Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An infant died while under the care of Carla McKinney, who operated a daycare center. Matthias Okoye, a pathologist who worked for Nebraska Forensic Medical Services (collectively, Appellees), reported in an autopsy report that the infant died of injuries from child abuse. McKinney was arrested and charged with felony child abuse, but the State later dropped the charges. McKinney sued Appellees for malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed McKinney's complaint, concluding that McKinney could not base an action for malicious prosecution on Okoye's statements because an absolute testimonial privilege shielded them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person who gives information to a prosecutor that results in a criminal prosecution against another does not have an absolute privilege from liability for malicious prosecution. View "McKinney v. Okoye" on Justia Law

Anthony Alsidez died in a single-car accident after a passenger, Gregory Segura, grabbed the steering wheel of the Jeep Anthony was driving. The Jeep was owned by Melissa Alsidez, Anthony's mother, who had a policy with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. Melissa filed a negligence suit against Segura, combined with a coverage action against American Family. After Melissa settled with Segura at an amount that did not compensate her for her claimed loss, Melissa sought to recover underinsured motorist coverage from American Family. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Melissa, holding, among other things, that the exclusion from the underinsured coverage in Melissa's policy for vehicles "owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or a relative" was not void as against public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment where (1) the Jeep was not an "underinsured vehicle" under the policy, and (2) the "regular use" exclusion was consistent with the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Act and not void as against public policy. View "Alsidez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Under one contract, City collected solid waste and took it to a waste services company's (Company) transfer station. Company hauled the waste to a landfill. After this contract expired, Company charged the city $42.50 per ton for temporarily accepting its waste at the transfer station. Company later increased City's rate to $60 per ton. Under a second contract, Company performed disposal services for City and charged the same rate it charged under the first contract. After the first contract expired, Company increased City's rate to $60 per ton under the second contract. City sued Company, alleging it was entitled to recover the payments that Company had received for disposal services at the rate of $42.50 per ton. The district court entered judgment for City. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that the parties were operating under an implied contract when Company temporarily accepted City's waste at the transfer station; (2) affirmed the district court's restitution award for the full amount of the overpayments, concluding that Company was unjustly enriched because Company obtained City's assent to its unilateral modification of the price for services through economic duress; and (3) reversed the court's determination of the reasonable value of Company's services. Remanded. View "City of Scottsbluff v. Waste Connections of Neb." on Justia Law

Lucky Iromuanya was convicted of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and two related counts of use of a weapon. The Supreme Court modified his sentence. Iromuanya subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel directed at his trial and appellate counsel. The district court overruled the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Iromuanya's motion without a hearing where, for all of his claims, Iromuanya either failed to allege facts that showed his counsel's deficient performance or failed to allege facts that showed he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficiencies. View "State v. Iromuanya" on Justia Law

Before Appellee began work as a certified nurse aid at Hospital, she failed to disclose on a preemployment questionnaire a work-related injury she received in 2001. In 2008, while working at Hospital, Appellee injured her back. Appellee subsequently petitioned for workers' compensation benefits. The trial judge dismissed the petition, concluding (1) Appellee had willfully misrepresented her work-related injury history when she failed to disclose information about her previous injury; and (2) the hospital could deny benefits because of Appellee's misrepresentation pursuant to Hilt Trucks Lines, Inc. v. Jones. The Workers' Compensation Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial judge erred in finding a causal connection between Appellee's misrepresentation and her 2008 injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court's decision in Hilt Truck Lines, Inc. was clearly erroneous, and it was therefore overruled. Remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Appellee was entitled to benefits without regard to Hospital's misrepresentation defense. View "Bassinger v. Neb. Heart Hosp." on Justia Law

Timmy Timmens was convicted of second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Timmens subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several particulars and that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims without a hearing and denied the remaining claim following an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Timmens' appeal of the order denying all but one of his postconviction claims without a hearing was untimely; (2) trial counsel's performance with respect to Timmens' remaining claim was not deficient under the Strickland v. Washington standard, and therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective in not raising the issue of trial counsel's performance on direct appeal; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Timmens' motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "State v. Timmens" on Justia Law

A rental vehicle driven by James Nelson was stopped for speeding. A subsequent search disclosed a package of cocaine. After a jury trial, Nelson was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver or distribute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although Nelson was not the driver authorized on the rental agreement, he had permission from the authorized driver to drive the vehicle, and therefore, Nelson had standing to challenge his detention and the search of the vehicle; (2) the district court's denial of Nelson's first motion to suppress was not in error where an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer would have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Nelson; and (3) the district court did not err when it denied Nelson's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because the evidence at issue was not newly discovered evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2101(5), the evidence was not exculpatory, and its loss or destruction did not deprive Nelson of due process or a fair trial. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Grandmother and Grandfather filed a petition for adoption seeking to adopt Child. Grandfather had dementia, so Father, who was Child's father and Grandparents' son, sought to participate in the adoption proceedings on Grandfather's behalf and object to his mental capacity to pursue the adoption. After a hearing, the county court entered an order finding that Father did not have standing in the adoption case. At issue on appeal was whether Father could stand as Grandfather's "next friend" and participate in the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction because Father's appeal was not taken from a final, appealable order; (2) Father could not appeal on his own behalf because he had asserted no personal stake in the controversy; and (3) Father could not appeal on Grandfather's behalf because the court's dismissal of Father did not affect any of Grandfather's substantial rights. View "In re Adoption of Amea R." on Justia Law

A public power and irrigation district (District) filed an action against a development and other sublessees (collectively, Development) to quiet title to land owned by District and leased by Development. Development filed motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that District's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be grante. The district court sustained the motions and overruled Development's motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting Development's motions to dismiss because (1) the allegations in District's complaint, taken as true, were plausible and thus were sufficient to suggest that District had presented a justiciable controversy, and (2) the motions to dismiss filed in this case provided no notice that Development was asserting the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel and res judicata. Remanded. View "Central Neb. Pub. Power v. Jeffrey Lake Dev." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Ronald Smith was convicted of murder in the second degree and related offenses. Smith appealed his conviction for second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed after (1) reaffirming the holdings of State v. Pettit and Bosche v. State that an intentional killing committed without malice upon a sudden quarrel constitutes the offense of manslaughter, and overruling the holding of State v. Jones that the distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel is the presence or absence of an intention to kill; (2) holding that the step instruction given in this case was not a correct statement of the law because it (i) required the jury to convict on second degree murder if it found that Smith killed the victim intentionally but (ii) did not permit the jury to consider the alternative possibility that the killing was intentional but provoked by a sudden quarrel and, therefore, constituted manslaughter; and (3) concluding that because there was no evidence in the record upon which the jury could have concluded that Smith committed sudden quarrel manslaughter instead of second degree murder, the improper jury instruction did not prejudice Smith or affect his substantial rights. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law