Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thunder Collins was convicted of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and use of a weapon to commit a felony. At the conclusion of the trial and after Collins' case was submitted to the jury, the jury was permitted to separate for the weekend and return to deliberate the next Monday, at which point it rendered its verdicts. On appeal, Collins contended that the district court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial on the basis that the court allowed the jury to separate during deliberations without Collins' express agreement or consent. The Supreme Court concluded that the rule stated in State v. Robbins, which holds that express agreement or consent is required by a defendant in order to waive his rights to have a jury kept together until they reach a verdict or are discharged by the court, was inconsistent with judicial efficiency and sound policy and, therefore, overruled Robbins to the extent it requires defendant consent to jury separation. Because the overruling of Robbins was prospective only, the court applied the Robbins rule and held that Collins was entitled to a presumption that he was prejudiced by the jury's separation. Remanded. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

Jamyia, a minor child of Navajo decent, was removed from her parents' home after doctors discovered that Jamyia suffered injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. The juvenile court entered a dispositional order that terminated the parents' parental rights. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the State had not proved it made active efforts pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1505(4) to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts had been unsuccessful; and (2) the State was required to provide active efforts to both parents to prevent the breakup of the family within the meaning of the statute when aggravated circumstances were present. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to reach the active efforts issue, and it erred when it reversed the juvenile court's determination that the State had satisfied the statute before terminating the parents' parental rights. View "In re Interest of Jamyia M." on Justia Law

A jury found Stephen Pullens guilty of killing his mother by throwing her over a balcony. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing hearsay evidence of a prior attempt by Pullens to throw his mother off a balcony; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence emails written by Pullens after finding that the State had made a showing that the emails were what the State purported them to be; (3) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on voluntary flight because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer flight; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Pullens' request for a continuance on the day of the sentencing hearing or in refusing to appoint a public defender for the sentencing hearing; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not affording Pullens an opportunity to review his presentence investigation report and by considering a letter written by someone not involved in the case; and (6) Pullens' arguments concerning ineffective assistance of counsel were not appropriate for review on direct appeal. View "State v. Pullens" on Justia Law

David Kass was found guilty of enticement by an electronic communication device under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-833, which proscribes a person age nineteen or older from knowingly and intentionally using an electronic communication device to contact a child under age sixteen or a peace officer whom the person believe to be a child under age sixteen, and using language that conjures up repugnant sexual images. The district court sentenced Kass to one year in prison and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Kass appealed, arguing that section 28-833 was facially overbroad, that the court erred in its jury instructions, and that his sentence was excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) there was no plain error in the court's instruction on the elements of the crime or in the court's denial of Kass's request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment; and (3) given Kass's age, his education, the offense, and the fact that he was a police officer, the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Kass to one year in prison. View "State v. Kass" on Justia Law

After it was discovered that Katrina R., who was fifteen years old at the time, sent nude photographs of herself to her boyfriend's cellular phone, Katrina was adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(b) as a child who deports herself so as to injure or endanger seriously the morals or health or herself or others. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Katrina serve six months' probation, that she be placed in the legal custody of The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and that she participate in counseling and community service. DHHS appealed the order, contending that the juvenile court erred in simultaneously committing Katrina to DHHS and placing her on probation in the same juvenile court case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that is within the juvenile court's statutory power to issue a dispositional order for juveniles adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(b) that includes both legal custody with DHHS and supervision by a probation officer. View "In re Interest of Katrina R." on Justia Law

After D.I. was convicted of sexual assault of a child and was adjudged to be a dangerous sex offender, D.I. was committed to secure inpatient treatment. Three years later, D.I. filed a motion for reconsideration before the mental health board, alleging that cause no longer existed to keep him in secure inpatient treatment. The mental health board denied D.I.'s motion for reconsideration, and the district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the denial of a motion for reconsideration is a final, appealable order under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902, the Court had jurisdiction to address D.I.'s claims; (2) the mental health board did not err when it found D.I. was still a dangerous sex offender; and (3) the mental health board did not err when it determined there was no less restrictive treatment alternative. View "In re Interest of D.I." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Cotton was severely injured in an accident that occurred when a pickup crossed the centerline and struck her vehicle. The pickup had been struck by a Ford Mustang driven by a man who was seeking to evade a state trooper. Cotton sued the state of Nebraska under the State Tort Claims Act, which makes the state liable for injuries to innocent third parties proximately caused by vehicular pursuit by a state-employed law enforcement officer. The district court entered judgment in favor of the state, concluding that (1) there was no vehicular pursuit under the statute, (2) Anson's actions were the sole proximate cause of the injuries to Cotton, and (3) Cotton failed to prove that the state trooper's actions were a proximate cause of the accident. Cotton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that Anson's actions were the sole proximate cause of Cotton's injuries and that the state was not liable under the State Tort Claims Act. View "Cotton v. State" on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals arose from actions taken by American National Bank (ANB) to execute on a judgment against Michael Medved, an Arizona resident with business interests in Nebraska. Medved's wife, Laura, unsuccessfully sought to intervene in an action ANB filed against Medved in the district court for Douglas County. The district court denied her motion and issued charging orders against Medved's transferable interest in three Nebraska limited liability companies. Laura also unsuccessfully sought to intervene in an action filed in the district court for Sarpy County. The Sarpy County action resulted in a garnishment of Medved's wages. Medved appealed and Laura cross-appealed, arguing that the Nebraska order violated their rights under Arizona community property law because the earnings and distributions from the limited liability companies were Medved and Laura's community property and were protected by Arizona law. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under either Arizona or Nebraska law, there was no error in the enforcement of the judgment. View "American Nat'l Bank v. Medved" on Justia Law

Appellant April Palmer, a member of Lakeside Wellness Center, was injured at Lakeside when she approached a treadmill and, unaware that the treadmill belt was running, stepped onto the treadmill and was thrown off the belt and into an elliptical training machine behind her. Palmer sued Lakeside and Precor, Inc., the manufacturer of the treadmill, for her injuries. Lakeside and Precor filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted. Palmer appealed, arguing, inter alia, that while Lakeside was not liable to Palmer for damages caused to by ordinary negligence by virtue of the waivers signed by Palmer upon joining Lakeside, Lakeside was nevertheless liable because its actions were grossly negligent or willful and wanton. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Precor was not shielded from liability as a result of the waivers; (2) as a matter of law, any negligence by Lakeside was not gross negligence or willful or wanton conduct; and (3) the record affirmatively showed that Precor did not breach any duty it owed to Palmer. View "Palmer v. Lakeside Wellness Ctr." on Justia Law

Appellant David Maycock, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of Marty Maycock, filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against various doctors and Alegent Health based on their treatment of Marty prior to and until his death. The district court dismissed the case against certain doctors and Alegent Health. The court of appeals affirmed these rulings. Meanwhile, at the district court, the remaining doctors moved for summary judgment on the sole basis that the claims against them were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, determining that there were genuine issues of material fact whether Marty was under a mental disorder at the time he was treated by the doctors and that therefore, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-213, the statute of limitations was tolled until the removal of his mental disorder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether and on what dates the action was tolled. View "Maycock v. Hoody" on Justia Law