Justia Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

SourceGas Distribution, LLC owned property located in an area that had been annexed by the City of Hastings. The City, on behalf of the board of public works, filed a petition in the county court under the general condemnation procedures found at Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-101 through 76-726, seeking to initiate condemnation proceedings against the property owned by SourceGas. In an effort to enjoin the county court proceedings, SourceGas Distribution filed a complaint in the district court for temporary and permanent injunction, primarily alleging that the City must utilize Nebraska’s Municipal Gas System Condemnation Act (the Act) rather than the procedures in chapter 76. The district court overruled the motion for temporary injunction and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 19-4626(2) exempted the City from being required to proceed under the Act and that the City could utilize chapter 76’s general condemnation procedures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that, pursuant to the exception set forth in section 19-4626(2), the Act does not apply in this case and, instead, the general condemnation procedures of chapter 76 apply. View "SourceGas Distrib., LLC v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

The owners (Owners) of certain property in the Village of Memphis filed with the county judge an inverse condemnation petition against the Village and sought compensation for an unlawful taking, alleging that the Village deprived them of their property by maintaining a well, a buried powerline, and water pipes on their property without an easement. An appraiser awarded damages to the Owners. The Village appealed. Thereafter, the parties entered into a settlement agreement as to compensation to be paid to the Owners. The Owners subsequently moved for attorney fees and expenses under Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720, which mandates that a property owner be allowed attorney fees if a public entity initiates condemnation proceedings without negotiating in good faith with the owner. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the Village did not fail to engage in good faith negotiations with the Owners. The Supreme Court affirmed because the record demonstrated that the Village engaged in good faith negotiations to settle with the Owners after the Village appealed to the district court. View "Village of Memphis v. Frahm" on Justia Law

Mike and Becky Carey applied for a building permit for an interior renovation of an apartment building. A municipal building inspector denied the application because the construction documents were not prepared by a registered design professional. The city's appeals board denied the Careys' appeal. The district court overruled the appeals board and ordered that the Careys be issued a building permit without the requirement that they retain a licensed architect, concluding (1) the appeals board did not act within its jurisdiction, and (2) the renovation fell into one of the exemptions to the Engineers and Architects Regulation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appeals board acted within its jurisdiction and that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the proposed renovation failed to qualify for statutory and regulatory exemptions to the Act. View "Carey v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

The County Board of Equalization determined that land owned by Ladd Krings was not agricultural or horticultural land. On appeal, the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) upheld the Board's decision but further concluded that the value of Krings' property should be equalized with the value of agricultural and horticultural land. Determining that the assessor's assessments of agricultural and horticultural land to be impermissibly low, TERC subsequently equalized Krings' property by reducing its assessed value. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of TERC's order determining that Krings' land was nonagricultural and nonhoricultural; but (2) reversed the portion of the order in which TERC equalized the value of Krings' nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the county, as this decision did not conform to the law. Remanded. View "Krings v. Garfield County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

In 1996, the district court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff child support. In 2006, the court issued a writ of execution against Defendant's unspecified property to satisfy the child support lien. However, Defendant had conveyed the property to his girlfriend by quitclaim deed. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a second praecipe for an execution on Defendant's property, seeking an execution sale of the property that Defendant had previously owned and alleging that when the quitclaim conveyances were made, the property was subject to her lien. The court ordered the sheriff to execute on the property, and the sheriff sold the property to Plaintiff. John McWilliams challenged the sale, alleging that when the court issued the writ of execution, he was the record owner, and therefore, the court could not order the sheriff to conduct the execution sale because the property was not titled in Defendant's name. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order confirming the sale, holding that the court lacked authority to order the sheriff to levy the writ on property in which Defendant, the judgment debtor, no longer had an interest, absent any finding that Defendant's transfer of the property was fraudulent. Remanded. View "Fox v . Whitbeck" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the surface owner of land in Sioux County. Plaintiff sued the owners of severed mineral interests in that land under Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes to reacquire their allegedly abandoned interests. Mineral interests are deemed abandoned unless the "record owner" has taken certain steps to publicly exercise his ownership rights during the twenty-three years preceding the surface owner's suit. This appeal involved one defendant (Defendant), who asserted that she was the "record owner" of the mineral interests through the will of Decedent. The register of deeds still listed Decedent as the owner of the disputed mineral interests. The district court vested title to the disputed mineral interests in Plaintiff, concluding that Defendant was not a "record owner" of the mineral interests because the term "record owner" under the dormant mineral statutes meant only the person listed in the register of deeds in the county where the property was located. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, for the reasons set forth in Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, the "record owner" of mineral interests includes an individual identified by probate records in the county where the interests are located. View "WTJ Skavdahl Land LLC v. Elliott " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the surface owner of various tracts of land. Plaintiff sued the owners of several mineral interests in those tracts under Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes to reacquire their allegedly abandoned interests. Mineral interests are deemed abandoned unless the "record owner" has taken certain steps to publicly exercise her ownership rights during the twenty-three years preceding the surface owner's suit. This appeal involved two Defendants. The district court vested title to the disputed mineral interests in Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the "record owner" of mineral interests includes an individual identified by probate records in the county where the interests are located and need not be determined only from the register of deeds in the county where the interests are located; and (2) an amended complaint that adds, rather than changes, a new party defendant does not relate back to the original complaint. View "Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler" on Justia Law

Defendants gave a promissory note to Bank and secured a loan with a trust deed on real property. Defendants defaulted on the note, and Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. The property was sold after a sheriff's sale. Bank subsequently filed a complaint to recover the deficiency. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that because Bank filed its complaint ninety-nine days after the sheriff's sale, the action was barred by the three-month statute of limitations in Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-1013. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the special three-month statute of limitations on actions for deficiency set forth in the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act applies where a lender elects to judicially foreclose upon the real estate, but the special limitation applies only where the property has been sold by exercising the power of sale set forth in the trust deed; and (2) because the judicial foreclosure of the trust deed in this case did not result in the sale of property under a trust deed, it did not fall under the statutory language in section 76-1013, and the deficiency action was governed by the general statute of limitations for actions on written contracts. Remanded. View "First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Davey" on Justia Law

Lender made loans to Borrower that were secured by deeds of trust describing real estate owned by Borrower. As additional security for the loans to Borrower, Guarantor promised payment of the indebtedness on the promissory notes. Borrower subsequently defaulted, and Lender sought payment of the indebtedness from Guarantor. Guarantor moved to amend his answer to assert he was not liable to Lender because Lender was barred by section 76-1013 of the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act (Act) from pursuing a deficiency action against Borrower. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lender. At issue on appeal was whether a guaranty of a promissory note secured by a deed of trust is subject to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Guarantor's guaranty was not subject to the Act, and under the terms of the guaranty, Guarantor was liable for the total amount of Borrower's debt, less the trustee's sale price. View "Mut. of Omaha Bank v. Murante" on Justia Law