Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Dunkin pled no contest to the charge of murder in the second degree. The district court accepted Dunkin's plea, entered a judgment of guilty, and sentenced Dunkin to forty years to life imprisonment. Dunkin filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) Dunkin was not pressured or coerced to enter his plea; (2) Dunkin failed to establish that counsel's preparation for the case was unreasonable or inadequate; (3) Dunkin's counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency; (4) Dunkin's allegation that a specific sentence was promised or that the plea agreement was conditioned on such a sentence was without merit; and (5) Dunkin's counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal where Dunkin and counsel had no contact following the sentencing proceedings. View "State v. Dunkin" on Justia Law

On March 21, 2006, Julie Lovelace was injured in the course of her employment with the City of Lincoln. Lovelace continued to work after her injury up until June 22, 2006, the date of the surgery on her knee. Lovelace returned to work on October 2, 2006 until November 6, 2007, when she was again injured. Lovelace had another surgery on her left knee on December 19, 2007. Lovelace did not return to work, and the City subsequently terminated her employment. Lovelace sought payments for temporary total disability. The workers' compensation court found Lovelace had been temporarily totally disabled from June 22, 2006 through October 1, 2006, and again from December 19, 2007 through August 19, 2009, and thereafter became permanently and totally disabled. A three-judge panel of the compensation court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lovelace was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits for the period of time after she was injured and while she was working between October 2, 2006 and December 18, 2007; and (2) Lovelace was entitled to permanent total disability payments from December 19, 2007 onward. View "Lovelace v. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

Chad Norman pled no contest to third degree assault and was sentenced to probation for two years and jail for thirty days. After a hearing, the district court also ordered Norman to register under Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Norman appealed the portion of his sentence requiring him to register, claiming he was denied due process. The Supreme Court reversed the registration order, holding (1) before a court orders a defendant to be subject to SORA pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4003(1)(b)(i), the court must make a finding whether the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact as part of the incident that gave rise to the defendant's conviction for one of the offenses not sexual in nature listed in section 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B); (2) the court must provide procedural due process when it makes this finding, including proper notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (3) although the court in this case provided Norman with notice and a hearing, the court erred when it based its finding solely on statements in the State's factual basis for Norman's plea and explicitly ignored the evidence at the hearing. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Norman" on Justia Law

After the Department of Health and Human Services took custody of Child, Mother filed a motion to require the Department to accept her voluntary relinquishment of Child. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. On the same date, the court entered an order overruling Mother's motion to require the Department to accept her relinquishment. Because the court had terminated Mother's parental rights, it found the relinquishment motion was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the juvenile court should have ordered the Department to accept relinquishment of Mother's parental rights, the relinquishment was moot; and (2) the juvenile court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights. View "In re Elizabeth S." on Justia Law

Jan Ginapp, a registered nurse, was injured on the job in a violent assault committed by a patient who had been admitted to the hospital after he was taken into emergency protective custody by the City of Bellevue police department. Ginapp sued Bellevue, alleging that her injuries resulted from the police department's negligence. The district court entered judgment for Ginapp against Bellevue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that the patient was in Bellevue's custody at the time of the assault and that Bellevue law enforcement acted unreasonably in transporting the patient to the hospital and permitting him to be admitted; and (2) therefore, the court erred in finding that Bellevue was liable for Ginapp's injuries. View "Ginapp v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

Mack Downey and his wife sued Western Community College area, which operates Western Nebraska Community College, after Downey suffered injuries from a fall that occurred while he was replacing a scoreboard at the College. Downey's employer, Ferguson Signs, was named as a plaintiff to preserve a subrogation interest for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court found that the College was liable for a portion of Downey's injuries and apportioned liability to Downey and Ferguson Signs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the court did not err in finding the College liable; (2) the court correctly denied the College's claim for indemnity; but (3) the court erred in apportioning negligence to Ferguson Signs where Ferguson Signs was not a "released person" within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,185.11. Remanded for the court to reapportion Ferguson Signs' share of the negligence to Downey and the College. View "Downey v. Western Cmty. College Area" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Matthew Fox was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Fox appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it found him competent to stand trial and when it allowed him to absent himself from major portions of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it determined that Fox was competent to stand trial, and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Fox knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial and allowed Fox to absent himself from trial. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Hessler was incarcerated and sentenced to death relating to the rape and murder of a fifteen-year-old. Hessler subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to demand a competency hearing before the trial court allowed Hessler to waive counsel and represent himself at sentencing. The court then denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hessler failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the sentencing hearing, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying postconviction relief. View "State v. Hessler" on Justia Law

The City of Minden filed an application to construct a subtransmission line with the Nebraska Power Review Board (Board). Southern Public Power District (Southern) objected to the application. The Board denied the application, finding that Minden's proposal was not the most economical and feasible means of supplying electrical services and also that its proposal would unnecessarily duplicate Southern's existing line. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was evidence to support the Board's decision that Southern could more economically and feasibly transmit Minden's necessary power; and (2) the record showed sufficient evidence to support the Board's decision that Minden's line would be unnecessarily duplicative of Southern's line, and that decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable. View "In re Application of Minden" on Justia Law

This appeal focused on the legality of a video gaming device known as Bankshot, which was developed and distributed by Appellees. Appellees filed this lawsuit after the State seized two Bankshot devices as alleged illegal gambling devices, seeking a declaration that they were not illegal. The state agencies and officers who were named as defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that Bankshot was a "game of chance" and therefore an unlawful gambling device. The district court (1) found that Bankshot was a game of chance when played in some modes but not when played by others; (2) ultimately concluded that Bankshot was a gambling device under Nebraska law; and (3) refused the State's request for injunctive relief, reasoning that there was no showing that Appellees knowingly used Bankshot to advance unlawful gaming activity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying injunctive relief because (1) where the Bankshot game was reconfigured to comply with the terms of the district court order, injunctive relief completely banning the development and distribution of Bankshot in any form was not warranted; and (2) Bankshot, as currently configured, was not a game of chance. View "Am. Amusements Co. v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law