Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On April 30, 2010, Midwest Renewable Energy and Marquette Equipment Finance (Marquette) filed a Nebraska personal property return that reported a value of zero dollars for three items involving ethanol manufacturing equipment. The tax assessor determined that the taxable value of the property should have been $4,170,149 and changed the value on the return. Marquette appealed the action of the assessor. On July 19, 2010, the county board of equalization upheld the assessor's action. Republic Bank, which had rights in the property, did not receive a copy of the Board's decision from Marquette until August 20, 2010. Republic subsequently appealed. The Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) received the appeal on August 23, 2010. TERC dismissed the appeal as untimely under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-12.33.06(4) because it was filed more than thirty days after the decision of the county board of equalization. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that TERC correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal, as it was not timely filed under section 77-1233.06(4). View "Republic Bank v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Midwest Renewable Energy and Marquette Equipment Finance (Marquette) executed a master lease agreement for certain manufacturing equipment, including two distillation columns. Later, Marquette assigned its interest in the lease to Prime Alliance Bank and agreed to file personal property tax returns on the equipment as an agent for Prime Alliance. On April 30, 2010, Marquette filed a personal property return with the county assessor that showed the taxable value of the two distillation columns as $0. The assessor changed the value of the columns to $776,832. Prime Alliance challenged the assessor's change, and, on July 19, 2010, the county Board of Equalization upheld the change. On August 23, 2010, Prime Alliance filed an appeal from the order to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that TERC did not err in dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the appeal was not timely filed under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1233.06(4). View "Prime Alliance Bank v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

The county district court entered a decree of dissolution of the marriage of Kevin and Valara Mamot. The court determined that the premarital agreement entered into by the parties, although unconscionable, was valid and enforceable. The court then divided the assets and entered an order regarding child support. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding that the premarital agreement was enforceable, holding that because Valara did not sign the agreement voluntarily, the agreement was unenforceable under the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act adopted by Nebraska, and therefore, the Court did not need to further address whether the agreement was unconscionable. View "Mamot v. Mamot" on Justia Law

Junior river water appropriators Jack Bond and Joe McClaren Ranch filed a request for a hearing before the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (Department), challenging the validity of the Department's administration of water in response to a call for administration placed by the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD). The Department joined the matter as a party litigant against the junior appropriators. Following a hearing, the director of the Department determined that the water administration was proper and denied the junior appropriators' challenge to the sufficiency of the closing notices issued to upstream junior appropriators. The junior appropriators appealed. At issue on appeal was whether the issues of nonuse and abandonment alleged by the junior appropriators were properly before the Department. The Supreme Court reversed the order, holding that the Department erred in refusing to determine the junior appropriators' challenge to the validity of NPPD's appropriations. Remanded with directions to determine whether NPPD's appropriations had been abandoned or statutorily forfeited in whole or in part. View "Bond v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist." on Justia Law

Tyler Britt was convicted in the county court of first-offense driving under the influence with a concentration of more than .15 of one gram alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The district court affirmed the conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that the admission of a certificate containing a chemical analysis certification of the alcohol breath simulator solution used to test the machine that was used to test Britt's breath did not violate the confrontation clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it concluded that the certificate was not testimonial, and therefore not subject to confrontation analysis; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it did not note plain error with regard to Britt's hearsay objections. View "State v. Britt" on Justia Law

This proceeding arose from an objection filed on March 6, 2012 by Appellant, the Nebraska Republican Party, with the Nebraska Secretary of State in which it challenged, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-624, the candidate filing of Bob Kerrey for the U.S. Senate. The Secretary of State issued his determination opinion concluding that Kerrey's name could appear on the May 15, 2012 primary election ballot. Appellant filed a petition for review of the determination opinion. The district court dismissed the case on March 21, 2012 with prejudice. At issue on appeal was whether section 32-624, which requires that an order be made by a judge "on or before the fifty-fifth day preceding the election" in order to reverse a decision of the Secretary of State, would prohibit the Supreme Court from granting relief after that fifty-five-day limitation period had run. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the statutory procedure established by the Legislature, it lacked the authority to grant the relief sought by Appellant because the fifty-five limitation period had run. View "Neb. Republican Party v. Gale" on Justia Law

The juvenile court signed written orders committing and transferring a juvenile to the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC). The orders were made in error and did not reflect the court's orally pronounced intention to pursue foster placement for the juvenile. In a subsequent written order, the court vacated and corrected the erroneous orders, but the juvenile had already been transferred to the YRTC. Despite the court's insistence that the juvenile be returned, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) refused to do so and appealed the juvenile court's order. While the appeal was pending, DHHS obtained an order from the court of appeals staying the juvenile court's corrected order. This left the juvenile in the YRTC, where she completed her program, was paroled, and was subsequently discharged from parole. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as moot, as there was no longer an actual case or controversy requiring judicial resolution. View "In re Shaleia M." on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Benjamin Sprunger was convicted of four counts of possessing child pornography. Sprunger appealed, challenging the search that uncovered the images and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the search, as (1) probable cause did not support the warrant to search Sprunger's computers for child pornography; and (2) the warrant was lacking probable cause to such a degree that the officers' reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable and thus did not bring it within the U.S. v. Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "State v. Sprunger" on Justia Law

A jury found William Kinser guilty of felony flight to avoid arrest and found Kinser to be a habitual criminal. Kinser appealed, contending that the habitual criminal determination was erroneous because the flight to avoid arrest conviction was enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony based upon Kinser's willful reckless operation of a motor vehicle and that any further enhancement under the habitual criminal statute would result in an improper double enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Kinser was properly sentenced as a habitual criminal; and (2) the district court did not impose an erroneous sentence for Kinser's flight to avoid arrest conviction. View "State v. Kinser" on Justia Law

This case arose from the settlement of a personal injury lawsuit filed by Edward Smalley, who was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. Although Smalley qualified for Medicaid as a result of the accident, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Nebraska's Medicaid administrator, refused to pay Smalley's outstanding medical bills prior to the disposition of his third-party liability claims. To facilitate a settlement of those claims, Smalley's attorney agreed that if DHHS paid the medical bills at the discounted Medicaid rate, Smalley would reimburse DHHS dollar-for-dollar out of the settlement proceeds. After DHHS paid the bills as agreed, Smalley objected to full reimbursement as contrary to federal law. The district court determined that under federal law, DHHS was entitled to reimbursement of only a portion of the Medicaid payments it had made. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DHHS was entitled to full reimbursement. View "Smalley v. Neb. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law