Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee was severely injured while working for Employer. Employer and its Insurer began paying lifetime workers' compensation benefits. Employee brought a separate negligence action against Employer's parent company (Ridgetop) and joined Employer and Insurer for workers' compensation subrogation purposes. Employee reached a settlement agreement with Ridgetop, after which the trial court granted Employer and Insurer's motion, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-118, for a future credit in the amount of Employee's settlement with Ridgetop against its continuing workers' compensation obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order granting the future credit, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting the motion for credit against the settlement proceeds Employee received from Employer; (2) Insurer did not waive its right to a future credit through a waiver clause in the policy or statements during settlement negotiations; but (3) the trial court erred in granting the credit for the entire amount of the settlement. Remanded for the limited purpose of deducting $437,500 - the amount paid to Insurer and an indemnity company - out of the settlement and for determining the amount of attorney fees to additionally be deducted from the amount of the credit. View "Bacon v. DBI/SALA" on Justia Law

An hourly employee who worked part-time while attending college sustained a work-related injury. At issue before the Supreme Court was how to calculate the employee's average weekly wage in order to determine the appropriate vocational rehabilitation priority - using his part-time wages, as the employer contended, or wages calculated using a forty-hour workweek, as the court below ruled. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of the compensation court, holding that under the circumstances of this case, a vocational rehabilitation plan seeking an average weekly wage based on a forty-hour week - the calculation used for purposes of permanent disability - best restored the employee to suitable employment. View "Becerra v. UPS" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) determined that Douglas County committed a prohibited labor practice when it increased union members' monthly health insurance premiums without negotiating. The County appealed, contending that the parties' collective bargaining agreement authorized its unilateral action and that its action did not change the status quo. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed (i) the CIR's determination that the County committed a prohibited labor practice in failing to negotiate health insurance premium increases; and (ii) the CIR's decision not to award attorney fees; but (2) reversed and vacated those portions of the CIR's orders requiring the County to reimburse union members for increased insurance premiums deducted from their wages, plus interest. View "Employees United Labor Ass'n v. Douglas County" on Justia Law

The Douglas County Health Center Security Union (Union) filed a petition before the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that its employer, Douglas County (County), had engaged in certain prohibited practices. The CIR found the County had engaged in a prohibited practice when it failed to negotiate its intention to contract out bargaining unit work to a private security company. The CIR ordered the parties to recommence negotiation and awarded the Union attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the CIR with directions to vacate its order and dismiss the Union's petition, holding that the issue of the subcontracting of bargaining unit jobs resulting in the elimination of bargaining unit jobs was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between the County and Union and presented an issue of contract interpretation over which the CIR lacked jurisdiction. View "Douglas Cty. Health Ctr. Sec. Union v. Douglas County" on Justia Law

Appellant David Pittman brought a negligence action against Western Engineering Company and Evert Falkena (collectively, Appellees) after David's wife, Robin Pittman, died in a work-related accident while working for Western on a road construction crew. David's sole theory of liability was bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed David's claim with prejudice, determining that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) David's negligence action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act because David accepted payment releasing Western, thus barring his action against Western by operation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-148; and (2) this employer immunity extends to Falkena, a fellow employee of Robin, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-111. View "Pittman v. W. Eng'g Co." on Justia Law

Roger McCannon died in an accident while working for Appellee T.O. Hass Tire Company. Christy Spitz, with whom McCannon lived for several years, sought workers' compensation death benefits. The trial judge dismissed Spitz' claim that she was McCannon's surviving spouse after applying Colorado law to find that Spitz was not McCannon's common-law wife. The review panel affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the trial court was not clearly wrong in finding that the vast majority of objective evidence showed that Spitz and McCannon did not intend to create a common-law marriage and did not conduct their affairs as though a common-law marriage existed. View "Spitz v. T.O. Haas Tire Co." on Justia Law

Appellant William Sellers injured his left knee in the course of his employment with Reefer Systems and sought workers' compensation benefits. The Nebraska workers' compensation court determined that Sellers was entitled to future medical care for the knee injury. A review panel of that court affirmed the award but modified it to exclude knee replacement surgery at present, as the evidence as of the date of trial did not support such a finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the modification did not limit Sellers' ability to claim workers' compensation benefits relating to any future knee replacement surgery, and thus, the compensation court review panel did not err in affirming the award as modified. View "Sellers v. Reefer Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Adam Martensen filed a negligence action against Rejda Brothers, alleging that he was injured in an accident when he was working in a pasture on a ranch owned and operated by Rejda and that Rejda, as his employer, was negligent when it failed to make a timely effort to search for, discover, and rescue him. The court entered judgment in favor of Martensen and awarded damages of $750,000, plus taxable court costs and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court (1) held that the district court did not err when it concluded Rejda owed a duty to Martensen; (2) found no prejudicial evidentiary rulings; (3) determined that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; (4) affirmed the award based on the jury verdict and the award of taxable costs; and (5) reversed the amount of prejudgment interest awarded, concluding that the district court erred in its reading of Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-103.02(1). Remanded for a recalculation of prejudgment interest. View "Martensen v. Rejda Bros." on Justia Law

On March 21, 2006, Julie Lovelace was injured in the course of her employment with the City of Lincoln. Lovelace continued to work after her injury up until June 22, 2006, the date of the surgery on her knee. Lovelace returned to work on October 2, 2006 until November 6, 2007, when she was again injured. Lovelace had another surgery on her left knee on December 19, 2007. Lovelace did not return to work, and the City subsequently terminated her employment. Lovelace sought payments for temporary total disability. The workers' compensation court found Lovelace had been temporarily totally disabled from June 22, 2006 through October 1, 2006, and again from December 19, 2007 through August 19, 2009, and thereafter became permanently and totally disabled. A three-judge panel of the compensation court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lovelace was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits for the period of time after she was injured and while she was working between October 2, 2006 and December 18, 2007; and (2) Lovelace was entitled to permanent total disability payments from December 19, 2007 onward. View "Lovelace v. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

Mack Downey and his wife sued Western Community College area, which operates Western Nebraska Community College, after Downey suffered injuries from a fall that occurred while he was replacing a scoreboard at the College. Downey's employer, Ferguson Signs, was named as a plaintiff to preserve a subrogation interest for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court found that the College was liable for a portion of Downey's injuries and apportioned liability to Downey and Ferguson Signs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the court did not err in finding the College liable; (2) the court correctly denied the College's claim for indemnity; but (3) the court erred in apportioning negligence to Ferguson Signs where Ferguson Signs was not a "released person" within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,185.11. Remanded for the court to reapportion Ferguson Signs' share of the negligence to Downey and the College. View "Downey v. Western Cmty. College Area" on Justia Law