Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father and Mother were unmarried when Mother became pregnant. The couple's child was born on February 9, 2012, but Father was not told about the birth. Father attempted to contact Mother several times and to gain information about the child but was unsuccessful. On February 23, 2012, five days after the child's original due date, Father filed a "petition to establish necessity of father's consent to adoption" with the county court. The court sustained Mother's motion for summary judgment because Father failed to object to the adoption within five business days after the birth of the child, as required by law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a material fact existed whether Mother was estopped from relying on the five-day filing requirement in Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-104.02 because she intentionally misled Father to prevent him from complying with the requirements of section 43-104.02. Remanded. View "Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D." on Justia Law

Turbines, Ltd. purchased a replacement part for a helicopter engine from Transupport, Inc., intending to use the part to fill an order Turbines had received from a customer in Singapore to be shipped to Malaysia. Turbines later learned that filling the order could subject it to criminal liability, Turbines attempted to return the part of Transupport and obtain a refund of the purchase price. Transupport refused to refund the payment. Turbines then brought this action seeking rescission of the purchase order. The district court entered default judgment in favor after Transupport failed to appear at a pretrial conference and the trial. The court of appeals reversed the default judgment against Transupport and ordered that Turbines' complaint be dismissed, concluding that the evidence adduced at trial did not support rescission as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the uncontroverted facts provided no legal basis for rescission; and (2) thus, although Transupport failed to appear for trial, the district court abused its discretion in entering default judgment in favor of Turbines. View "Turbines Ltd. v. Transupport Inc." on Justia Law

Prime Realty, Inc. (Prime) acted as general partner for two limited partnerships (collectively, the Partnerships). Without the Partnerships' limited partners' knowledge, Prime took out two loans from a bank (the Bank) and, by deed of trust, secured the loans with Partnerships' property. The Bank ultimately sold the collateral and applied the proceeds to the loans. The Partnerships sued the Bank for conversion, alleging that the loans were for a nonpartnership purposes and, as such, Prime lacked authority to offer the Partnerships' property as collateral without the limited partners' consent under the Partnership agreements. The district court concluded that the Bank had converted the Partnerships' property and awarded the Partnerships damages and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Partnerships' complaint was timely; (2) the Bank converted the Partnerships' property; (3) the district court improperly awarded damages in the full amount of the proceeds applied to the loans because a portion of the first loan served a Partnership purpose; and (4) prejudgment interest was proper only in the amount the Bank applied to the second loan. View "Brook Valley Ltd. P'ship v. Mut. of Omaha Bank" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense. The district court determined that a conviction for driving while ability impaired (DWAI) in Colorado could be used to enhance Defendant's current DUI sentence and sentenced Defendant for three to five years' imprisonment. The court also revoked Defendant's license for fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's DWAI conviction in Colorado could not be used to enhance the penalty for a conviction of DUI in Nebraska. Remanded with directions to vacate Defendant's sentence and to resentence him. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Husband filed a complaint for dissolution of marriage from Wife. The couple had three minor children. A deputy county attorney filed the petition in the Douglas County Juvenile Court. The court dismissed the action for lack of prosecution. Husband filed a motion to reinstate. Wife then filed a complaint for dissolution in the Lancaster County District Court. Meanwhile, the Douglas County District Court reinstated the original case. At trial, the Douglas County District Court overruled Wife's motion to dismiss, concluding that its order to reinstate Husband's action related back to the date that Husband had filed the motion. The court also concluded it had jurisdiction over the subject matter despite pending juvenile proceedings involving two of the parties' children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Douglas County District Court had jurisdictional priority over the Lancaster County District Court; and (2) because the parties did not comply with the procedural requirements for transferring a case to juvenile court, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction. View "Molczyk v. Molczyk" on Justia Law

Appellee, an LLC, sought a refund from Kearney County of a portion of its 2006 personal property taxes, alleging the taxes were paid as the result of an honest mistake or misunderstanding. The County Board of Supervisors denied the refund. The district court sustained Appellee's petition in error and ordered the County to refund $480,411 to Appellee pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1734.01, concluding that Appellee had paid the taxes as the result of an honest mistake or misunderstanding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellee paid the 2006 personal property taxes based upon a mistake of law, section 77-1734.01 afforded it no relief, and therefore, the district court erred in determining that Appellee was entitled to a refund. View "Kaapa Ethanol, LLC v. Kearney County Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Appellant owned a convention center. In the 2009 and 2010 tax years, the conference center was valued by the Sarpy County assessor at $23,400,000. Appellant protested that valuation to the Sarpy County Board of Equalization, which denied the request. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) denied Appellant's appeal and valued the conference center at the amount previously valued by the county assessor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that TERC did not err in affirming the valuation of the property because Appellant failed to meet its burden of showing that the county's valuation was unreasonable and arbitrary, and therefore, TERC's decision was lawful, was supported by competent evidence, and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "JQH La Vista Conference Ctr. Dev. LLC v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

This was the second appeal in this case. Doctor, who was licensed to practice medicine in Nebraska and Washington, entered into an assurance of compliance with the Attorney General due to unprofessional conduct. The assurance of compliance was made part of Doctor's public record. Consequently, Doctor alleged that the Washington Department of Health learned via public record of the assurance of compliance and initiated a disciplinary action against him. Doctor was also made ineligible with the American Board of Family Medicine. Doctor filed a complaint against the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services and the Attorney General alleging that the Attorney General fraudulently and negligently misrepresented the adverse effects of the assurance of compliance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding the misrepresentation claims to be contract claims subject to, and barred by, the State Contract Claims Act (Act). Doctor again appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Doctor's claims were subject to, and barred by, the Act. View "Zawaideh v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Law Firm represented Employee in a workers' compensation action against Employee's Employer. After a trial, Employee was awarded compensation, including medical expenses incurred by Employee with Medical Clinic. Employer paid sums owed to Medical Clinic pursuant to the award. Law Firm subsequently filed a complaint against Medical Clinic, seeking attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. Following a hearing, the district court dismissed Law Firm's complaint, concluding that Law Firm was not permitted to recover attorney fees from Medical Clinic under the doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-125(2)(a) prohibits the charging of attorney fees against medical providers in workers' compensation court; and (2) the common fund doctrine may not be applied in this case to allow Law Firm a fee from Medical Clinic from the district court when it would not be entitled to such a fee from the workers' compensation court. View "Walentine, O'Toole, McQuillan & Gordon, LLP v. Midwest Neurosurgery, PC" on Justia Law

After Defendant pled no contest to third degree assault, the district court ordered Defendant to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider all the evidence in the record rather than just the factual basis for the plea in making its determination. On remand, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant's crime involved sexual contact and ordered Defendant to register under SORA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant's crime involved sexual contact and in ordering Defendant to register under SORA. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law