Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A court is required to dismiss a forcible entry and detainer action upon receiving evidence of the existence of a title dispute. In this case, Plaintiff filed a forcible entry and detainer complaint against Defendants in the county court. Defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the county court, alleging that they had filed an action in the district court challenging title in Plaintiff. After the district court action had been dismissed as to Plaintiff, the county court overruled Defendants’ motion to dismiss, found in favor of Plaintiff, and ordered a writ of restitution to be issued. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendants failed to present to the county court evidence of a question of title until after that question had been resolved, the county court was not divested of jurisdiction. View "Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Marcuzzo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the surface owner of various tracts of land in Sioux County, sued the alleged owners of severed mineral interests in those tracts, claiming that the defendants abandoned their interests because they did not comply with the requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. 57-229 by failing to exercise publicly the right of ownership of the severed mineral interests. All of the defendants filed verified claims to the mineral interests prior to the action filed by Plaintiff. The district court concluded (1) the alleged mineral owners had either strictly complied or substantially complied with the requirements of section 57-229; and (2) the alleged mineral owners had not forfeited their mineral interests, except for one of the claims, which was terminated. Rice appealed, and two of the defendants cross-appealed as to the mineral interests that were terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) strict compliance with section 57-229 is mandatory; (2) several of the defendants abandoned their interests by not strictly complying with the statute, and therefore, the district court erred in failing to terminate their interests; and (3) the district court correctly terminated the remaining mineral interests. View "Rice v. Bixler" on Justia Law

Michael Kelliher and Travis Soundy had equal membership rights in Clover Investments, LLC, which purchased a bar. Soundy then purchased Kelliher’s interest in Clover. Kelliher and Soundy subsequently negotiated an agreement for Kelliher to earn back his interest in Clover that required Kelliher to manage the bar and make capital improvements. Kelliher fulfilled his duties under the management agreement. Soundy subsequently terminated the management agreement, and the next year, Clover sold the bar to Schijohn, LLC. Kelliher sued Soundy, Clover, and Schijohn and filed a notice of lis pendens against the property. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Schijohn on Kelliher’s quiet title claim. Before trial on the remainder of Kelliher’s claims, the court canceled the notice of lis pendens based on its earlier dismissal of the claim against Schijohn. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction over the appeal under the collateral order doctrine; and (2) the district court erred when it cancelled the notice of lis pendens, as the perceived merits of the underlying action were not good cause to cancel the notice while time for appeal remained. View "Kelliher v. Soundy" on Justia Law

SFI Ltd. Partnership 8 (SFI) owned an apartment complex containing approximately 200 apartments. Through its agent, SFI leased an apartment to Michelle Carroll. The lease included provisions requiring Carroll to pay for repairs caused by her use of the unit and to maintain renter’s insurance including “a personal liability coverage to a minimum of $100,000.00.” A fire occurred in the apartment rented to Carroll. Both the apartment and the surrounding building were damaged. SFI had $10 million of total insurance coverage on the apartment complex. The policy provided for a deductible of $250,000 per occurrence unless a specific deductible applied. The parties stipulated that SFI sustained damages in excess of $100,000 resulting from the fire, which damages were not covered by its insurance policy. But neither the total amount of damages nor the amount of any insurance recovery by SFI was included in the evidence. Carroll had renter’s insurance in place at that time, and she submitted a claim to her insurer. Carroll’s insurer paid her $1,500, representing only her damages under “Loss of Use Coverage.” In previous cases, the Nebraska Supreme Court applied an antisubrogation rule to prohibit a landlord’s insurer from seeking reimbursement from the tenant of fire losses paid by insurance. In this appeal, the Court declined to extend the antisubrogation rule to a landlord’s uninsured losses allegedly caused by its tenant’s negligence. Therefore the Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the tenant. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SFI Ltd. Partnership 8 v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Appellees, husband and wife, entered into an agreement with Appellant under which Appellees were to purchase Appellant’s undivided one-third interest in a 160-acre parcel of real estate. Appellant subsequently backed out of the purchase agreement, and Appellees filed a breach of contract action against Appellant. A bench trial was held, at which time Appellant no longer had title to the property. The district court found in favor of Appellees and awarded damages, concluding that Appellant had breached the purchase agreement by refusing to sell her interest in the property to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Appellant breached the purchase agreement and failing to find repudiation of the contract. View "Stauffer v. Benson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to quiet title in their favor to a disputed parcel of land of which Defendants were the record owners. Defendants filed a cross-claim seeking a prescriptive easement in the event that title was quieted in Plaintiffs. The district court quieted title in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) quieting title of the disputed parcel in Plaintiffs where Plaintiffs did not fail to provide an exact and definite description of the land they claimed to have entered and possessed; and (2) quieting title in Plaintiffs where their adverse possession claim was not barred by the doctrine of laches. View "Schellhorn v. Schmieding" on Justia Law

This case involved a parcel of real estate previously owned by Four H Land Company Limited Partnership (Four H). Four H twice applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a sand and gravel pit on the property. James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney objected to the applications. To resolve their dispute, the Tierneys, Four H, and Western Engineering Company (Western), the operator of the sand and gravel pit, entered into an agreement in 1998 in which the Tierneys agreed to waive their right to appeal the issuance of the CUP, and Four H and Western accepted various conditions regarding operation of the sand and gravel pit. In 2009, the Tierneys brought an action for specific performance, alleging that Four H and Western had not fulfilled the conditions of the agreement. The district court dismissed the Tierneys’ complaint for specific performance, concluding that Four H and Western had not met the requirements of the 1998 CUP and the agreement but that specific performance was not an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that specific performance was an appropriate remedy for Four H’s and Western’s breach, and the district court should have ordered it. Remanded. View "Tierney v. Four H Land Co. Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were five parcels of real estate located within the Sanitary and Improvement District No. 424 of Douglas County (SID). In 2011, the SID became the titleholder of the properties. Through assignment, Tristar Management, LLC became the holder of five 2009 tax certificates on the properties. Tristar subsequently obtained the tax deeds for the properties pursuant to the “tax deed” method under Neb. Rev. 77-1837. The SID filed a complaint against Tristar seeking to quiet title in the properties. The district court granted summary judgment for Tristar, concluding that the special assessment liens levied by the SID survived Tristar’s acquisition of title to the parcels. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the treasurer tax deeds issued to Tristar pursuant to section 77-1837 and in compliance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1801 et seq. passed title to Tristar free and clear of the special assessment liens of the SID. View "Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 424 v. Tristar Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

SourceGas Distribution, LLC owned property located in an area that had been annexed by the City of Hastings. The City, on behalf of the board of public works, filed a petition in the county court under the general condemnation procedures found at Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-101 through 76-726, seeking to initiate condemnation proceedings against the property owned by SourceGas. In an effort to enjoin the county court proceedings, SourceGas Distribution filed a complaint in the district court for temporary and permanent injunction, primarily alleging that the City must utilize Nebraska’s Municipal Gas System Condemnation Act (the Act) rather than the procedures in chapter 76. The district court overruled the motion for temporary injunction and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 19-4626(2) exempted the City from being required to proceed under the Act and that the City could utilize chapter 76’s general condemnation procedures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that, pursuant to the exception set forth in section 19-4626(2), the Act does not apply in this case and, instead, the general condemnation procedures of chapter 76 apply. View "SourceGas Distrib., LLC v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

The owners (Owners) of certain property in the Village of Memphis filed with the county judge an inverse condemnation petition against the Village and sought compensation for an unlawful taking, alleging that the Village deprived them of their property by maintaining a well, a buried powerline, and water pipes on their property without an easement. An appraiser awarded damages to the Owners. The Village appealed. Thereafter, the parties entered into a settlement agreement as to compensation to be paid to the Owners. The Owners subsequently moved for attorney fees and expenses under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720, which mandates that a property owner be allowed attorney fees if a public entity initiates condemnation proceedings without negotiating in good faith with the owner. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the Village did not fail to engage in good faith negotiations with the Owners. The Supreme Court affirmed because the record demonstrated that the Village engaged in good faith negotiations to settle with the Owners after the Village appealed to the district court. View "Village of Memphis v. Frahm" on Justia Law