Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A county court, sitting as juvenile court, adjudicated Trey H. and committed him to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS) with placement in his parental home. After Trey violated his treatment plan, the court changed his placement to a youth rehabilitation and treatment center (YRTC) operated by OJS. The court then conducted a review hearing in which the Department of Health and Human Services argued that the juvenile court did not have statutory authority to order the review hearings. After examining the juvenile code, the Supreme Court concluded that a juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct review hearings for such juveniles. Because the order was void, the Court vacated the order and dismissed the Department's appeal. View "In re Interest of Trey H." on Justia Law

Stephen O'Bryant, a commercial truckdriver, was killed during the course of his employment as the result of a motor vehicle accident. Sylvia Devese, the representative of his estate, sought to recover under O'Bryant's occupational accident policy with Transguard Insurance Company of America. Transugard denied the claim on the ground that O'Bryant did not have a valid commercial driver's license (CDL) at the time of the accident, and the personal representative brought this action against Transguard for breach of contract and bad faith. The policy stated that no benefits would be paid for any claim resulting from any loss occurring while the insured person was operating a vehicle without a valid CDL. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Transguard. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 44-358 applies so as to require a showing of causation between the breach and the loss, despite the language of the policy. View "Devese v. Transguard Ins. Co. of America" on Justia Law

American Central City (ACC) appealed from two separate decisions of the district court. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court and involved complaints regarding the condemnation of three properties located in Lincoln, Nebraska. In the first case, a civil suit for damages apart from the condemnation award, ACC claimed it had compensable property interests for which it was not paid when the Joint Antelope Valley Authority (JAVA) and the City of Lincoln took its land through condemnation. In the second case, an appeal from the condemnation award, ACC argued that it did not receive adequate compensation for its land. The district court granted JAVA's motion for summary judgment in the civil suit and granted JAVA's motion to dismiss in ACC's appeal from the condemnation award. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) in the appeal of the civil suit for damages, ACC did not present sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) in the appeal from the condemnation award, ACC did not offer sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. View "American Central City, Inc. v. Joint Antelope Valley Auth." on Justia Law

James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney brought an action against Four H Land Company and other defendants to compel them to lower the elevation of a lakeside housing development adjoining the Tierneys' land. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Tierneys appealed. While their appeal was pending the Tierneys discovered that the district court judge who issued the order harbored a personal prejudice against the Tierneys' attorney. The Supreme Court concluded that the three-factor test set forth in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. is the best means of determining when the rulings of a judge who should have recused himself or herself will be vacated and adopted the test. Applying the Liljeberg test to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the district court judge's order on the summary judgment motions should be vacated. View "Tierney v. Four H Land Co. Ltd." on Justia Law

Terence Nero was charged with burglary, a class three felony. Nero waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial followed. The district court declined to make a specific finding regarding which felony it determined Nero had intended to commit to support the charge of burglary. The court found Nero guilty of burglary, and Nero appealed the conviction. At issue was whether the state is required to specify the underlying felony it seeks to prove to support a charge of burglary. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) because the state did not specify the underlying felony it sought to prove, Nero was deprived of an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution; (2) because Nero's right to notice was prejudiced, the district court's denial of Nero's motion for a bill of particulars was not harmless error, and therefore the judgment should be reversed; and (3) the totality of the evidence admitted by the district court was sufficient to sustain Nero's conviction, and therefore the Double Jeopardy Clause does not forbid a retrial. Remanded. View "State v. Nero" on Justia Law

Eleazar Oceguera was convicted of DUI and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. At the sentencing and enhancement hearing the State offered three certified copies of prior convictions, the first of which was for driving under revocation. The district court found the three exhibits were valid prior convictions of DUI. The State agreed that the district court erred and filed a motion for remand, which the court of appeals denied. At issue was whether the Supreme Court should remand the case for sentencing on DUI or remand for a new enhancement hearing. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred when it used a prior conviction for driving under revocation to enhance Oreguera's sentence for DUI; (2) the restrictions of 29-231.01 or 29-2316, which contain a stringent double jeopardy provision, are inapplicable in this case; and (3) because this case is more analogous to habitual criminal cases where the Court has remanded for a new enhancement hearing when the State has failed to produce sufficient evidence of the requisite prior convictions, the same procedure should be used here. Vacated and remanded with directions. View "State v. Oceguera" on Justia Law

This case arose from a boundary dispute between R and B Farms and Cedar Valley Acres. The disputed property, a parcel of cropland located north of a fence, was encompassed by a legal description deeded to Cedar Valley under the agreement conveying the land. R and B, however, claimed that all parties to the contract decided the fence line would serve as the boundary for the property. R and B filed suit against Cedar Valley, alleging among other causes of action mutual recognition and acquiescence. In its complaint R and B did not explicitly plead mutual mistake as a theory of recovery. The district court ultimately found in favor of R and B on the theory of mutual mistake and reformed the contract on that basis. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because the facts pleaded by R and B were sufficient to place the theory of mutual mistake at issue and because mutual mistake was tried by the implied consent of the parties, the claim of mutual mistake was properly before the district court. However, because the record did not support a finding of mutual mistake, the Court held the district court erred in reforming the contract. View "R & B Farms v. Cedar Valley Acres" on Justia Law

In 2009, a semi-trailer truck owned by McLaughlin Freight Lines collided with cattle owned by Marvin Gentrup that had escaped from their holding pen. McLaughlin filed suit, seeking recovery for damages to its truck. McLaughlin premised its argument for recovery solely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The district court sustained Gentrup's motion for summary judgment. At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court correctly applied the common-law principles of res ipsa loquitur, and (2) whether Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,274, which provides that the fact of escaped livestock, standing alone, is insufficient to raise an inference of negligence, supplants those principles. The Supreme Court held that (1) because there were genuine issues of material fact with regard to one or more elements of res ipsa loquitur, the trial court's order granting summary judgment was improper, and (2) because McLaughlin presented evidence in conjunction with the fact of escaped livestock, the statute does not bar McLaughlin's claim. View "McLaughlin Freight Lines v. Gentrup" on Justia Law

Ruth Mansfield, the beneficiary of an inter vivos trust, died in 2005 after more than a decade of battling diffuse cerebrovascular disease. After Ruth's death, her estate sought payment of her last-illness expenses from the trust. The trustee declined. The county court concluded the trustee had properly denied payment of the medical bills because the purpose of the trust had ended with Ruth's death. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's reasoning and remanded. On remand, the county court granted the trustee's and remainder beneficiaries' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trustee did not have a fiduciary duty imposed either through statute or the language of the trust to pay Ruth's medical expenses and did not abuse its discretion in declining to pay Ruth's medical expenses from the trust principal. View "In re Trust Created by Hansen" on Justia Law

Appellants, four natural resources districts ("NRDs"), appealed the Department's 2009 order finding that in 2008, the basin was fully appropriated. Michael Jacobson, a landowner in the basin, cross-appealed. As a threshold matter, the supreme court found the NRDs had standing to challenge the Department's determination, but Jacobson lacked standing because he failed to allege actual or imminent harm. The court then reversed and vacated the Department's order, holding it to be arbitrary and invalid because (1) the Department failed to conform to its own regulations when it determined the basin was fully appropriated and failed to apply its methodologies in a consistent manner, resulting in a designation that was arbitrary and capricious; and (2) the Department failed to plainly describe its methodologies so that they could be replicated and assessed in compliance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 46-713(1)(d). View "Middle Niobrara Natural Resources Dept. v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law