Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Emil Alberts died, Lois Alberts, his surviving spouse, authorized her attorney to file a petition on her behalf to elect to take one-half of Emil’s augmented estate pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2313. Emil’s two nephews (Appellants), as coperaonal representatives of Emil’s estate and as beneficiaries of Emil’s trust, objected to the petition’s validity and to the calculation of Lois’ elective share within it. The county court found that Lois’ petition for elective share was validly filed and that certain trust property should be included in the augmented estate for purposes of calculating Lois’ elective share. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the county court did not err in finding that the petition for elective share was validly filed; but (2) the county court erred in failing to rule that the value of the trust property at issue should be excluded from the augmented estate under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2314(c)(2). Remanded. View "In re Estate of Alberts" on Justia Law

Various members of the Doty family gave three deeds of trust (DOT) conveying specific tracts of real estate to West Gate Bank, Inc. as security for certain loans. The DOTs also secured future advances given by the Bank. One advance was documented by Promissory Note 257. The Dotys defaulted on Note 257, and therefore, the Bank exercised its power of sale under one DOT and applied the funds generated by the sale to Note 257. The Dotys later brought a declaratory judgment action asking the district court to declare that the Bank was barred by Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1013 from recovering any amount still owed under Note 257. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Dotys, concluding that the Bank was barred by the three-month statute of limitations in section 76-1013 from taking action to collect amounts due on Note 257. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that section 76-1013 precludes the Bank from bringing a personal deficiency action against the Dotys for the balance owed under Note 275; but (2) erred in determining that the three-month statute of limitations set forth in section 76-1013 applies to successive foreclosures on remaining collateral. Remanded. View "Doty v. West Gate Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1502(2) imposes a requirement and specifies a consequence for its violation. In this case, a taxpayer filed a property valuation protest. The taxpayer’s protest form specified the assessed and requested valuation amounts but stated no reason for the requested change. The Lincoln County Board of Equalization dismissed the protest, citing section 77-1502(2). The taxpayer appealed to the Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). TERC dismissed the appeal with prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the protest due to the taxpayer’s failure to state the reason for the protest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly dismissed the taxpayer’s protest because the protest failed to include a reason for the requested change in valuation; and (2) because the Board lacked authority to hear the taxpayer’s property valuation protest on the merits, TERC likewise lacked authority to do so. View "Village at North Platte v. Lincoln County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

In 2012, as the result of a change in the way the Custer County assessor classified irrigated grassland for purposes of valuation, the assessor increased the assessed value of the property owned by Appellant from $734,968 to $1,834,924. Appellant filed petitions with the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1507.01 challenging the valuation increase. After two separate hearings on Appellant’s petitions, TERC affirmed the assessor’s valuations for 2012. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TERC’s consideration of Appellant’s petitions using the appellate standard of review described in Nev. Rev. Stat. 77-5016(9) constituted plain error. Remanded. View "Cain v. Custer County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

The water appropriation in this case was a surface water right to divert a specified volume of water from the North Loup River to “be used for irrigation purposes only.” Appellant held the appropriation and the lands covered by it. The Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (Department) issued a notice of preliminary determination of nonuse of the appropriation to Appellant. The Department cancelled the appropriation in its entirety, concluding that the lands designated under the appropriation had not been irrigation for more than five consecutive years and that Appellant had failed to establish sufficient cause for nonuse. The Supreme Court affirmed the Department’s order of cancellation, holding that Appellant failed to establish sufficient cause to excuse its nonuse of the appropriation and that the Department’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "In re Appropriation A-7603" on Justia Law

NAMN, LLC filed this action against Bernard Morello seeking, among other relief, an order declaring that a permanent easement existed over Morello’s property to allow vehicular access to NAMN’s property. The district court ruled that NAMN had a permanent easement implied from prior use for vehicle ingress and egress over Morello’s property and that NAMN was entitled to make reasonable upgrades to the easement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err when it granted an easement to NAMN, as the equities did not preclude the relief granted to NAMN; (2) applied the correct legal standard as to the degree of necessity required for an easement implied by prior use; and (3) did not err when it granted an easement in favor of NAMN where the land abutted a public road. View "NAMN LLC v. Morello" on Justia Law

After the filing of a partition of real estate action, the parties entered into a joint stipulation agreeing to sell the property at public auction. Following the sale, Plaintiffs sought confirmation of the sale and asked the court to approve the payment of fees and costs. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded Plaintiff’s attorney, under the terms of the stipulation, fees in the amount of $5,224. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that attorney fees were not available under statutory law or case law regarding partition; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the stipulation to limit fees to those incurred in connection with the responsibilities listed in the stipulation. View "Labenz v. Labenz" on Justia Law

Paul McGill and Michael Henery, the developers of the Lion Place Condominium, both offered to purchase the limited common elements adjacent to Henery’s commercial units. The unincorporated unit owners association that governed the condominium voted to accept Henery’s offer and transferred the limited common elements to Henery. McGill filed a derivative action on behalf of the association against Henery and the association challenging the sale of the limited common elements. The district court concluded that the sale and conveyance were void and that title to the limited common elements remained with the Association because the sale was only approved by 77.7 percent of the association and there was no agreement signed by the requisite number of unit owners. The court awarded McGill his attorney fees and expenses. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that equity allows a derivative suit on behalf of an unincorporated unit owners association; (2) affirmed the judgment invaliding the sale, holding that the governing statute requires both approval by eighty percent of the votes in the association and unanimous agreement by the owners of units to which the limited common elements are allocated; and (3) vacated the award of costs and expenses, as the relevant statute does not permit the recovery of expenses. View "McGill v. Lion Place Condo. Ass’n" on Justia Law

David and Pamela Fisher, as “Husband and Wife,” sued U.S. Bank National Association to terminate severed mineral interests, alleging that they had owned the land since 1986. In its answer, US Bank argued that the Fishers, as husband and wife, were not the real parties in interest because, in 2001, the Fishers conveyed the land to themselves as trustees for the David and Pamela Fisher Living Trust. The Fishers subsequently filed an amended complaint adding themselves as plaintiffs in their capacity as trustees. Before the complaint was amended, however, US Bank recorded a verified claim of mineral interest. The district court granted summary judgment for US Bank, concluding that the Fishers’ amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-301. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amended complaint related back under the plain language of section 25-301 because it joined the real parties in interest. Remanded. View "Fisher v. Heirs & Devisees of Lovercheck" on Justia Law

In 2007, Ryan Hanzlick and his wife acquired two tracts of land through treasurer’s tax deeds. A trust controlled by Hanzlick subsequently acquired title to the two tracts by quitclaim deed. Selma Hauxwell, the adjacent property owner, had allegedly been using those tracts since 1971 but did not appear in the official records of the county register of deeds as the owner of the tracts. Hauxwell filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the two tracts by claim of adverse possession. The Hanslicks counterclaimed, requesting that the court find the Hanzlicks were the owners of the tracts and to eject and enjoin Hauxwell from the property. The district court quieted title in favor of Hauxwell but did not address any other issues regarding the tax deeds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred (1) by not dismissing Hauxwell’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to the Hauxwell’s failure to establish standing; and (2) in failing to address the Hanzlicks’ counterclaims. Remanded. View "Hauxwell v. Henning" on Justia Law