Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant sustained a compensable injury while working for Employer. The workers’ compensation court awarded benefits. Appellant later filed a second petition to modify, alleging that her injury had materially and substantially worsened, necessitating a modification of the award. The workers’ compensation court found that a modification was not warranted and that, in the alternative, Employer could not be ordered to pay more even if Appellant had established that she was entitled to modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation court did not err in concluding that Appellant did not prove a material and substantial change for the worse in her condition warranting a modification of the award. View "Rader v. Speer Auto" on Justia Law

Employee was severely injured when he fell off a flatbed truck driven by the location manager for Employer’s facility after a customer appreciation supper. Employee filed for workers’ compensation benefits. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court concluded that Employee was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The court reserved the issue of benefits for a later determination, and Employer appealed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court’s order was final. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that Employer did not appeal from a final order because the trial court had not yet determined benefits. Remanded. View "Jacobitz v. Aurora Coop." on Justia Law

Robert Sivick was appointed the county attorney for Howard County. Sivick was unsuccessful in his bid to be elected the county attorney for the next term of office and subsequently filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the State. The Nebraska Department of Labor determined that Sivick was ineligible for benefits because his wages were not for covered "employment." The Nebraska Appeal Tribnual reversed, concluding that because the majority of Sivick's duties were not spent in policymaking or advisory capacities, because Sivick was not an elected official, and because there was no statutory designation of his position being a major advisory position, Sivick's earnings were covered wages for the purposes of unemployment insurance benefits. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the position of county attorney is one that has been designated a "major nontenured policymaking or advisory position" under Nebraska law, and therefore, the services Sivick performed in his position were monetarily ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because his wages were not for covered "employment." View "Lang v. Howard County" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant purchased the assets of an indoor football team owned by Omaha Beef, LLC. In 2008, Appellant applied for workers' compensation insurance under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Plan, arguing that it was entitled to a certain experience modifier (XMod), which is used when calculating the premium owed, because it was a new entity with no claims experience. The National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. determined that Appellant was a successor entity to Omaha Beef, and thus, the various XMods assigned to Omaha Beef for the relevant time periods must be transferred to Appellant. The director of the Department of Insurance affirmed. The district court affirmed, reasoning that Appellant was a successor to Omaha Beef and that the change in ownership resulted in the transfer of the workers' compensation rating for Omaha Beef to Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Appellant had the burden of proof to show there was no "change in ownership"; and (2) a "change in ownership" existed such that the XMod of Omaha Beef should be transferred to Appellant. View "Gridiron Mgmt. Group, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union Local 226 (Local 226) was the certified exclusive bargaining agent for three bargaining groups of the Douglas County School District 001 (District). Following the implementation of the District's new vacation accrual policy, Local 226 filed petitions with the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that the District had engaged in a prohibited practice of bad-faith bargaining under the Industrial Relations Act by failing to negotiate regarding the vacation accrual policy and that the unilateral action constituted a change in the terms and conditions of employment with respect to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The CIR found that the District had not engaged in a prohibited practice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District unilaterally changed its vacation accrual policy but presented Local 226 with opportunities to give input on the policy changes and request negotiations before implementation of the changes, and because Local 226 failed to take advantage of those opportunities it waived its right to negotiate on the matter of vacation accrual. View "Serv. Employees Int'l Union (AFL-CIO) Local 226 v. Douglas County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Employee was injured during the scope and course of his employment with Employer, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company. Because he was a railroad employee, Employee filed a claim for personal injury damages pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The district court entered judgment in favor of Employee for $145,000. Employer paid the judgment but withheld $6,202 as Employee's share of Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) payroll taxes on the entire general verdict award. The district court (1) overruled BNSF's motion for satisfaction and discharge of judgment and directed BNSF to pay $6,202 directly to Employee, and (2) directed the parties to agree in writing that no amount of the award would be considered lost wages so as to avoid any obligations under the RRTA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the general verdict award in favor of Employee was an award of compensation from which Employer was required to withhold a portion of in order to pay RRTA payroll taxes. Remanded with directions that the district court enter a satisfaction and discharge of the judgment upon proof of payment of $6,202 by BNSF to the IRS on account of the lost wages paid to Employee. View "Heckman v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Employee, an African-American, was employed by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services for several years. Employee filed suit against the State and individual defendants in their official capacities, alleging she was denied the opportunity to enroll with the health insurance carrier that had insured her prior to 2007 due to a ZIP code exclusion plan. Specifically, Employee alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of her race because most African-American employees resided in three excluded ZIP codes and were offered substandard health insurance based on the ZIP codes associated with their residential addresses. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Employee's claim of disparate impact arising under Title VII, as the evidence presented by Defendants established that the plans offered in the excluded ZIP codes were equivalent to the plans offered statewide. View "Cartwright v. State" on Justia Law

Employee filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits for injuries he received during his employment with Employer. In accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-139(3), Employee entered into a lump-sump settlement with Employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier. Pursuant to the statute, Employee filed a release in which he waived his rights under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act (Act) and discharged Employer from further liability arising from the injury. Employer paid the lump-sum amount forty-two days after the filing of the release. Employee subsequently sought and received a workers' compensation court order awarding a waiting-time penalty and attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a worker waives all of his rights under the Act when he files a release pursuant to the settlement procedures in section 48-139(3), including the right to penalties; and (2) therefore, a waiting-time penalty and the corresponding attorney fees cannot be imposed following a settlement reached under section 48-139(3). Remanded. View "Holdsworth v. Greenwood Famers Coop." on Justia Law

While at work, Employee was asked by his supervisor to enter a grain bin and to shovel grain into the center of the bin's conical base in order to facilitate removal of grain from the bin. Employee died of asphyxiation after being engulfed in the grain. Employer pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of willfully violating Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations by knowingly permitting an employee to enter a grain bin in violation of safety standards. The personal representative of Employee's estate (Estate) subsequently brought this action against Employer for wrongful death and assault and battery and for a declaratory judgment that either the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act did not apply or, alternatively, that it was unconstitutional on its face as applied. The district court dismissed the Estate's complaint, finding that the Act applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite the egregiousness of Employer's conduct, the injury was still an "accident" as defined by the Act; and (2) the Act does not thereby unconstitutionally discriminate between employees and nonemployees or employee victims of employer willful negligence and employee victims of their own willful negligence. View "Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Coop. Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2009, a registered nurse (Nurse) employed by Hospital commenced this action for workers' compensation benefits, alleging that as the result of three incidents with patients involving assault and sexual assault, she suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. The workers' compensation court found all three incidents occurred, held that Nurse suffered depression and PTSD as a result of the incidents, and that Nurse was permanently and totally disabled. The court awarded benefits accordingly. After Hospital appealed, it was discovered that the testimony of all Hospital witnesses who testified on behalf of Hospital could not be transcribed due to a failure of electronic equipment used by the court reporter. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial, concluding that, under the circumstances of the case, where the testimony of all Hospital witnesses had been lost due to no fault of either party, the Court could not undertake a meaningful appellate review of the assignments of error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp." on Justia Law