Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marco Torres was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree murder, one count of robbery, three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of unauthorized use of a financial transaction device. Torres was sentenced to death on each count of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Torres' conviction and death sentence, holding (1) the district court (i) did not err in making certain evidentiary rulings, and where it did err in admitting certain evidence, the error was harmless, and (ii) did not err in overruling Torres' motion to suppress; and (2) the sentencing panel, among other things, (i) did not err by receiving for purposes of the State's proof of aggravating circumstances the trial court's bill of exceptions over Torres' objections, (ii) did not err in finding certain statutes challenged by Torres to be constitutional, (iii) incorrectly considered the mental suffering of one of Torres' victims in determining whether an aggravating circumstance was in existence, but the failure of this one finding did not affect the existence of the aggravator, and (iv) did not err in concluding that no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors existed. View "State v. Torres" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties established a common levy for the general fund budgets of its eleven member school districts. After Sarpy County levied this tax on real property, three taxpayers brought an action in the district court seeking a declaration that the tax was unconstitutional. The Learning Community, each of its member school districts, and the Sarpy County treasurer were named defendants in the action. The district court declared the Learning Community's common levy was unconstitutional as a property tax for state purposes. The Learning Community and two of its member school districts appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-34442(2)(b), which provides that a learning community may establish a levy for general fund budgets of its member school districts, serves a predominantly local purpose, not a state purpose; and (2) because all members of the learning community received benefits from taxes levied and the levy was uniform throughout the community, there was no violation of either the Nebraska Constitution's prohibition of commutation or the uniformity clause. Remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Sarpy County Farm Bureau v. Learning Cmty. of Douglas & Sarpy Counties" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between AT&T Communications and TCG Omaha (collectively AT&T) and the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) regarding the correct interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 86-140, which governs the regulation of access charges. In its order, the PSC determined that telecommunications companies like AT&T could seek the negotiation and review of access charges under section 86-140 only when a local exchange carrier had implemented new or revised access charges, and not "at will." The district court reversed in part and in part modified the decision of the PSC. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court placing certain limitations on the section 86-140 negotiation and review process, holding that the plain language of the statute envisions both a negotiation and review process that are not limited by the statute. Remanded. View "AT&T Commc'ns v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Jorge Vigil was found guilty of sexual assault of a child. Vigil appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine and allowing a video-recorded interview of the victim to be heard by the jury after finding that the interview was admissible under Neb. R. Evid. 803(3), a hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. At issue was whether the statements were admissible when some time had passed since the sexual assaults and the victim did not see the physician the day of the interview. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that the elements of the medical purpose exception found in Rule 803(3) were met. View "State v. Vigil" on Justia Law

The Lesiaks were farmers who suffered a reduced corn yield, allegedly due to the overapplication of herbicide to their crops by Central Valley Ag Cooperative, Inc. (CVA). The Lesiaks filed this action against CVA, asserting multiple theories of recovery, including negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty of services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CVA on the implied warranty of services and negligence claims. Following the Lesiaks' presentation of their case, the district court granted CVA's motion for a directed verdict on the Lesiaks' remaining claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of CVA as there was evidence in the record which would allow a jury to find the overapplication of the herbicide damaged the Lesiaks' fields and also to reasonably estimate the extent of the damage; and (2) the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Lesiaks' negligence claim, as it was not barred by the economic loss doctrine. View "Lesiak v. Central Valley Ag Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Joshua Nolan was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony in connection with the killing of Justin Gaines. Nolan, relying primarily on inconsistencies among the statements and testimony of the State's witnesses, argued that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Nolan had shot and killed Gaines. A jury convicted Nolan of both charges. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself; (2) the step instruction used in this case was not constitutionally infirm; (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict; and (4) trial counsel did not perform in a deficient manner. View "State v. Nolan" on Justia Law

Timothy Jimenez pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Jimenez was arrested in Colorado. He failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and the county attorney obtained a warrant for his arrest. Thereafter, a detainer was placed on Jiminez in Nebraska. Jimenez then requested a final disposition or an order directing the State to release the detainer. The district court denied Jimenez's request, determining that the interstate Agreement on Detainers, which allows a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged to demand a speedy disposition of outstanding charges, did not apply because Jimenez had no untried matters pending in Nebraska. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding Jimenez was not eligible to invoke the Agreement, as a detainer for a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense but not sentenced does not relate to an "untried indictment, information or complaint" under the Agreement and thus does not trigger the procedural requirements of the Agreement. View "State v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

Prime Home Care, LLC sought a permanent injunction pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 87-217, part of the statutes governing the protection of trade names, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 87-303, part of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, to prevent Pathways to Compassion, LLC from using the name "Compassionate Care Hospice." The district court granted Prime Home Care a permanent injunction and attorney fees. Pathways appealed, arguing that "Compassionate Care Hospice" was merely descriptive and had not acquired secondary meaning. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the name had acquired secondary meaning as it concerned Prime Home Care's hospice services; (2) the district court did not err when it granted Prime Home Care's request for a permanent injunction where confusion existed as a result of Pathways' use of Prime Home Care's protected trade name; and (3) the trial court did not err in granting Prime Home Care's request for attorney fees under either section 87-217 or section 87-303, and Prime Home Care was not entitled to additional attorney fees. View "Prime Home Care, LLC v. Pathways to Compassion, LLC" on Justia Law

Thomas & Thomas Court Reporters sued Douglas Switzer, an attorney, and his law firm, Hathaway & Switzer (Hathaway Switzer), for failure to pay for court reporting services. The district court entered judgment for Thomas & Thomas. At issue on appeal was whether Hathaway Switzer was liable to Thomas & Thomas for its fees or whether Hathaway Switzer's clients were. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's judgment to the extent that it held Hathaway Switzer rather than Hathaway Switzer's clients liable, as Hathaway Switzer had not disclaimed liability for those fees; and (2) reversed the court's judgment to the extent that it held Switzer personally liable. Remanded with directions to dismiss Thomas & Thomas' claim against Switzer as an individual. View "Thomas & Thomas Court Reporters, LLC v. Switzer" on Justia Law

Alma Gonzalez was convicted of fraudulently obtaining public assistance benefits based upon a no contest plea that she entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Over two years after her sentencing, Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw her plea, alleging that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney had not explained that her plea would result in automatic deportation. The district court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) procedurally, Gonzalez was permitted to move for withdrawal of her plea; but (2) Gonzalez failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal of her plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law