Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thomas M. was adjudicated to be a juvenile who had committed acts which would constitute a felony and misdemeanors and who was mentally ill and dangerous. The juvenile court ordered Thomas to be placed in the custody of DHHS and committed to detention. The court then ordered DHHS to identify appropriate placement, including counseling, for Thomas. The court subsequently found DHHS in contempt of the order. In a second order, the court stated that DHHS would be in contempt of court if it did not provide satisfactory evidence that certain future billings related to Thomas' placement were timely paid. DHHS appealed both orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the issues surrounding the first order were moot but could be considered under the public interest exception; and (2) the second order was not a final, appealable order because it did not affect a substantial right of DHHS. View "In re Interest of Thomas M." on Justia Law

A jury found Armon Dixon guilty of one count of first-degree sexual assault and one count of robbery. The trial court determined that Dixon was a habitual offender as to both counts and sentenced Dixon to consecutive terms of thirty-five to sixty years in prison. On appeal, Dixon asserted that the district court erred in, inter alia, failing to sustain his motions for a change of venue, a mistrial, a continuance when he could not produce a witness, and for a directed verdict, and in imposing excessive sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that none of Dixon's assignments of error had merit. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The Commission of Industrial Relations was presented with an industrial dispute between the Professional Firefighters Association of Omaha, Local 385, and the City of Omaha. Prior to resolution of the industrial dispute, the Commission issued a status quo order requiring the City to adhere to the employment terms in place at the time. Local 385 then instituted proceedings in the district court, alleging that the City was in violation of the status quo order. The district court entered an order (1) finding that the City was in violation of the status quo order by failing to retain the required minimum number of fire personnel, and (2) determining that the City was not in violation of the status quo order by failing to maintain a specific number of fire captains based on the Commission's previous determination that the issue was one of management prerogative. The City appealed and Local 385 cross-appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding the appeal was moot because the industrial dispute between the parties had been resolved in an order that also dissolved the status quo order. View "Prof'l Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Employee was injured and began receiving disability benefits. Later, Employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier (collectively Employer) stopped paying Employee benefits because of his lack of cooperation in obtaining treatment and adhering to his pain rehabilitation program. Employee petitioned for past-due benefits, rehabilitation, and future medical treatment. On February 29, 2008, the workers' compensation court ordered Employee to refrain from abusive communications and to enroll in a pain rehabilitation program. On March 28, 2008, the court dismissed Employee's petition and terminated his benefits for contempt and unreasonably refusing to cooperate. Later, Employee filed a further petition in the workers' compensation court, seeking further benefits. The trial court entered an order on January 10, 2010 vacating the March 28 order. A review panel affirmed and remanded to the trial court, holding that the workers' compensation court had no authority under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act to terminate Employee's right to future benefits for contemptuous behavior. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a compensation court is not authorized to dismiss a petition as a sanction for a party's conduct either because an injured worker failed to cooperate with treatment or rehabilitation or as an exercise of contempt authority. View "Hofferber v. Hastings Utils." on Justia Law

Larry Williams was convicted and sentenced in district court for five counts of first degree sexual assault and one count of sexual assault of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams' convictions, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams' motion for new trial on the bases that (a) the informations were signed by persons were signed by persons not properly identified as the prosecuting authority, (b) prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and (c) the court erroneously admitted certain evidence; and (2) the district court did not impose excessive sentences, but the court committed plain error when it granted Williams forty-five days of credit for time against each of the five counts. The Court modified the sentencing order to state that Williams was entitled to a credit for time served in the amount of forty-five days against the aggregate of the minimum and the aggregate of the maximum sentences of imprisonment. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Karnell Burton was convicted of manslaughter, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Burton's convictions and sentences, holding (1) Burton waived any violation of his right to a speedy trial by not moving for discharge before trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Burton's motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct during the state's rebuttal in final argument; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that evidence of gang membership of two of the State's witnesses was not relevant; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing lengthy terms of imprisonment because of the nature of Burton's offenses. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

Raad Almasaudi was charged with theft by receiving stolen property pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-517 after various items of stolen property were found in his residence. A jury convicted Almasaudi of the charge. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Almasaudi was prejudiced by an instruction directing the jury to apply an objective rather than a subjective standard to the knowledge requirement of section 28-517 because such an instruction was contrary to law and failed to conform to the criminal code, and (2) the totality of the evidence was sufficient to sustain Almasaudi's conviction. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Almasaudi" on Justia Law

Frederick Skaggs was convicted in California of attempted forcible rape, kidnapping, robbery, and the unlawful taking of a vehicle. After he was paroled, Skaggs eventually moved to Nebraska. The Nebraska State Patrol required Skaggs to register under the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). After Skaggs requested a determination of the applicability of SORA to him, a hearing was held, and a hearing officer determined that Skaggs was required to register. The State Patrol adopted the recommendation of the hearing officer in full. The district court agreed that Skaggs was required to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State Patrola and district court did not err in determining SORA applied to Skaggs, and (2) the district court did not err when it refused to address the issue of whether SORA, as applied to Skaggs, was unconstitutional because it was not properly preserved for judicial review. View "Skaggs v. Neb. State Patrol" on Justia Law

Herchel Huff was driving a motor vehicle when he struck and killed a pedestrian. Huff was convicted of several charges in connection with the accident, including manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide. The primary issue on appeal was whether Huff's convictions for manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because, as Huff argued, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of motor vehicle homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part vacated, holding that, under Blockburger v. United States, unlawful act manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of motor vehicle homicide, and therefore, Huff was subjected to multiple punishments in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court then vacated Huff's conviction and sentence for manslaughter and remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Huff" on Justia Law

Susan Schwerdtfeger became pregnant by in vitro fertilization, and after giving birth, she and Teri Latham lived with the child for five years. The parties then separated and Latham moved out of the home. After Latham's visitation with the child stopped, Latham brought an action seeking custody and visitation, alleging that she had standing based on the doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Schwerdtfeger and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it concluded that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not apply to the facts of this case, and therefore, Latham had standing to seek custody and visitation of the child; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact whether Latham should be granted custody and/or visitation of the child. View "Latham v. Schwerdtfeger" on Justia Law