Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s petition and dismissing his claim, holding that the compensation court correctly dismissed Appellant’s petition for injuries sustained on the job in Alaska.Appellant was a Nebraska resident when he was hired by Trident Seafoods, a State of Washington corporation without a permanent presence in Nebraska. Appellant sustained a work-related injury while working at Trident Seafoods’ Alaska plant. Appellant filed a petition in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court claiming benefits under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. The compensation court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Trident Seafoods was not a statutory employer under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-106(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Trident Seafoods was not a statutory employer, and therefore, the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act did not apply. View "Hassan v. Trident Seafoods" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Workers’ Compensation Court that Employee, who was injured during the course and scope of her employment, had reached maximum medical improvement prior to the stroke she suffered approximately three weeks after she filed her petition in the compensation court seeking temporary and permanent disability benefits and the compensation court’s award of permanent total disability, holding that the compensation court did not err.The stroke suffered by Employee was unrelated to her work injury or treatment and left Employee largely incapacitated. The compensation court awarded Employee permanent total disability benefits, thus rejecting Employer’s contention that the occurrence of the stroke relieved Employer of the ongoing responsibility to pay total disability benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation court did not err in (1) finding Employee reached maximum medical improvement prior to her stroke; (2) finding Employee was permanently and totally disabled; and (3) finding the stroke had no impact on Employee’s entitlement to ongoing permanent total disability benefits. View "Krause v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the award of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court, holding that none of Employee’s contentions on appeal warranted modification of the award.In his petition, Employee sought temporary total disability benefits, vocational rehabilitation, payment of past and future medical bills, and waiting-time penalties and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Court did not err by failing to (1) award permanent disability based on a loss of earning capacity rather than a member impairment rating; (2) award permanent disability based on a twelve-percent member impairment rating rather than a fifteen-percent member impairment rating; (3) award a waiting-time penalty from the date of the injury rather than the date of payment of benefits in August 2016; (4) award Employee out-of-pocket medical expenses; and (5) award reimbursement of vacation time and short-term disability. View "Bower v. Eaton Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Regional West Medical Center and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint alleging retaliatory discharge and employment discrimination, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in finding that Plaintiff’s discrimination claims were barred by the relevant statute of limitations; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s retaliation claim on the basis that there was no evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff’s termination was retaliatory. View "Brown v. Regional West Medical Center" on Justia Law

In this workers’ compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed the compensation court’s findings that Plaintiff was entitled to benefits and that the court did not have jurisdiction to resolve issues regarding a third-party settlement but reversed the compensation court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request that she be awarded penalties, attorney fees, and interest.Plaintiff was driving a school bus when the bus was struck by a drunk driver, injuring Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s employer (Employer) paid workers’ compensation benefits for a time but refused to pay benefits when Plaintiff asserted that she was permanently disabled as a result of her injuries. The workers’ compensation court concluded (1) Plaintiff was entitled to additional benefits; (2) the court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief requested by Employer concerning a settlement that Plaintiff entered into with the third party who caused her injuries; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to penalties, attorney fees, and interest. The Supreme Court held that the compensation court (1) correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve disputes related to Plaintiff’s settlement with the third-party tortfeasor; (2) correctly found that Plaintiff was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits; but (3) was clearly wrong in denying Plaintiff penalties, attorney fees, and interest because there was no reasonable controversy regarding her entitlement to benefits. View "Gimple v. Student Transportation of America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court determining that Appellant’s injuries did not “arise out of” his employment, holding that Appellant’s assignment of error on appeal was without merit because he waived his argument by failing to present it to the compensation court.At trial, Appellant argued only that his injury arose out of employment because his fall, which resulted in injuries, resulted from a risk of employment. On appeal, however, Appellant argued that his injury arose out of employment under the “increased-danger” rule. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit plain error by not applying the increased-danger rule, and Appellant waived his argument on appeal by failing to present it to the compensation court. View "Maroulakos v. Walmart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

The recent amendment for finalizing lump-sum settlements under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-139(4) is procedural in nature and therefore applies to this workers’ compensation case, which was pending on appeal when section 48-139 was amended.Employer and Employee reached a lump-sum settlement and filed a verified release with the court using the process set out in section 48-139(3) and (4). Employer did not pay the amounts owed under the statutory deadline, and Employee moved for late payment penalties under section 48-139(4). The Workers’ Compensation Court overruled Employee’s motion and dismissed Employee’s petition with prejudice. While the matter was pending on appeal, the Legislature amended section 48-139 to specifically include a penalty provision for late payments of lump-sum settlements. The Supreme Court vacated the order of dismissal and remanded the cause with directions to award late payment penalties under section 48-139(4), holding that Employee was entitled to a late payment penalty. View "Dragon v. Cheesecake Factory" on Justia Law

The district court did not err in finding that Elizabeth Mays, an exotic dancer with Midnite Dreams, Inc., doing business as Shaker’s, was an employee entitled to compensation under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Wage and Hour Act (WHA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1201 et seq., but the court erred in granting Mays relief under the FLSA and the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act (NWPCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1228 et seq.Mays filed a complaint seeking unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorney fees and costs under FLSA and Nebraska law. The trial court determined that Mays was entitled to a full minimum wage rate and that Defendants were jointly and severally liable for $7,586.78 in damages for unpaid wages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court correctly determined that Mays was an employee entitled to a minimum wage under the WHA, but Mays was entitled to only the minimum wage amount for tipped employees; and (2) the court erred in ruling that Mays was entitled to relief under the FLSA and the NWPCA. View "Mays v. Midnite Dreams, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s wrongful discharge claim on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.Appellant filed a complaint against her former employer, alleging violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and wrongful discharge in violation of Nebraska law and public policy. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the claim was governed by the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) and was not a general state law tort claim for wrongful discharge. Appellant’s title VII claim remained pending in the federal court. Appellant then filed the instant complaint against Defendant in the district court for Lancaster County, alleging wrongful discharge “in violation of Nebraska law and public policy.” The district court dismissed the wrongful discharge claim, concluding that it was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because the federal district court had already decided the claim on the merits and dismissed it as time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hill v. AMMC, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission of Industrial Relations’ (CIR) denial of Appellant’s petition requesting decertification of the certified collective bargaining agent for the protective service bargaining unit (PSBU) and certification of itself as PSBU’s new collective bargaining agent, holding that the CIR did not err in dismissing the petition as untimely filed.On appeal, Appellant, Nebraska Protective Services Unit, Inc., doing business as Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88, argued that the CIR erred in finding that it did not timely file its petition under CIR rule 9(II)(C)(1), not ordering an election to be held, and dismissing its petition. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because Appellant did not file its petition in the period required under rule 9(II)(C)(1), its petition was time barred, and therefore, the CIR did not err in denying Appellant’s request for an election and dismissing the complaint. View "Nebraska Protective Services Unit, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law