Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thirteen-year-old Efrain Ramos-Domingo was killed by a Union Pacific Railroad Company train. Two days later, Efrain's mother, Manuela Gonzalez signed a document releasing Union Pacific from liability for Efrain's death in exchange for $15,000. Manuela later filed a complaint in district court for wrongful death and breach of fiduciary duty. Union Pacific filed a motion to dismiss Manuela's complaint, arguing that the release barred Manuela's claims. The district court sustained the motion to dismiss with respect to the wrongful death claim but overruled the motion with respect to the fiduciary duty claim. The district court then granted Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim, finding that there was no fiduciary duty owed by Union Pacific to Manuela. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in dismissing Manuela's wrongful death claim because Manuela alleged facts that, if proved, could demonstrate that the release was void on the basis of its failure to represent a binding mutual understanding of the parties or was voidable as the product of fraud, overreaching or duress; and (2) the district court correctly concluded that Union Pacific owed no fiduciary duty to Manuela. Remanded. View "Gonzalez v. Union Pacific RR. Co." on Justia Law

In preparation for filing for a dissolution action, Elizabeth Johnson prepared several documents, including a petition for dissolution, a voluntary appearance for her then-husband, Kari Johnson, and a proposed dissolution decree. Kari signed the voluntary appearance and proposed decree. Elizabeth filed the petition for dissolution and Kari's voluntary appearance in the district court. The district court held a hearing that Kari did not attend, but the court found that the voluntary appearance signed by Kari established personal jurisdiction. The district court entered the decree, which required Kari to pay child support and alimony to Elizabeth. Kari moved to vacate the decree of dissolution, arguing that the decree was void because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Kari when Elizabeth failed to serve Kari with process and Kari never waived service. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the voluntary appearance waived service, and thus, the court had jurisdiction. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Joni Mueller, an employee of the Lincoln Public Schools (LPS), sought workers' compensation benefits after she suffered a whole body injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. At issue was how to calculate Mueller's average weekly wage for workers' compensation purposes. As a school employee, Mueller worked only during the school year and did not work during summer vacation, but her salary was spread out so that she was paid every month of the year, including the summer months. The trial court determined the the basis of calculation should be what Mueller earned during the six months before her injury, not necessarily what she was paid, and awarded Mueller temporary and permanent disability benefits based upon its determinations. The review panel of the Workers' Compensation Court affirmed the award. On appeal, the reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not calculating Mueller's average weekly wage based upon her actual weekly income. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Lincoln Public Schools" on Justia Law

McKinnis Roofing and Sheet Metal and homeowner Jeffrey Hicks entered into two contracts. The first contract related to Hicks' roof, and the second contract related to copper awnings on Hicks' residence. McKinnis filed a complaint in the district court alleging that Hicks breached both contracts after Hicks refused McKinnis' demand for advance payment. After trial, he district court determined that Hicks had breached both contracts, awarding McKinnis damages in the amount of $4,419 with regard to the roofing contract and $789 with regard to the awning contract. McKinnis appealed, arguing that the district court erred in calculating the amount of damages to which it was entitled. Hicks cross-appealed and claimed that the district court erred when it determined that he breached the contracts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that based on the facts and contract language, Hicks did not breach either contract. View "McKinnis Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Hastings State Bank sought to enforce a commercial guaranty against Miriam Misle in her capacity as trustee of the Julius Misle Revocable Trust. The bank claimed that Julius had signed a guaranty in favor of the Bank, which guaranteed debt owed by a limited liability company. The district court determined that Julius' trust was liable for up to $500,000 in principal on the commercial guaranty and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the bank. After a trial, the district court found in favor of the bank and entered judgment in the amount of $500,000. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it granted partial summary judgment in the bank's favor and denied Miriam's motion for summary judgment; and (2) the district court's factual determination that the trust was liable for the full amount of the guaranty, $500,000, was supported by the evidence and was not clearly wrong. View "Hastings State Bank v. Misle" on Justia Law

Chicago Lumber recorded a construction lien on JoAnn Selvera's home and sued to foreclose the lien. Selvera brought a counterclaim under Neb. Rev. Stat. 52-157, which provides a remedy against claimants who, in bad faith, file liens, overstate liens, or refuse to release liens. Chicago Lumber eventually withdrew its foreclosure action and released its lien, but Selvera maintained her suit. The district court granted summary judgment to Selvera, concluding that (1) because Selvera had not received a copy of Chicago Lumber's lien within ten days of its recording, the lien was invalid; and (2) Chicago Lumber's failure to dismiss its action and to release the lien before it received Selvera's documents clarifying that she had paid her debt in full constituted bad faith. The court awarded Selvera $10,000 in attorney fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Chicago Lumber had a reasonable belief that its lien was valid, at least before it received Selvera's clarifying documents, Chicago Lumber did not act in bad faith. The Court concluded that after Chicago Lumber received the clarifying documents, questions of fact existed whether Chicago Lumber was acting in bad faith. Remanded. View "Chicago Lumber Co. of Omaha v. Selvera" on Justia Law

The State brought a petition before the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that Christopher T., who was fifteen years old at the time, was a juvenile within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(b), in that he deported himself so as to injure or danger seriously the morals or health of himself or others, and under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(c), in that he was a mentally ill and dangerous juvenile. The State alleged that Christopher unlawfully subjected his stepbrothers to sexual contact without consent. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the juvenile court did not err in (1) adjudicating under section 435-427(3)(c) using the clear and convincing standard of evidence to find that Christopher was a mentally ill and dangerous person; (2) in finding that the State had adduced sufficient evidence to adjudicate Christopher under either section 435-427(3)(b) or (c); (3) in overruling the objection to certain testimony on Daubert-Schafersman grounds; and (4) finding certain testimony satisfied the reasonable degree of medical certainty standard set forth in In re Interest of G.H. View "In re Interest of Christopher T." on Justia Law

In 2006, Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved pursuant to a decree of dissolution, which included a provision providing that Husband was awarded a profit-sharing plan, and Wife was awarded a portion of the plan. By 2008, when no QDRO had been entered to facilitate transfer of the funds, the district court entered an amended QDRO, which awarded Wife interest on her portion from 2006 to 2008. The court of appeals affirmed. During the appeal process, Wife did not execute on the QDRO. Wife then filed motions to reopen the case and to enter an amended QDRO, arguing that the QDRO should provide for interest that had accrued during the appeal of the prior orders. The district court ordered the case reopened and entered an amended QDRO that provided for interest from the date of the decree of dissolution through the 2010 date of the hearing on the motions. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it extended Wife's award of postjudgment interest through the 2010 date because Wife was entitled to postjudgment interest from the date of the decree until she received her share of the profit-sharing plan. View "Fry v. Fry" on Justia Law

An irrigation district (FCID) petitioned the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to reevaluate a portion of the Republican River Basin according to the criteria in Neb. Rev. Stat. 46-713 and to determine whether the basin met the criteria to be considered "overappropriated" rather than "fully appropriated." If the status of the basin was changed to "overappropriated," the DNR could assert more authority over the basin. The DNR denied FCID's petition, finding the statute allowed the DNR to declare a river basin overappropriated only if it was subject to an interstate cooperative agreement. Because the basin was subject to an interstate compact, the DNR declared it did not have the authority to change the status as an interstate compact was not the equivalent of an interstate cooperative agreement. The FCID appealed. The DNR cross-appealed, alleging that FCID failed to demonstrate an injury in fact for standing purposes. The Supreme Court found the FCID failed to plead an injury in fact and therefore did not have standing. The Court dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the merits of the litigation. View "Frenchman-Cambridge Irr. Dist. v. Dep't of Nat. Res." on Justia Law

After Alicia L. gave birth to Jaime, Cesar C. and Alicia signed an acknowledgment of paternity form acknowledging that Cesar was Jaime's biological father. The signatures were notarized. Cesar and Jaime lived together for two years. Cesar filed a complaint to establish paternity, custody, and child support with respect to Jaime. Cesar then filed a motion for temporary custody, which the court granted. After genetic testing excluded Cesar as being Jaime's biological father and after Alicia filed a separate complaint, the court awarded custody of Jaime to Alicia based on its application of the parental preference doctrine. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the district court erred when it failed to give proper legal effect to the notarized acknowledgment of paternity. In the absence of a successful challenge directed at the acknowledgment, the acknowledgment had the effect of establishing that Cesar was the legal father of Jaime and matters of custody and child support should have been considered within this legal framework. Remanded. View "Cesar C. v. Alicia L." on Justia Law