Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming (1) he was prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct, (2) he was deprived of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) he was deprived of his right to present a complete defense. The trial court dismissed his motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed as to all matters except for the denial of an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue impeachment of the State's key witness with his alleged inconsistent statement. Remanded. View "State v. Poe" on Justia Law

Shirley Krzycki was the sole settlor, trustee, and beneficiary of the Shirley Krzycki Trust established to hold annual payments from an insurance settlement. Upon Shirley's death, Shirley's son Greg was named successor trustee of the Trust. Greg filed suit, claiming that sums on deposit in a bank account, formerly owned by Shirley as "primary joint owner," were property of the Trust. Shirley's daughter Robin was originally named "secondary joint owner" on this account, and Robin refused to give to the Trust the sums on deposit in this account. After a bench trial, the district court held that the balance of the Wells Fargo account belonged to the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, but for reasons different from those of the district court, holding (1) the remaining sums on deposit in the bank account for the benefit of the Trust were trust funds belonging to the Trust; and (2) Robin converted the funds in the account for her own use by refusing to turn them over to the Trust. View "Krzycki v. Krzycki" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the assault and weapon convictions and found that the trial court did not err in failing to give a self-defense instruction, but (2) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the attempted second degree murder conviction, finding the jury should have been instructed on both attempted second degree murder and attempted sudden quarrel manslaughter. Although its reasoning differed in some respects from that of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not request an instruction on attempted sudden quarrel manslaughter, and because he was charged with a nonhomicide charge, the district court had no duty to instruct on any lesser-included offenses in the absence of such a request, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise; but (2) Defendant was entitled to a new trial at which the jury could be instructed on the distinction between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to first degree sexual assault. The district court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five to thirty years' imprisonment with credit for 224 days served. The two issues presented for review in this appeal were whether Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective and whether Defendant received an excessive sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record was insufficient to to review on direct appeal Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and accordingly, the Court declined to address it; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to twenty-five to thirty years' imprisonment for first degree sexual assault. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a grievance alleging that Lancaster County denied him an opportunity to fairly compete for job vacancies because County officials did not follow the County's personnel rules. There were two vacancies at issue. The first was a vacancy at the County's mental health center, for which the County reassigned one of its employees to that position without conducting competitive examinations. The second vacancy was a ground maintenance position left open after the County reassigned the first employee to the mental health center. The district court held (1) regarding the first vacancy, a department head's decision to place a current department employee in a newly created vacancy was not an appointment subject to competitive examinations; (2) regarding the second vacancy, the County properly promoted a department employee to the vacancy even though the department did not consider the applicants' seniority; and (3) Appellant's claim was moot because he no longer worked for the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant's claim was not moot; (2) the County failed to comply with statutory requirements and its own personnel rules in assigning department employees to the mental health center and the ground maintenance vacancies, and the assignments were therefore invalid. View "Blakely v. Lancaster County" on Justia Law

After her Father's death, Mother underwent intrauterine insemination using Father's cryopreserved sperm. The procedure was successful, and Mother gave birth to a child. Mother subsequently applied to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of the child. SSA denied the application. An ALJ decided that the child was entitled to child's insurance benefits on Father's Social Security record. SSA's appeal council reversed. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the following question to the Nebraska Supreme Court: "Can a child, conceived after her biological father's death through intrauterine insemination using his sperm, and born within nine months of his death, inherit from him as the surviving issue under Nebraska intestacy law?" The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that under the relevant Nebraska statutes, a child conceived after her biological father's death cannot inherit from her father as surviving issue for purposes of intestacy. View "Amen v. Asture" on Justia Law

After a jury trial at which the jury was instructed on aiding and abetting, Defendant was convicted of robbery, attempted robbery, two counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony, and second degree assault. As postconviction relief, Defendant was granted a new direct appeal. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the district court erred when it declared that a witness was unavailable and when it allowed Defendant's deposition testimony to be read into the record, but the error was harmless; and (2) the court of appeals did not err when it determined that the evidence supported the convictions. View "State v. Kitt" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a class IV felony based on his failure to comply with certain registration provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court subsequently sustained Defendant's motion for rehearing and ordered the case submitted without further oral argument. The Court then withdrew its prior opinion, reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss, holding that Defendant did not commit the offense for which he was charged and convicted because he was not subject to SORA on the date of the alleged offense, and therefore, Defendant had no legal obligation to report his change of address to the sex offender registry. View "State v. Gaskill" on Justia Law

Employee was severely injured while working for Employer. Employer and its Insurer began paying lifetime workers' compensation benefits. Employee brought a separate negligence action against Employer's parent company (Ridgetop) and joined Employer and Insurer for workers' compensation subrogation purposes. Employee reached a settlement agreement with Ridgetop, after which the trial court granted Employer and Insurer's motion, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-118, for a future credit in the amount of Employee's settlement with Ridgetop against its continuing workers' compensation obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order granting the future credit, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting the motion for credit against the settlement proceeds Employee received from Employer; (2) Insurer did not waive its right to a future credit through a waiver clause in the policy or statements during settlement negotiations; but (3) the trial court erred in granting the credit for the entire amount of the settlement. Remanded for the limited purpose of deducting $437,500 - the amount paid to Insurer and an indemnity company - out of the settlement and for determining the amount of attorney fees to additionally be deducted from the amount of the credit. View "Bacon v. DBI/SALA" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of theft by shoplifting, $200 or less. The district court relied on two prior county court convictions to enhance the crime for punishment as a Class IV felony. In the second of these two prior proceedings, the county court had refused to enhance the conviction and had treated it as a first offense. Defendant argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required the district court to treat the instant conviction as only a second offense, and thus, as a Class I misdemeanor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for enhancement as a third or subsequent offense, the plain language of the relevant statute required only that Defendant have been previously convicted of two instances of theft by shoplifting, whether the earlier convictions were called first offense or second offense; and (2) Defendant's two prior convictions clearly satisfied this requirement. View "State v. McCarthy" on Justia Law