Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff's former husband filed for dissolution, the parties reconciled and entered into two postmarital agreements specifying how their property would be divided in the event of a future dissolution. The district court approved the agreements and dismissed the dissolution proceeding. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second dissolution proceeding. On the advice of Defendants, certain attorneys and law firms, Plaintiff accepted a settlement proposal from her former husband based upon the postmarital agreements approved in the first dissolution action. The marriage was then dissolved. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants were negligent in advising her to accept the settlement proposal. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the actions of Defendants were not the proximate cause of any damage to Plaintiff, and even if Defendants breached the standard of care, Plaintiff could not have received a more favorable settlement in the second dissolution proceeding because the court was bound to enforce the order in the first dissolution proceeding under the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment in the first proceeding had preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata. View "Young v. Govier & Milone, LLP" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was born in Zaire and immigrated to the United States after being granted asylum, pled no contest to two misdemeanors in 2010. Because of credit for time served, Defendant was released from custody on the same day he was sentenced. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not properly advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of conviction at the time he entered the pleas. The district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because Defendant had completed his sentences and had been released from custody. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide Defendant's common-law motion to withdraw his pleas because (1) the statutory remedy under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02 did not apply and the motion asserted a constitutional issue which was not addressed under the Nebraska Postconviction Act; and (2) the fact that Defendant served his sentences was not relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. Remanded. View "State v. Yuma" on Justia Law

Defendant obtained controlled substances pursuant to prescriptions written for chronic pain issues but did not inform her medical providers that she was being prescribed similar medications elsewhere. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of ten counts of acquiring a controlled substance by fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that she should not be charged with multiple counts based on multiple prescriptions from the same doctor because the fraudulent act was the singular failure to disclose to the other medical providers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of Defendant's pharmacy records did not violate her constitutional or statutory rights; (2) the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant committed multiple violations of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-418 each time she obtained and filled a prescription by her treating family physician; and (3) probable cause supported the warrant for Defendant's medical records. View "State v. Wiedeman" on Justia Law

Shawna was the biological mother of two girls and two boys, all of whom were under fifteen years old. After an amended petition was filed by the State, the juvenile court found that all four children were within Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) due to the faults and habits of Shawna and her husband and ordered the children to remain in the temporary care of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services for placement. Shawna challenged only the juvenile court's adjudication of her two sons, arguing that because the boys were not residing with her, they were not at risk of harm and did not fall within the meaning of section 435-247(3)(a). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court pertaining to the two boys, holding that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an adjudication of the boys. View "In re Justine J." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court's step instruction to the jury regarding second degree murder and manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court plainly erred in giving the instruction, as (1) although the instruction was correct when it was given, the Court's subsequent holding in State v. Smith rendered the instruction an incorrect statement of the law; (2) Smith applied retroactively to this case; and (3) there was evidence upon which a jury could conclude that the killing was intentional but provoked by a sudden quarrel and therefore constituted manslaughter. View "State v. Trice" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of third degree sexual assault and admitting a minor to an obscene motion picture, show, or presentation. The district court affirmed the convictions. The court of appeals affirmed the sexual assault conviction but reversed the obscenity-related count. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence supported his conviction for third degree sexual assault, and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in (1) affirming Defendant's conviction for third degree sexual assault; and (2) indicating that the ineffective assistance claim could not be reached on direct appeal on the existing record. View "State v. Osborne" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant's sentence on the firearm conviction was twice vacated and the cause remanded to correct the amount of credit for time served. Defendant subsequently filed an amended motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that Defendant's motion did not allege facts constituting a denial of constitutional rights, and, as to certain allegations, the record refuted his claims. View "State v. Marks" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled no contest to second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to sixty years to life imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his counsel was deficient for not informing him about potentially exculpatory information disclosed at an in-chambers conference. The district court denied the motion, concluding that even if trial counsel's performance had been deficient, Defendant would still have accepted the plea agreement, and thus suffered no prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to disclose to Defendant exculpatory evidence relevant to his plea. View "State v. Keyser" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to the unauthorized use of a financial transaction device with a value between $500 and $1,500. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated when private counsel was prohibited from entering a limited appearance in Defendant's case, as Defendant was found to be indigent, Defendant was represented throughout the proceedings, and at no point throughout her proceedings did Defendant waive her right to her appointed public defender or report to the court that her appointed counsel was incompetent; (2) Defendant failed to establish that her trial counsel was deficient; and (3) the district court did not err in sentencing Defendant on the same day it accepted her plea. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In 1985, Husband and Wife obtained a certificate of marriage form from the county court and participated in a wedding ceremony officiated by the county judge. In 2012, Husband brought this declaratory judgment action asking the district court to declare that no marriage ever existed because the section of the certificate of marriage form entitled "return of marriage ceremony certificate" was not completed and was never filed with the bureau of vital statistics. The district court found that a valid marriage existed between Husband and Wife and awarded attorney fees to Wife. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that all statutory requirements were met in this case and that the marriage of Husband and Wife was valid. View "Vlach v. Vlach" on Justia Law