Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee suffered an accident arising out of the course of his employment on October 23, 2007. Employee filed a workers' compensation action on February 28, 2012 against Employer, seeking relief under an amended version of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3), alleging that he was entitled to benefits calculated on the basis of the loss of earning capacity pursuant to this amendment. The Legislature specified that the operative date of the amendment to the statute was January 1, 2008. The workers' compensation court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that the amendment was substantive rather than procedural and that because Employee's accident and injuries occurred prior to the operative date of the amendment, Employee could not recover for a loss of earning capacity under the amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the amendment to section 48-121(3) did not apply to Employee's action, he could not recover for an alleged loss of earning capacity on that basis. View "Smith v. Mark Chrisman Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

After Employees separated from their employment with employer, Employer denied Employees' demand for payment of their unused "paid time off" (PTO) hours. The county court granted summary judgment for Employees, concluding that Employer was required to pay earned but unused PRO hours to Employees. The district court affirmed. At issue was whether Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1229 of the Wage Payment and Collection Act (Act) entitled Employees to collect their unused PTO hours despite a provision in an employee manual that Employer would not pay them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that regardless of the label Employer attached to its PTO hours, they were indistinguishable from earned vacation time under section 48-1229, and like earned vacation time, Employees had an unconditional right to use their earned PTO hours for any purpose. View "Fisher v. PayFlex Sys. USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee suffered a shoulder injury arising out of the course of his employment with Employer. Employee subsequently resigned his employment with Employer and began working for another company. Employee later filed a petition against Employer in the compensation court, seeking temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The compensation court awarded Employee TTD benefits for the periods he was unable to work due to postsurgery restrictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of TTD benefits, holding that an employee who leaves a job with an employer responsible for an injury in order to pursue more desirable employment does not waive TTD benefits simply because the employer responsible for the injury would have accommodated light-duty restrictions during postsurgical recovery periods necessitated by the injury. View "Zwiener v. Becton Dickinson-East" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured during the course of his employment with Employer. Appellant obtained a workers' compensation award that covered future medical treatment. Appellant subsequently underwent knee replacement surgery and sought a further award of benefits. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) denied the petition, finding that Appellant's knee replacement surgery was not established to be the product of the subject accident but, rather, was prompted by Appellant's preexisting degenerative knee condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence provided sufficient competent evidence to support a finding that Appellant's knee replacement surgery was not the result of the work-related accident, and therefore, the WCC did not err in finding that Appellant's surgery was not compensable; and (2) in so holding, the WCC was not acting contrary to the original award but was enforcing the award's plain language. View "Pearson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Co." on Justia Law

Employee, an undocumented worker, was injured while working for Employer. Employee was awarded temporary total disability benefits. Employer later petitioned the workers' compensation court to discontinue the temporary benefits. While the action was pending, Employee returned to his county of origin. The compensation court concluded (1) Employer's obligation to pay Employee temporary total disability should cease because Employee had reached maximum medical improvement; and (2) there was no credible evidence which could be used to determine Employee's loss of earning capacity in his new community, and therefore, Employee's request for benefits for his claim of permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity was denied. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the compensation court's conclusion that Employee had reached maximum medical improvement; but (2) reversed the denial of Employee's claim of permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity because where no credible data exists for the community to which the employee has relocated, the community where the injury occurred can serve as the hub community. Remanded. View "Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions" on Justia Law

While in the course and scope of her employment, Appellant suffered and injury and incurred medical expenses. The Workers' Compensation Court ordered Appellant's employer (Employer) to pay the expenses. Employer made payments directly to Appellant's health care providers within thirty days of the court's order. Because she was not personally reimbursed for the medical expenses within thirty days, Appellant sought a waiting-time penalty, attorney fees, and interest pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-125. The Workers' Compensation Court denied relief, and Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because section 48-125 did not apply to Appellant's request for a waiting-time penalty, the compensation court did not err in overruling her motion for a waiting-time penalty; and (2) Employer in this case was not subject to liability for attorney fees, and therefore, Appellant was not entitled to an award of interest. View "VanKirk v. Cent. Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Law Firm represented Employee in a workers' compensation action against Employee's Employer. After a trial, Employee was awarded compensation, including medical expenses incurred by Employee with Medical Clinic. Employer paid sums owed to Medical Clinic pursuant to the award. Law Firm subsequently filed a complaint against Medical Clinic, seeking attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. Following a hearing, the district court dismissed Law Firm's complaint, concluding that Law Firm was not permitted to recover attorney fees from Medical Clinic under the doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-125(2)(a) prohibits the charging of attorney fees against medical providers in workers' compensation court; and (2) the common fund doctrine may not be applied in this case to allow Law Firm a fee from Medical Clinic from the district court when it would not be entitled to such a fee from the workers' compensation court. View "Walentine, O'Toole, McQuillan & Gordon, LLP v. Midwest Neurosurgery, PC" on Justia Law

While employed as a nurse, Appellant was attacked by a psychiatric patient at her place of employment. Appellant filed a workers' compensation case against Employer. The trial court found that Appellant suffered a compensable injury and that the incident caused an aggravation of a non-work-related condition. The trial court found medical treatment, including surgery, was necessary and reasonable. However, the court denied all compensation fro treatment and bills from medical providers other than one particular doctor, concluding that Appellant failed to produce evidence of a "chain of referral" for the medical providers and that some of the treatment Appellant received was not related to the incident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in requiring chain-of-referral proof for all medical treatment Appellant received, as Employer denied compensability for Appellant's injury, and Appellant was thereby entitled to choose her treating physicians and avoid the chain of referral. View "Clark v. Alegent Health Neb." on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, Employee, an illegal alien, was injured in an accident during the course of his employment with Employer. Employer's insurance carrier subsequently informed Employer that it would terminate payments for Employee's temporary partial disability benefits and start paying permanent partial disability benefits. Employer then determined that Employee did not have proper immigration documents and discharged Employee. A judge found that Employee had sustained a permanent total disability (PTD) and awarded Employee benefits for permanent loss of earning power. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act covers illegal aliens under a contract of hire with a covered employer in Nebraska; (2) the Act does not preclude an award of PTD benefits for illegal aliens; and (3) the trial judge was not clearly wrong in finding that Employee's injury resulted in pain that interfered with his ability to perform the work he had previously performed. View "Moyera v. Quality Pork Int'l " on Justia Law

Appellant filed a grievance alleging that Lancaster County denied him an opportunity to fairly compete for job vacancies because County officials did not follow the County's personnel rules. There were two vacancies at issue. The first was a vacancy at the County's mental health center, for which the County reassigned one of its employees to that position without conducting competitive examinations. The second vacancy was a ground maintenance position left open after the County reassigned the first employee to the mental health center. The district court held (1) regarding the first vacancy, a department head's decision to place a current department employee in a newly created vacancy was not an appointment subject to competitive examinations; (2) regarding the second vacancy, the County properly promoted a department employee to the vacancy even though the department did not consider the applicants' seniority; and (3) Appellant's claim was moot because he no longer worked for the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's claim was not moot; (2) the County failed to comply with statutory requirements and its own personnel rules in assigning department employees to the mental health center and the ground maintenance vacancies, and the assignments were therefore invalid. View "Blakely v. Lancaster County" on Justia Law