Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court awarding temporary total disability and attorney fees to Suzy Fentress, holding that the compensation court did not err.Fentress received a workplace injury while working for Westin, Inc. The compensation court entered an award in which Fentress received temporary partial workers' compensation benefits. Westin later moved to terminate the temporary indemnity benefits and to determine maximum medical improvement (MMI) and permanency. After the compensation court held an evidentiary hearing to determine MMI Westin moved to withdraw its motion to determine MMI. The compensation court disallowed the withdrawal of the motion and, thereafter, awarded temporary total disability and attorney fees to Fentress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation court did not err when it (1) overruled Westin's motion to withdraw its motion to determine MMI; (2) admitted certain evidence during the hearing; (3) found that Fentress had achieved MMI with respect to mental health issues but not physical health issues; and (4) awarded Fentress medical treatment, temporary total disability, and attorney fees. View "Fentress v. Westin, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Workers' Compensation Court ordering Jack's Supper Club and its workers' compensation carrier (collectively, JSC) to reimburse Sheryl Rogers for medical expenses she incurred, holding that where Rogers selected the physicians who provided the treatment at issue in disregard of provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, JSC was not responsible to reimburse Rogers.Rogers injured her back while working for JSC. The compensation court approved a lump-sum settlement, and JSC remained responsible to pay Rogers for reasonable and necessary medical care for her work-related injury. After Rogers received treatment she asked that the compensation court order JSC to reimburse her. The JSC argued that it was not responsible for the medical expenses because Rogers failed to comply with Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-120(2), a statute governing selection of treating physicians. The compensation court rejected the JSC's arguments and ordered JSC to pay certain bills offered by Rogers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred in ordering JSC to reimburse Rogers for her treatment and by issuing a decision that did not comply with Workers' Comp. Ct. R. of Proc. 11. View "Rogers v. Jack's Supper Club" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals' decision reducing Terry Bortolotti's weekly income benefit awarded by the workers' compensation court from the maximum to the minimum and eliminating the award of out-of-pocket medical expenses, holding that the reduced weekly benefit was correct but that the medical expense award should be reinstated.In upholding the reduced weekly benefit, the Supreme Court held (1) the compensation court erroneously based the determination of Bortolotti's average weekly wage on a superseded and inoperative pleading, and the court of appeals' determination of average weekly wage was supported by competent evidence in the record; and (2) as to Bortolotti's medical expenses, the court of appeals failed to give Bortolotti's testimony the inferences mandated by the deferential standard of review. View "Bortolotti v. Universal Terrazzo & Tile Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the City of Scottsbluff, Nebraska and dismissing Plaintiff's claim of discrimination and retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), holding that the City was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff, a former police officer for the City, was terminated when he refused to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination (FFDE). Plaintiff brought this action alleging discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the undisputed evidence in the record, the City could lawfully require Plaintiff to undergo an FFDE under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1107.02(1)(j); and (2) because Plaintiff alleged that the City retaliated against him for expressing disapproval of his fellow employees' actions, as to his employer's actions, there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff engaged in protected activity pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(3). View "McPherson v. City of Scottsbluff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals summarily dismissing this appeal, holding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1329 applies to a district court's judgment disposing of a petition in error and overruling several previous decision to the extent that they held section 25-1329 inapplicable to judgments of a district court acting as an intermediate appellate court.Appellant filed a petition in error in the district court against Defendant, alleging that he was wrongfully terminated. The district court overruled the petition. Ten days later, Appellant moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for an order vacating the judgment. The district court overruled the motion and the alternative motion. Thirty days afterward, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that it was untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 25-1329 does not apply to a judgment of a district court acting as an intermediate appellate court; and (2) in the instant case, the summary dismissal of Appellant's appeal must be reversed because Appellant's alternative motion to vacate qualified as a motion to alter or amend a judgment within the meaning of section 25-1329. View "McEwen v. Nebraska State College System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision affirming the decision of the State Personnel Board dismissing Appellant's grievance challenging her termination as a teacher at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the dismissal of Appellant's grievance.After the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) terminated Appellant's employment for cause Appellant completed a grievance form challenging her termination. Appellant initiated the grievance proceedings provided by the government collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The proceedings concluded with the Board dismissing Appellant's grievance appeals. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant waived the right to continue to pursue her grievance under the terms of the CBA, and therefore, the district court did not err in affirming the Board's dismissal of Appellant's grievance. View "Bower-Hansen v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court determining what constitutes the term “employer” under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-116 of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, in imposing liability on CMR Construction & Roofing of Texas, LLC (CMR), and in finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual Insurance Co., holding that the court did not err.The compensation court concluded that CMR was a statutory employer under section 48-116, thus requiring CMR to compensate Juan Martinez for injuries he sustained while acting as an employee of a CMR subcontractor. The court further found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual, a workers’ compensation insurance company domiciled and having its principal place of business in Texas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the compensation court did not err in finding that CMR was the statutory employer of Martinez and in imposing liability; (2) the compensation court lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual; and (3) the court did not err in awarding Martinez attorney fees and future medical care and in determining that Martinez had sustained an eighty-percent loss of earning capacity. View "Martinez v. CMR Construction & Roofing of Texas, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action alleging that she had not been notified that her employment contract would not be renewed within the timeframe required by a collective bargaining agreement, holding that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.Plaintiff brought this action against the Board of the Nebraska State Colleges alleging that the Board had breached the collective bargaining agreement by failing to timely notify her in writing of its intent not to renew her employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and dismissed this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that that Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action against the Board was an action against the State, and Plaintiff failed to identify any statute that served to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. View "Burke v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the Workers’ Compensation Court in this attorney fee dispute between discharged lawyers and the lawyer who represented the client through a settlement, holding that because the discharged lawyers were entitled to less than the amount awarded by the compensation court under the terms of their fee agreement with their client, the order splitting the fee evenly was erroneous.During the course of his workers’ compensation action with his employer, Edward St. John switched lawyers. St. John settled his claim, and the compensation court held a hearing regarding how much St. John owed his lawyers. The compensation court concluded that one set of attorneys did not contribute more to the end result than the other and directed that Brenda Bartels and Monte Neilan, the discharged lawyers, receive $82,500, and that the lawyer who represented St. John throughout the settlement, James Zimmerman, receive $82,500. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order splitting the fee evenly was erroneous and that Bartels and Neilan were entitled to receive $32,577.50, and Zimmerman was entitled to receive $132,422.50. View "St. John v. Gering Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the district court overruling Plaintiff’s motion to recuse and granting summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims, holding that the judge should have recused himself.Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, her former employer, claiming retaliation, hostile work environment, and other claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the latter three claims. Defendant then moved for summary judgment on the retaliation and hostile work environment claims. When the district court judge assigned to the case became aware that his brother-in-law was a potential witness Plaintiff moved for recusal. Plaintiff then amended her complaint and added a claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court overruled the motion to recuse and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed to the extent of the claims disposed of before the assertion of the Equal Pay Act claim and vacated as to all other claims, holding that because the judge’s brother-in-law was likely to be a material witness, Neb. Rev. Stat. 5-302.11(A)(2)(d) mandated disqualification of the judge. View "Thompson v. Millard Public School District No. 17" on Justia Law