Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At a public tax sale, Appellants’ property was sold to Anne Determan, who subsequently obtained a tax sale certificate for the property. Appellants attempted to redeem their property in the manner prescribed by Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1824. Appellants were advised by both the Douglas County Treasurer and Determan that the only avenue of redemption available to them was Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1917. Unlike section 77-1824, section 77-1917 required payment of costs and attorney fees. Appellants petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Treasurer and Determan to accept redemption of the property pursuant to section 77-1824. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Treasurer and sustained Determan’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding (1) once Determan filed a foreclosure action, Appellants could not redeem their property under section 77-1824; and (2) Determan was not the proper subject of a mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in its determination that once a foreclosure action was filed, Appellants were required to use the manner of redemption provided in section 77-1917; and (2) properly dismissed Determan from the case. View "Neun v. Ewing" on Justia Law

In 1989, The Bauermeisters and the Deavers (collectively, Plaintiffs) entered into an agreement with Waste Management Co. of Nebraska, Inc. (WMN) for the sale of 280 acres of farmland. WMN eventually located a monofill on the site. In 2006 and 2007, Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to exercise their option to purchase under the agreement. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against WMN for specific performance, accounting, quiet title, and declaratory judgment. The district court severed the specific performance and quiet title actions from the accounting and declaratory judgment actions. Judgment was entered for Plaintiffs with respect to the specific performance action. On remand, WMU was ordered to convey title of the disputed property to Plaintiffs, subject to specified exceptions. With respect to the accounting action, the district court found primarily for WMM. Beauermeister Deaver Ecology Land Use Development, LLC (BDELUD), successor in interest to Plaintiffs, appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that (1) WMN owned the landfill gases and equipment associated with collecting and transporting the landfill gases and that WMN was entitled to all landfill gas revenue; and (2) BDELUD was not entitled to past or future revenues from the monofill. View "Bauermeister Deaver Ecology Land Use Dev. v. Waste Mgmt. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs asserted six causes of action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), Erika Knapstein, Bank of the West, and Jeff T. Courtney arising out of the foreclosure and subsequently sale of Plaintiffs’ residence. As a premise for all causes of action, Plaintiffs asserted that the assignment of their mortgage was defective. The district court dismissed Bank of the West and Courtney for failure to prosecute and granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, Fannie Mae, and Knapstein. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) whether the assignment of the mortgage was properly executed was not a material issue in the causes of action addressed in this appeal because Plaintiffs could not show an injury arising from the assignment, and therefore, Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert any cause of action that dependent upon the validity of the assignment; and (2) the district court correctly dismissed Courtney for failure to prosecute, but Bank of the West should have been dismissed from the action for lack of standing. View "Marcuzzo v. Bank of the West" on Justia Law

Plaintiff donated 159 acres of land to the Nebraska National Trails Museum Foundation (NNTM). At the time of the donation, NNTM leased the land back to Plaintiff and allowed him to farm the land. Plaintiff’s subsequent upgrades to the land caused the number of certified irrigated acres (CIAs) assigned to the land to almost double. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that NNTM would be unjustly enriched if it were allowed to maintain possession of the CIAs. The district court entered judgment in favor of NNTM. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that Plaintiff was not entitled to the CIAs; and (2) the district judge who heard the case did not err in not recusing himself from the proceedings after the judge had a conversation with the manager of another natural resources district regarding Plaintiff. View "Kalkowski v. Neb. Nat’l Trails Museum Found., Inc." on Justia Law

After voters in School District rejected a bond proposal to construct an addition to existing high school building, School District entered into a lease-purchase agreement with Bank, which agreed to finance the project. Appellants, residents and taxpayers in the school district, sought declaratory and injunctive relief contending that the agreement violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-10,105. The trial court denied relief, concluding (1) under section 79-10,105, lease-purchase agreements may be used to make school improvements without the voters’ approval if the project is not funded by bonded debt; and (2) School District in this case did not fund the project through bonded indebtedness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants’ claims were moot because, as of the time of this appeal, the addition had been completed, but the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied; and (2) section 79-10,105 does not prohibit a school district from entering into a lease-purchase agreement to finance a capital construction project if it has not created a nonprofit corporation to issue bonds for the school district, and because there was no evidence that this occurred in this case, School District did not violate section 79-10,105 by entering into the lease-purchase agreement with Bank. View "Nebuda v. Dodge County Sch. Dist. 0062" on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiffs purchased real estate from Charter West National Bank. Plaintiffs later filed suit, alleging that Charter West represented that the property would be free and clear of all liens but manipulated the language of the deed to reflect that the conveyance was subject to liens of record. Charter West moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the real estate purchase agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiffs filed an objection asserting that the arbitration clause was void because it failed to comply with Nebraska’s Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was inapplicable because the transaction did not involve interstate commerce. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice based on a lack of evidence that the transaction affected interstate commerce as to trigger the provisions of the FAA. Charter West appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that there was no final, appealable order entered by the district court capable of appellate review. View "Wilczewski v. Charter West Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Buyers purchased a building from Seller that had formerly been leased as a dental clinic. Buyers planned to transform the building into their personal residence. After the parties closed on the property, Buyers discovered that the interior doors had been removed. Buyers commenced a small claims action against Seller seeking damages or the return of the property. The county court entered judgment in favor of Buyers. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of merger was inapplicable in this case because Seller had a duty to disclose that the interior doors would be removed, and Seller’s nondisclosure amounted to a misrepresentation; (2) the doors were fixtures rather than trade fixtures and thus were not removable by the former tenant; and (3) the county court’s award of damages was supported by competent evidence. View "Griffith v. Drew’s LLC" on Justia Law

After Bel Fury Investments Group, LLC failed to pay assessments for property it owned in the Twin Towers Condominium (Unit SCB), the Twin Towers Condominium Association (the Association) recorded two notices of lien and filed a foreclosure action. The Association initially levied assessments against Unit SCB in a manner prohibited by the Association’s governing documents, but the Association recalculated the assessments when it discovered the error while the foreclosure action was pending. The district court ultimately found that the Association had a lien against Unit SCB for delinquent assessments. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Association’s initial miscalculation of assessments did not invalidate its lien; (2) the court erred by not awarding the Association attorney fees and not including several installments as part of the debt secured by the lien; and (3) the court erred by failing to include in its decree a legal description of the property subject to the lien. View "Twin Towers Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bel Fury Invs. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant executed a promissory note in favor of the entity that was soon to merge with First Tennessee Bank National Association. The note was secured by a deed of trust for property in California. First Tennessee later filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that he was in default on the note and seeking damages in the amount of $274,467. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that First Tennessee’s claim was barred by a California statute of limitations. First Tennessee appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the limitations period was not tolled by either a California statute or provision of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the California tolling statute could not be applied against Defendant, a nonresident of California, without violating the Commerce Clause; and (2) although Defendant was a member of the National Guard, he was neither on “active duty” during his membership nor had he ever been called to active service, and therefore, the SCRA provided no basis to toll the limitations period. View "First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Newham" on Justia Law

Ordinance No. 611 of the City of Valley, Nebraska authorized the annexation of land near Valley’s corporate border, some of which included Sanitary and Improvement District No. 196 (SID 196). SID 196 filed a complaint seeking to declare the ordinance invalid and seeking to enjoin Valley from enforcing the ordinance. Valley filed a motion for summary judgment, and both parties presented evidence from expert witnesses. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment for Valley and declared the ordinance valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that ordinance No. 611 is valid and in therefore granting summary judgment. View "Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 196 v. City of Valley" on Justia Law