Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Karlie D.'s mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Karlie, and Karlie's father later died. The Nebraska Deaprtment of Health and Human Services placed Karlie in foster care, but Karlie's parental grandmother, Martha D., moved to have Karlie placed with her and her husband and to become Karlie's guardian. The juvenile court adopted a transition plan, against the Department's recommendation, which permanently moved Karlie to live with her grandparents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the court's order affected a substantial right of the State, the order was final and appealable; and (2) because Martha was fully capable of caring for Karlie, had established a relationship with her, and was her grandmother, it was in Karlie's best interests to be placed with Martha. View "In re Karlie D." on Justia Law

The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) provided Medicaid benefits for Virginia Lee Cushing during the final years of her life. After her death, DHHS filed a claim against Cushing's estate for recovery of the benefits pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 68-919. The personal representative of the estate appealed from an order of the county court allowing the claim and awarding interest. At issue on appeal was whether DHHS timely presented its claim and, if so, whether it was proved as a matter of law. The Supreme Court concluded the claim was both timely presented and proved as a matter of law but modified the award of interest. View "In re Estate of Cushing" on Justia Law

Dwight Trumble owned property in Sarpy County and paid two levies for the support of school districts in the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties (Learning Community). Trumble subsequently brought suit under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1735 against the school districts in the Learning Community, claiming the levies were unconstitutional. The district court determined it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a suit to recover unconstitutional taxes cannot be brought under section 77-1735; (2) Trumble filed suit outside the tax year in which the challenged taxes were levied or assessed, so the district court did not have jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,149; and (3) since the district court lacked jurisdiction, it properly dismissed the action. View "Trumble v. Sarpy County Board" on Justia Law

David and Wilai Burden provided childcare services in their home. The Southwind Homeowners Association filed suit against the Burdens, alleging that the childcare services as provided violated several restrictive covenants applicable to the premises and asking that the Burdens be enjoined from providing those services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the childcare services were in violation of several restrictive covenants, and granted an injunction. The Burdens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact remained, and as a matter of law, the Burdens' activities on the property violated the Association's covenants. View "Southwind Homeowners Ass'n v. Burden" on Justia Law

The Douglas County attorney filed a petition with the Mental Health Board alleging that S.J. was a dangerous sex offender within the meaning of Nebraska's Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA). The Board concluded that S.J. was a dangerous sex offender. The Board then held a hearing in which it concluded that inpatient treatment at Norfolk Regional Center was the least restrictive alternative presently available and ordered inpatient commitment. S.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's findings that S.J. was substantially unable to control his behavior; (2) clear and convincing evidence supported the court's finding that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative; and (3) SOCA's provision regarding the composition of the Board was consistent with due process requirements. View "In re S.J." on Justia Law

Big John's Billiards filed this action against the State and others seeking a declaration that the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was special legislation, violated Nebraska's equal protection clause, and constituted a regulatory taking. The district court sustained in part and in part overruled Big John's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of special legislation but did not direct entry of a final judgment or dismiss Big John's other constitutional claims. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the district court did not enter a final order, the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Big John's Billards v. State" on Justia Law

This case concerned a city's preexisting lien on land eventually condemned. At issue was whether the city could file a motion in either county or district court for setoff of the lien amount from the condemnation award. The landowner argued (1) the city must condemn the lien, as well as the subject property, in order to claim the land in condemnation proceedings; and (2) it was error for the county court in this case to grant such a setoff because county courts lack jurisdiction to make judicial determinations in condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part, holding (1) it is appropriate for a district court to consider the question of a setoff upon a timely motion by the condemnor when the condemnor has a lien interest in the land acquired; and (2) the district court in this case erred in remanding the matter of the setoff to the county court, as the issue was properly presented to the district court through a timely motion by the city, and the district court had jurisdiction to determine the city's lien and whether and to what amount it should be deducted from the condemnation award. View "City of Waverly v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

The dispute in this case revolved around a limited partnership (Kellom Heights) formed to provide financing for the redevelopment of property. Appellees were Kellom Heights, a corporation, and limited partners in Kellom Heights. Appellants were the redevelopment corporation, the general partner, and a corporation that was a limited parter of the redevelopment corporation. Appellees became dissatisfied with the operation of Kellom Heights and filed this complaint asserting various causes of action. The district court found for Appellees on certain causes of action and entered a judgment in their favor in the amount of $918,228 plus costs and interest. The court also awarded attorney fees and denied Appellees' request for prejudgment interest. The Supreme in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred when it rejected Appellants' statute of limitations defenses as to certain claims; and (2) the court erred in ruling that additional supervisory fees were not permitted. The Court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment. View "Fitzgerald v. Cmty. Redevelopment Corp." on Justia Law

Because of Defendant Oscar Hernandez's third conviction for driving under the influence, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his license. Defendant received an ignition interlock permit from the Department. Before the revocation expired, Defendant was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle that did not have an ignition interlock device. The State charged Defendant with driving during revocation under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.06. The district court concluded that section 60-6,197.06 did not apply to Defendant's conduct and that Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,211.05(5) did. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) section 60-6,197.06 does not provide the penalty for a driver who has a valid ignition interlock permit but operates a vehicle not equipped with such a device; and (2) rather, that conduct is a Class II misdemeanor under section 60-6,211.05(5). View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Servio Diaz, a Honduran disaster refugee with authorization to reside in the U.S., pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to misdemeanor charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and driving while intoxicated. Diaz subsequently filed a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief on the basis that his counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to advise Diaz of potential deportation consequences he would face when he entered his guilty plea. The district court determined that Diaz had not established entitlement to relief and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that the error asserted by Diaz was not an appropriate basis for relief by a writ of error coram nobis. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law