Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Based on genetic testing, Michael was found to be Child's father. The district court awarded sole custody to Jessica and ordered Michael to pay monthly child support. Michael subsequently requested that the court modify his child support, claiming that he had entered school full time and had no income. The court concluded that there had been a material change in circumstances but that Child still required support. The court then calculated a lower child support based on Michael's earning capacity. Jessica later sought to modify Michael's child support obligation. After a trial, the court increased Father's child support based on his new earning capacity. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding a material change in circumstances; (2) calculating Michael's child support obligation; (3) refusing to make the modification retroactive; and (4) declining to order Michael to contribute toward childcare expenses. View "Freeman v. Groskopf" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several taxpayers who managed or owned land in the vicinity of a landfill, challenged the validity of an agreement for hosting of the landfill. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court further found that the complaint was frivolous and filed in bad faith and ordered Plaintiffs to pay the landfill parties' and counties' attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the district court's judgment imposing attorney fees because the court failed to resolve doubt over the merits of the complaint in Plaintiffs' favor; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because the reason for dismissal was relevant only to the fee issue. View "White v. Kohout" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in (1) denying Defendant's motion to continue trial based upon a witness's plea agreement to testify because her deal was struck upon the eve of trial; and (2) admitting into evidence a receipt showing that Defendant pawned the victim's jacket two days before the victim's murder because the evidence was inadmissible as evidence of other bad acts, namely theft. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence, holding that the district court (1) erred in denying Defendant's motion for continuance, as the failure to provide a continuance under the circumstances was prejudicial; and (2) abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the theft under the inextricably intertwined exception to the rule making a defendant's uncharged bad act inadmissible. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Ash" on Justia Law

Constance created an LLC and a revocable trust. Constance transferred her real estate to the LLC and directed that, upon her death, her remaining property be transferred to the Trust. After Constance's death, her son David, as trustee of the Trust and as manager of the LLC, filed a declaratory action to allow the sale of the real estate pursuant to the Trust. Constance's other children, as beneficiaries of the Trust and members of the LLC, filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment that the LLC should govern disposition of the real property and sought an accounting. The district court determined that the Trust would control the disposition and that David did not breach his fiduciary duties. The court of appeals affirmed. David subsequently moved for attorney fees and postjudgment interest, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order and denied the beneficiaries' request for attorney fees, holding (1) the award of attorney fees and costs was outside the scope of the mandate given by the court of appeals, and therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion; and (2) the beneficiaries were not entitled to attorney fees on the ground that David's motion was frivolous. View "Klingelhoefer v. Monif" on Justia Law

Brydon was a minor child. After Brydon's mother died, Silvija, Brydon's maternal grandmother, sought to be appointed Brydon's permanent guardian. Eric, Brydon's adjudicated father, was allowed to intervene in the proceedings. The county court appointed Silvija as Brydon's permanent guardian but rejected her request for adoption and for permanent in loco parentis status. The court subsequently awarded Silvija attorney fees and assessed them to Eric and Brydon's estate. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the part of the county court's order that assessed Silvija's attorney fees against Eric, holding that in a guardianship proceeding for a minor, a court cannot assess a petitioner's costs against another party; and (2) affirmed the county's court's decision not to confer permanent in loco parentis status to Silvija. Remanded. View "In re Guardianship of Brydon P." on Justia Law

Petitioner was a pregnant sixteen-year-old who sought authorization for an abortion with consent of a parent or guardian. In general, an abortion can only be performed on a unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen with the consent of both the pregnant woman and one of her parents or a legal guardian. The district court denied Petitioner's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a waiver of consent under the provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-6903(3) for abuse or neglect by a parent or guardian, the pregnant woman must establish that a parent or guardian has abused or neglected her; (2) Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that she was a victim of abuse or neglect under section 71-6903(3); and (3) Petitioner failed to establish that was sufficiently mature and well informed to decide on her own whether to have an abortion. View "In re Petition of Anonymous 5" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) filed an application with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to appropriate additional surface water from the Niobrara River. The Middle and Lower Niobrara Natural Resources Districts (collectively, NRDs) and Thomas Higgins, who held senior existing and pending Niobrara River surface water appropriations, objected to the application. The DNR dismissed all objections sua sponte, concluding that the objectors lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DNR did not err in (1) dismissing the NRDs' objections for lack of standing because they failed to allege any legal right, title, or interest in the subject water of the Niobrara River and because the NRDs' allegations that the granting of the application would cause a portion of the Niobrara River Basin to be declared fully appropriated in the future were based on mere conjecture; and (2) finding that Higgins lacked standing, as Higgins failed to allege sufficient allegations of harm. View "In re Application A-18503" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, relatives of Decedent, sought Attorney's services in the administration of Decedent's estate. Plaintiffs later brought this professional negligence case against Attorney and his firm (Defendants), claiming that Attorney failed properly to disclose a conflict of interest to Plaintiffs, Attorney erroneously advised Plaintiffs to execute disclaimers that should be regarded as invalid and ineffective, and Attorney caused the estate to incur additional taxes by failing to include the purportedly disclaimed property in the qualified terminable interest property election on the estate tax return. The district court (1) entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the conflict of interest claim, and (2) dismissed as time barred Plaintiffs' claims regarding the disclaimed property and associated tax return elections. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment regarding the conflict of interest; but (2) reversed the judgments on Plaintiffs' remaining claims, holding that the district court erred when it concluded that the statute of limitations barred the claims. Remanded. View "Guinn v. Murray" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erroneously gave a step jury instruction relating to the charge of first degree murder, and the court erred in refusing to give a "negative element of 'sudden quarrel'" instruction; and (2) his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in using a step instruction, the elements of first degree murder exclude any reference to "sudden quarrel," and the jury's presumed adherence to the step instruction precluded any prejudice regarding the rest of the instruction; and (2) the record was insufficient to address two of Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and Defendant's remaining claims of ineffective assistance lacked merit. View "State v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with first degree sexual assault stemming from his conduct toward his stepdaughter, M.H. During trial, M.H.'s therapist testified, over Appellant's objection, that Appellant's sexual abuse of M.H. caused M.H.'s posttraumatic stress disorder. The court subsequently granted Appellant's motion for a mistrial on the grounds that the therapist's testimony was "over the edge." Appellant then filed a plea in bar, arguing that the State's questioning of the therapist was intended to provoke a mistrial so that the State could have a second change at a more favorable prosecution and thus circumvent the protections of the double jeopardy clause. The trial court denied the plea in bar. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the prosecutor did not intend to goad Appellant into moving for a mistrial, Appellant's plea in bar was properly denied. View "State v. Muhannad" on Justia Law