cleaver-Brooks Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, a company providing optometric care, as a clinical technician. Defendant terminated Plaintiff on the grounds that Plaintiff consistently failed to meet performance expectations over her five years of employment. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming unlawful discrimination based upon a perceived disability. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was not proper where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment based upon Defendant’s perception that Defendant had a disability. Remanded. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialities, P.C." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the construction of the the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 554 (the Union) and Douglas County. The Union filed a grievance, arguing that the CBA prevented the County from hiring a new employee at a wage above the “start,” or the first step, of the pay scale. The parties disputed the interpretation of the word “start” in the CBA, and both parties filed for summary judgment on the meaning of “start” in the CBA pay rates scale. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that “start” is unambiguous and is the minimum wage or “start” of a pay scale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “start” in the CBA is unambiguous, and summary judgment was proper. View "Gen. Drivers & Helpers Union v. County of Douglas" on Justia Law

Appellant, a deputy sheriff at the Cass County sheriff’s office, was suspended for ten days. Appellant filed a grievance on his suspension. The Cass County Merit Commission affirmed the actions of the sheriff’s office. Forty-two days from the date the Commission orally announced its decision, Appellant filed a petition in error with the Cass County District Court. The notice of appeal was filed seventeen days after the date the Commission’s decision was faxed and mailed to Appellant’s counsel. The district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the appeal was not filed within the thirty-day time period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) although decisions rendered by an inferior tribunal, board or commission are typically final when they are announced on the record, Neb. Rev. Stat. 23-1734 - which requires that the order must be in writing, certified to the sheriff, and delivered - overrides that general rule; and (2) pursuant to section 23-1734, the appeal was timely. Remanded. View "Schaffer v. Cass County" on Justia Law

Kyle Kercher sued the Board of Regents at the University of Nebraska and the University of Nebraska at Omaha (collectively, “the University”), alleging that the University breached his employment contract when it removed him from his appointed professorship that he alleged was a part of his tenured appointment as a faculty member. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Kercher on the issue of liability. Damages were stipulated by the parties, save for the issue of attorney fees. The University appealed the judgment against it, and Kercher cross-appealed the district court’s order awarding him attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted Kercher’s motion for partial summary judgment and did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney fees for Kercher. View "Kercher v. Board of Regents" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were the Professional Firefighters Association of Omaha, Local 385, the president of the association, and individual employees covered by the bargaining unit represented by Local 385 (collectively, the firefighters). The firefighters filed two declaratory judgment actions in the district court seeking declarations that the City of Omaha was misinterpreting the terms of orders entered by Nebraska’s Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR). The district court determined that the City owed additional wages because it failed to comply with the CIR orders. The firefighters then brought this suit under the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act (the Act) for wages they claimed were due under the CIR orders. The district court concluded that the firefighters had no valid claim under the Act. At issue in this consolidated appeal was whether the wages were “agreed to” at the time of the final CIR order or whether they were “agreed to” when the declaratory judgment actions were resolved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the wages were agreed to on the date of the final CIR order, and therefore, the district court erred in determining that the firefighters did not have a valid claim under the Act. View "Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working as a staff home nurse at the Eastern Nebraska Veterans’ Home. Appellant filed a petition in Workers’ Compensation Court alleging that she suffered from complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) and had sustained injuries to her left and right upper limbs as a result of the accident. The compensation found that Appellant was entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. Appellant appealed the award. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the compensation court (1) did not err in finding that Appellant was permanently partially disabled and suffered a seventy-five percent loss of earning capacity; (2) did not err by denying Appellant a waiting-time penalty, attorney fees, and interest; but (3) erred in failing to consider mileage expenses for all of Appellant’s travel to injury-related medical appointments. Remanded. View "Armstrong v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint in the district court against Bellevue Public Schools (BPS), alleging that he was fired as an employee of BPS in retaliation for reporting to his superiors the presence, demolition, and removal of asbestos-containing materials at the middle school where he worked. The district court granted summary judgment for BPS. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that BPS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Appellant failed to present evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that the permissible reason of poor job performance articulated by BPS for his termination was a pretext for an impermissible termination. View "O’Brien v. Bellevue Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

In 2009, Patricia Damme injured her low back in a workplace accident. In 2013, Damme underwent surgery on her back. The surgery was a success. The Workers’ Compensation Court awarded Damme temporary total disability benefits from 2009 to 2013 and future medical care. Damme’s employer, Pike Enterprises, Inc. appealed, arguing, among other things, that the 2009 incident was not an injury but a “temporary symptom aggravation” of Damme’s preexisting back problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Court did not err in (1) finding a causal relationship between the work-related injury Damme sustained in 2009 and the 2013 surgery; (2) determining that Damme’s 2013 surgery was reasonably necessary to treat her physical condition and pain symptoms; (3) finding that after her injury, Damme could not work until the surgeon who performed the surgery released her to return to work; (4) determining that Damme’s incarceration was not an event that barred her receipt of temporary total disability disability benefits; and (5) awarding nonspecified future medical benefits. View "Damme v. Pike Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellee was employed by Appellant on two separate occasions. On each occasion, Appellee signed a noncompete agreement. After Appellee’s second term of employment ended he filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the noncompete agreements were unenforceable. The district court entered declaratory judgment in favor of Appellee, determining that the noncompete agreements were unreasonable and unenforceable because the scope of the noncompete agreements was greater than reasonably necessary to protect Appellant against unfair competition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the applicable noncompete agreement was greater than reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of Appellant and was therefore unreasonable and unenforceable. View "Gaver v. Schneider’s O.K. Tire Co." on Justia Law