Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Becker pleaded guilty to motor vehicle homicide and was sentenced to five years of probation, which included a requirement that Becker participate in a work ethic camp. The court also revoked Becker's driver's license for five years as a condition of probation. Becker later violated his probation, and the court revoked it. The court then sentenced Becker to five years in prison and again revoked Becker's license, this time for fifteen years. The court did not give Becker credit for the time he served in the work ethic camp or for his previous driver's license revocation. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding (1) Becker should receive credit for the time served at the work ethic camp, but (2) Becker should not receive credit for the time his license was revoked while he was on probation. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Becker" on Justia Law

Ronald Bacon was injured while working at a construction site. Bacon sued the general contractor, the general contractor's commercial liability insurer, the subcontractor, and the parent company of the subcontractor. Bacon settled with the insurer, which together with the general contractor's separate liability insurer, made payments to Bacon pursuant to the settlement agreement. After Bacon settled with the subcontractor's parent company, the general contractor's two insurers filed a breach of contract action because Bacon received the proceeds of his second settlement but refused to make payment to the insurers under the terms of the first settlement agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurers, finding Bacon, his lawyer, and the lawyer's law firm liable in the amount of $437,500. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's finding that lawyer and law firm were personally liable on the contract, holding that an attorney and/or law firm is not liable on a contract negotiated on behalf of a client when the contract provides that both the client and the attorney "agree to and will pay" a certain sum of money and the attorney signs the contract under the legend "Agreed to in Form & Substance". The Court otherwise affirmed. View "RSUI Indemnity Co. v. Bacon" on Justia Law

A state patrol officer stopped for speeding a vehicle driven by Anthony Laws in which Stuart Howard and Sarah McGee were passengers. When consent to search was denied, a trained drug detection canine unit was brought to the scene. The canine alerted, and a subsequent search disclosed over 700 pounds of marijuana being towed behind the car. Laws, Howard, and McGee were all charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. After their motions to suppress were denied, each was convicted. This appeal addressed McGee's challenge to the denial of her motion to suppress and to the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed McGee's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court correctly denied McGee's motion to suppress for the reasons articulated in its opinion related to Laws and Howard, and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support McGee's conviction. View "State v. McGee" on Justia Law

A state patrol officer stopped for speeding a vehicle driven by Anthony Laws in which Stuart Howard was a passenger. When consent to search was denied, a trained drug detection canine unit was brought to the scene. The canine alerted, and a subsequent search disclosed over 700 pounds of marijuana. Laws and Howard were both charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Each filed a motion to suppress. The motions were denied, and Laws and Howard were convicted of the charge. Both filed notices of appeal, assigning separate but related errors. In a consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle after the traffic stop, and the length of the continued detention was not unreasonable; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's factual finding that the results of the canine sniff were admissible; and (3) the reasonable suspicion factors combined with the canine alert constituted probable cause to search the vehicles. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Pearson was struck by a forklift and was later determined to have been injured in the course of his employment with Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Company (ADM). The workers' compensation court entered an award granting Pearson, among other benefits, certain future medical expenses. Pearson subsequently had a total knee replacement and sought reimbursement from ADM for those expenses as well as for expenses relating to a back injury. After ADM declined to pay the expenses, Pearson filed a motion to compel payment. A further award was entered (1) denying Pearson's motion with respect to the knee replacement but ordering ADM to pay expenses relating to the treatment of the back injury, and (2) applying the workers' compensation court's fee schedule to payments for the back injury, which had previously been paid by Pearson's health insurer. The workers' compensation court review panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly found that the original order denied knee replacement, and (2) the trial court did not err in applying the fee schedule to any reimbursement to a third party. Remanded. View "Pearson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Co." on Justia Law

Appellants, three individuals, filed an initiative and referendum petition to refer a proposed ballot measure, which would have amended a city ordinance imposing an occupation tax, to the electorate of the City. The City filed a declaratory judgment action to have the proposed measure declared invalid. The district court ruled that the petition proposed a referendum measure that violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 18-2528(1)(a), which prohibits referendums that interfere with a city's contractual obligations. The electors voted on the proposed amendment. The district court subsequently ordered the county clerk not to count the votes cast and not to report or certify the results. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and vacated, holding (1) the district court lacked the authority to block the count of the votes cast because the City failed to comply with the statutory requisites that would allow a court to take that action; (2) the district court erred in ruling that the proposed referendum violated section 18-2528(1)(a); and (3) the proposed referendum violated a common-law single subject rule, which invalidates proposed ballot measures that ask voters to approve independent and distinct measures in a single vote. View "City of North Platte v. Tilgner" on Justia Law

Jesse Britton was shot by a city police officer and a conservation officer with the state game and parks commission after Jesse failed to comply with the officers' commands to drop his gun. Jesse died. Pat Britton, as personal representative of Jesse's estate, filed an action against the City of Crawford under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) on common-law negligence claims. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, determining that the claim was barred by an intentional torts exception to the PSTCA providing that the PSTCA shall not apply to any claim arising out of a battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the alleged negligence was inextricably linked to a battery, Britton's suit was barred by the PSTCA. View "Britton v. City of Crawford" on Justia Law

Trevelle Taylor was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. On appeal, Taylor contended that the district court erred in giving certain jury instructions, receiving expert opinion testimony regarding the presence of gunshot residue on Taylor's hands, and admitting cellular telephone records purporting to prove contacts between Taylor and his codefendant on the basis of insufficient foundation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court committed reversible error in giving a jury instruction that allowed the jury to presume that Taylor was guilty of the crimes charged but failing to specify that the jury that was not required to draw the inference of guilt in violation of Neb. R. Evid. 303(3); (2) Taylor was not unfairly prejudiced by the other jury instructions given; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of gunshot residue; and (4) there was sufficient authentication to support the admission of the cellular telephone records. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, Husband alleged that Defendants, several physicians, a hospital and others, caused his Wife's death by negligently failing to administer an expensive drug to treat her hypertension. Because the drug needed to be administered indefinitely and could cause deadly symptoms if its administration was interrupted, Wife's treating physicians decided not to administer the drug until Wife's insurer approved it or another source of payment could be found. Wife died before either happened. The jury returned a general verdict for Defendant. Husband then filed a motion for a new trial, which the court granted based on its conclusion that Defendants' expert testimony was inconsistent with the standard of care. At issue on appeal was whether under the circumstances of this case, an expert medical witness is permitted to opine that under the customary standard of care, a physician should consider the health risks to a patient who may be unable to pay for continued treatment. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting a new trial, holding that such testimony is admissible and that, as a matter of law, it could not be said that Defendants' decisions in this case violated the standard of care. View "Murray v. UNMC Physicians" on Justia Law

This case involved a constitutional challenge to an occupation tax levied pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 2-3226.05. Appellant landowners, who were residents and taxpayers of natural resources districts in the Republican River basin, brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to have the occupation tax declared unconstitutional and its levy and collection enjoined. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the occupation tax, determining that it did not violate the Nebraska Constitution as (1) the occupation tax was not a property tax but, rather, an excise tax levied upon the activity of irrigation; (2) the occupation tax did not result in a commutation of taxes; and (3) section 2-3226.05 was not special legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judgment in Garey v. Nebraska Department of Natural Resources did not bar this action under the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) the landowners did not meet their burden of establishing that the occupation tax was unconstitutional. View "Kiplinger v. Neb. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law