Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault. Throughout the criminal proceedings, Defendant was represented by a Nebraska attorney (Attorney) whose license had been suspended for nonpayment of dues. After learning Attorney's license was suspended but before Attorney was disbarred, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion after (1) declining to apply a per se rule, reasoning that Attorney was qualified when admitted and was suspended solely for nonpayment of dues; and (2) finding Defendant's specific claims were either affirmatively disproved by the record or constituted mere conclusions. The Supreme Court affirmed after declining to adopt a per se determination of ineffectiveness based on the fact that Attorney was suspended for nonpayment of dues at the time he represented Defendant, holding that Defendant failed to establish Attorney provided ineffective assistance based on specific aspects of Attorney's actual performance. View "State v. Vanderpool" on Justia Law

The State filed a complaint against Defendant charging him with third degree assault, to which Defendant pled no contest. Before sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that he had not received the complaint twenty-four hours before being asked to plead in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1802. The county court denied the motion, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 29-1802 applies to prosecutions by indictment or information and not complaints in county court; and (2) therefore, the county court's failure to comply with the statute was not a fair and just reason for Defendant to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Schanaman" on Justia Law

In 1996, the district court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff child support. In 2006, the court issued a writ of execution against Defendant's unspecified property to satisfy the child support lien. However, Defendant had conveyed the property to his girlfriend by quitclaim deed. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a second praecipe for an execution on Defendant's property, seeking an execution sale of the property that Defendant had previously owned and alleging that when the quitclaim conveyances were made, the property was subject to her lien. The court ordered the sheriff to execute on the property, and the sheriff sold the property to Plaintiff. John McWilliams challenged the sale, alleging that when the court issued the writ of execution, he was the record owner, and therefore, the court could not order the sheriff to conduct the execution sale because the property was not titled in Defendant's name. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order confirming the sale, holding that the court lacked authority to order the sheriff to levy the writ on property in which Defendant, the judgment debtor, no longer had an interest, absent any finding that Defendant's transfer of the property was fraudulent. Remanded. View "Fox v . Whitbeck" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants for breach of contract and quantum meruit. The county court entered judgment against Defendants. On appeal, Defendants asked the district court to take judicial notice of the county court transcript and the bill of exceptions of the county court proceedings. The district court affirmed after a hearing, holding that the record did not support Defendants' appeal, as the bill of exceptions was not complete at the hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the incomplete record was the fault of the county court and because the district court was aware of the incomplete record prior to reaching its decision, the district court erred in failing to order the county court to file a complete bill of exceptions. Remanded. View "Centurion Stone of Neb. v. Whelan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief. The motion was filed stamped on August 28, 2012. In 2011, the legislature amended the Nebraska Postconviction Act by requiring a one-year time limit for fling a motion for postconviction relief. The one-year period runs from the appropriate triggering event or August 27, 2011, whichever is later. Here the district court concluded that Defendant had until one year from August 27, 2011 to file his motion, and therefore, Defendant's postconviction action was barred by the limitation period. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, as the court's finding that Defendant filed his motion outside the one-year period was not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, third offense. In sentencing and sanctioning Defendant, the district court (1) sentenced Defendant to one year imprisonment with one day's credit for time served; (2) fined Defendant; (3) revoked Defendant's driver's license for fifteen years; and (4) ordered that, if Defendant chose to drive, he obtain an ignition interlock permit, install an interlock device on each motor vehicle he operates, and utilize a continuous alcohol monitoring (CAM) device for the entire fifteen-year revocation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in ordering Defendant to use a CAM device; (2) the district court did not err in stating in its written order that Defendant must abstain from alcohol use during the interlock revocation period; and (3) the sentence and sanctions imposed were not an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Sikes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the disappearance of nine-year-old Jill Cutshall. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. In 1992, The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that he had recently learned of the existence of newly discovered evidence - a diary in which was detailed the abduction, rape and murder of Cutshall. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in finding that Defendant's motion was procedurally barred because his motion affirmatively showed on its face that the ground for relief could not have been asserted at the time of the prior postconviction proceedings; (2) the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant did not allege facts sufficient to necessitate an evidentiary hearing; and (3) because Defendant raised no justiciable issue of law or fact, the district court did not err in declining to appoint counsel. View "State v. Phelps" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery and kidnapping and sentenced to life imprisonment for kidnapping. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present alibi evidence in the form of a witness's testimony. The district court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's denial of Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing regarding trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in failing to present the witness's alibi testimony; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. Remanded. View "State v. Branch" on Justia Law

Employee filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits for injuries he received during his employment with Employer. In accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-139(3), Employee entered into a lump-sump settlement with Employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier. Pursuant to the statute, Employee filed a release in which he waived his rights under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act (Act) and discharged Employer from further liability arising from the injury. Employer paid the lump-sum amount forty-two days after the filing of the release. Employee subsequently sought and received a workers' compensation court order awarding a waiting-time penalty and attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a worker waives all of his rights under the Act when he files a release pursuant to the settlement procedures in section 48-139(3), including the right to penalties; and (2) therefore, a waiting-time penalty and the corresponding attorney fees cannot be imposed following a settlement reached under section 48-139(3). Remanded. View "Holdsworth v. Greenwood Famers Coop." on Justia Law

After the dissolution of her marriage to Father, Mother sought a modification of child custody and related matters. Father was personally served but defaulted. The district court first entered a default modification order. The court subsequently entered a second order vacating the first order based on the fact that Father was not given notice of the default hearing. Mother appealed, contending that the second order was an abuse of discretion. Father cross-appealed, challenging the first order. The Supreme Court dismissed Father's cross-appeal and affirmed the district court's order vacating the first order, holding (1) because the first order was a final order from which Father did not timely appeal, Father could not use his cross-appeal to attack it; and (2) precedent does not forbid a court from promptly vacating a default modification order for failure to comply with an approved local district court rule requiring notice of the motion for default. View "Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law