Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Harold Warp Pioneer Village Foundation (Foundation) owned and operated a museum, motel, and campground. The motel and campground were primarily used by museum visitors. The museum, motel, and campground were all granted property tax exemptions for many years, but in 2011, state tax officials challenged the exemptions granted to the motel and campground. The Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission determined that because the motel and campground were not used exclusively for educational purposes, neither was entitled to tax exemptions under Nebraska law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motel and campground were beneficial to the museum and reasonably necessary to further its educational mission, and were therefore entitled to property tax exemptions. View "Harold Warp Pioneer Village Found. v. Ewald" on Justia Law

Mother sought to modify the child custody and support provisions of a decree of dissolution, claiming there had been material changes in (1) Father's emotional, mental, and lifestyle circumstances, requiring a modification or suspension of his parenting time with the parties' minor child, and (2) Father's financial circumstances, necessitating a modification of child support. The district court ordered Father to obtain certain medical records from two health care providers located outside Nebraska for eventual production to Mother. Father appealed, challenging the district court's authority to issue the order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no final, appealable order before the Court, and therefore the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction. View "Furstenfeld v. Pepin" on Justia Law

Mike and Becky Carey applied for a building permit for an interior renovation of an apartment building. A municipal building inspector denied the application because the construction documents were not prepared by a registered design professional. The city's appeals board denied the Careys' appeal. The district court overruled the appeals board and ordered that the Careys be issued a building permit without the requirement that they retain a licensed architect, concluding (1) the appeals board did not act within its jurisdiction, and (2) the renovation fell into one of the exemptions to the Engineers and Architects Regulation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appeals board acted within its jurisdiction and that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the proposed renovation failed to qualify for statutory and regulatory exemptions to the Act. View "Carey v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI). The offense occurred in 2011. After an enhancement hearing, the district court found that Defendant had three prior convictions and that the current DUI offense should be enhanced to a fourth offense. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that, at the enhancement hearing, the State met its evidentiary burden in establishing Defendant's prior DUI convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for purposes of enhancement of a DUI offense, the State is not required to provide an exact offense date for prior convictions, but rather, the State is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior offense occurred within the twelve years prior to the offense for which the defendant is being charged; and (2) that the district court correctly found that the relevant evidence in this case made it more likely than not that one of Defendant's prior convictions pursuant to which his 2011 DUI offense was enhanced occurred within the twelve years of his 2011 DUI offense. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

When Appellant was a minor ward, The Department of Health and Human Services adjudicated Appellant's two daughters under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(a) because of Appellant's neglect. As part of Appellant's reunification plan with her children, the juvenile court required Appellant to continue her high school education. The Department subsequently placed Appellant's children in a foster home, and Appellant aged out of the juvenile court system. The juvenile later changed Appellant's rehabilitation plan and required her to actively pursue a high school diploma or a GED diploma. Appellant appealed, arguing that the requirement to pursue a high school or GED diploma was not reasonably related to correcting the conditions that caused the adjudication. The court of appeals determined that this order was not appealable because it merely continued the court's previous orders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court's later order did not continue the terms of the previous rehabilitation plan but, instead, imposed a materially different requirement for Appellant's reunification plan with her children. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Mya C." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding that the district court did not err when it (1) allowed a witness to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid testifying at trial; (2) denied Defendant's request to grant the witness use immunity to allow him to testify in Defendant's defense; (3) declined to admit the witness' recorded statement to police under a hearsay exception; (4) did not deny Defendant a complete defense by making the foregoing rulings; and (4) overruled Defendant's motion for a mistrial and his motion for a new trial. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in overruling Appellant's motions to suppress the eyewitness identifications of two witnesses and in subsequently allowing both witnesses to make in-court identifications of Appellant, as the identifications of both witnesses were reliable; and (2) the district court did not err when, in its articulation of its factual findings, it overruled Appellant's motions to suppress the eyewitness identifications. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony for the killing of his mother. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly stated the elements of the crime, and therefore, Appellant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for failing to object to the instructions; (2) Appellant failed to identify an expert who would have opined differently on Appellant's insanity, and therefore, Appellant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to obtain an additional expert opinion as to Appellant's sanity at the time of the killing; and (3) the arguments Appellant asserted were omitted by appellate counsel lacked merit. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that Violet was a minor child who came within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) due to the faults and habits of her biological mother, Abigael. The State also filed a motion for a protective custody hearing. Abigael filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that although Violet was born in Nebraska, she had never actually lived in Nebraska. The juvenile court dismissed the petition, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Violet had lived in Iowa since her discharge from the hospital after she was born. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. View "In re Interest of Violet T." on Justia Law

Arlene Easter sold insurance for First Express Services Group, Inc. Arlene subsequently resigned from First Express and began to work for her son, Mark, who was a part owner of a competing agency. After resigning, Arlene took a customer list from First Express and transferred many of First Express' customers to Mark's agency. First Express sued Arlene for breach of contract and Arlene, Mark, and Mark's agency for misappropriation of trade secrets and unjust enrichment. After a jury trial, judgment was rendered for First Express on all claims. The Supreme Court (1) modified the judgment against Arlene, finding that Arlene was liable only for the portion of the judgment attributed by the district court to the breach of contract claim; and (2) reversed the judgment against Mark, holding that Mark was not liable for either misappropriation of trade secrets or unjust enrichment. View "First Express Servs. Group, Inc. v. Easter" on Justia Law